THE FUTURE OF
NATO’S ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE
PROF. DR. FIRUZ DEMIR YASAMIS
DIRECTOR OF
RESEARCH AND ADVANCEMENT
AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY IN THE EMIRATES
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
PRESENTED IN
ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE POLICY
ADVISORY GROUP (ICI PAG) MEETING
GRAND TARABYA
HOTEL
16-18 NOVEMBER 2014
ISTANBUL, TURKEY
(90) (532) 3619156
(971) (56) 2744538
(971) (4) 4499554
Introduction
1. This paper aims to forecast the
future of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) established in 2004 to set up a
framework for the relations between NATO and some Arabic Gulf countries namely
the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Oman and Saudi Arabia has the observer
status they did not signed the document yet. The intended relations, although
not specifically spelled out in writing, covers the areas of security in the
Gulf Region in other words Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
2. At the first instance, such a
political and military alliance makes sense since the region is oil rich and
energy security is a major security concern for most NATO members. On the other
hand, secure and safe out flow of oil to the World markets is crucial for the
ICI and GCC countries.
3. The fate of the alliance,
realistically speaking, will depend on the success to be achieved on the above
stated expectations of the parties. If the expectations are met the Alliance
will go ahead and be further enhanced, deepened and solidified. On the
contrary, the established system will die down in time. The main expectation
for NATO is to help regional security in terms of military training as foreseen
in the ICI document, whereas, the main expectation of the ICI countries is the security
guarantee offered by NATO to the countries in the region. The partner
countries’ top request is the security from external regional
threats. On the other hand, all NATO is offering in the security field is “military exercises and related education and
training” as stated in Istanbul Cooperation Initiative document. NATO does
not have more to offer for regional security.
4. However, the forecasting the future
of the ICI is not that simple. The regional issues are too complex and varied
thus making to reach a dependable forecast is almost impossible. This paper
will try to examine the issues and factors involved and, if possible, will make
policy proposals.
Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Future of ICI
5. There is a drastic improvement for
the security concept developed since the end of the World War 2. The security concepts such as "balance of power" and deterrence
representing realist outlook and “collective security", “arms control”,
"peaceful coexistence", “non alignment”, “neutrality”, “equal
security” and “common security” representing liberal outlooks to the security
issues. All these concepts were somehow successful to prevent the emergence of
a new World War which will definitely mean the end of human kind on this Globe.
The stockpiles of nuclear arsenal are more than enough to destroy everything that
we have on this Globe.
6. Although
they were successful in the past, these concepts are now found to be not satisfactory
to deal with the security issues in the World.
7. Firstly,
the security threats are not only military nature in our own today. There are
new threats to the humanity which are not less significant than any military
threat such as: Poverty, ecological and environmental catastrophes, national
economic insecurity and instability, corruption and bribery, infectious diseases
and environmental degradation, war and violence within States, the spread and
possible use of radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism,
transnational organized crime, human trafficking, child trafficking, woman
trafficking, drug trafficking, food and water security, cyber security and
energy security. Therefore, security issues should not confined only to the
military threats but should also cover threats mentioned above.
8. Secondly,
even for the military threats a new concept is developed by NATO: The
Cooperative Security Concept. This new approach attaches an accelerated
priority to the partnership responsibilities requesting more active and
functional solutions to the threats against overall security and humanity.
Basing upon more constructive dialogue among the partners, the new concepts
urges member countries to develop more and better relations with the partners
of the NATO in a smart manner since financial possibilities are not abundant
anymore.
9. NATO
foreign ministers have established a different “partnership policy” with
non-member countries in April 2011 in Berlin which bases upon the decisions
accepted in the Lisbon Summit in
addition to the policies pursued since 90s such as “Partnership for
Peace” (PfP), “Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council” (EAPC), “the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)”, and “the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI).
10. Within this framework there are
several positive factors for NATO to contribute to the enhancement of
cooperative security concept. First of NATO has deep interest in the regional
matters particularly for the Gulf Region. Secondly, NATO is expanding its
mission to the region with a desire for a better cooperation with the regional
actors with a well established military power, political and organizational
structure. “NATO’s training mission in IRAQ”, “ISAF Program” in Afghanistan, “the
Mediterranean (MD) Dialogue” and “the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI), “Partnership
for Peace (PfP) Program”, “the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee”, “Individual
Partnership and Cooperation” approach, “Tailored Cooperation Packages” and
several others are the examples in this regard.
11. The problems of the Gulf Region cannot
be isolated from the problems of the Middle East. The region is producing two
third of the oil produced in the World. Therefore, the Region is the essential
source of energy for the World economy and particularly important for those
countries that is oil dependent thus causing various type of players of the
energy game has special interest in the Region.
Players of the game are mainly state actors in the region and outside
the region having major interest in the region and non state actors such as al
Qaeda, DAESH and other terrorist organizations aspiring a wide range of
political ambitions ranging from re-establishment of the Caliphate, to toppling
down of the governments in power to the establishment of a new religious state
based upon Islamic Shariah principles.
12. NATO has basic deficiencies as well.
Firstly, NATO is based upon regular armies and conventional military
principles. Other actors in the region are using asymmetric warfare strategies
and tactics. Another main deficiency of NATO is the strong relations between
the USA and Israel whereas the partner countries have serious differences of
interest and opinion in regional security issues thus creating a lack of trust
between the NATO and partner countries in the ICI Program.
13. However, such a situation may lead
to new roles for the European members of NATO. For instance and Turkey could
have played a major role in this regard. This role seems do not exist at the
moment because of pro-Ikhvan (Muslim Brotherhood) policy of the Turkish
Government. Turkey’s backing for Mursi in Egypt has seriously curtailed the
potential role of Turkey in the Region.
14. There are several deficiencies for
the ICI countries as well. Especially, the differences in the national security
priorities of partner countries reflecting it into differences in foreign
policies thus hampering further cooperation among the partners. The support and
refuge provided by some partner countries to Ikhvan officials and military and
economic aid to DAESH type terrorist organizations through either formal or
non-formal channels have become major source of concerns for the partner
countries causing lack of trust among the partners. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE have recalled their ambassadors from Qatar. Further negotiation to
straighten the relations is not progressing effectively at the moment. Proposed
and agreed meetings are being postponed or cancelled at the last minutes.
Therefore, it would not be mistaken to state that mutual confidence and trust
are severely hampered in the region presently.
15. Iran, which is not a member in the
ICI, also is a major player in the region and is a very crucial factor for the assessment
of the fate of the ICI. Iran is a Shia based country. On the other hand, the
ICI or rather GCC countries are mainly Sunni societies with the exception of
Bahrain. Therefore, the relations between Iran and Arabic monarchies in the
region are not promising for the future. Iran has strong interest in Bahrain
where the majority Shia population is governed by a minority Sunni government.
In Syria where the majority of population is Sunni and governed by Esad family
who is Alawite a section of Shia sect therefore preferred and supported by Iran
whereas Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE are against the Esad regime in Syria.
Furthermore, the Iran’s tendency to develop nuclear armament and long range
missiles are seen as a serious threat not only by Israel but also by Gulf
Countries. In addition to these potential security threats, the cyber wars
between USA-Israel and Iran and then between Iran and Saudi Arabia are the real
examples of animosities among the countries in the region.
16. Impact of Muslim Brotherhood in the
region also contributes considerably to the complexities of relations in the
region. The aims of the Ikhvan movement’s are not secret for the countries in
the region: to gain political control in Muslim countries by redesigning the
political power structure. This objective seemed to be detrimental for the
national security of the countries in the region. The Ikhvan Movement is
forbidden and people supporting the Movement have been jailed. Claiming that
Qatar is supporting Ikhvan Movement by allowing Qaradawi, the leading cleric,
and supporters to operate in Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain suspended
their political cooperation with Qatar and re-called their ambassador to lower
the level of diplomatic relations. Recently, Qatar has expelled some Ikhvan
leaders but not Qaradawi who is from Egypt but is a Qatari national living in
Qatar for long years. This basic issue is one of the most important factors in
creating mutual distrust among the ICI partner countries.
17. The impact of DAESH has been great
in the regional security concerns. Sudden and quick appearance of DAESH and the
size of area in Iraq and Syria controlled by DAESH have shocked most of the
countries in the region. The whole political and military picture and existing
balances have changed. The DAESH is trying to create a new State covering the
territories of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The new State will be governed
on ye Shariah basis under the leadership of the re-instituted Caliph. The DAESH
case has materialized the potential security dangers by a vivid example. The
governments in the region are at further stake. DAESH is now controlling
considerable amount of territory in Syria and Iraq with a big ambition on
Jordan and then to Lebanon to establish a port on the Mediterranean Sea.
Therefore, not Syria and Iraq but also Jordan and Lebanon is under the threat
of DAESH militants. Turkey is also threatened by DAESH through its sleeping
cells in Turkey. The DAESH success and the lack of any effective western
reaction have created serious question marks about the MD and the ICI thus
complicating the regional security concerns to the maximum extent possible.
18. What is happening in Syria -if not
anything else- is the basic declaration of nullifying the political borders
established in the Middle East by Sykes-Picot Agreement after the First World
War. It seems to be almost impossible to return to the old borders in the
region and only borders will be changed but new states should be expected to be
formed soon. The Kurdish segment of the new states has already established a safe
haven in the Northern Iraq and now is trying to establish other milestones/cornerstones
of the Great Kurdistan to be established over the territories of Iraq, Syria,
Turkey and Iran. The insistence on Kurdish town of Kobani (Ayn al Arab) on the
Turkish border proves this intention. Therefore, new states are being planned
in the Region at the moment. The lack of vision over Syria’s future seems to be
not coincidental but rather intended to allow such a radical transformation in
the Region.
19.
Another
important concern is the lack of vision of partnership on behalf of NATO and
partner countries. For NATO the potential areas/topics of cooperation range
from 200 to 500. However, these areas are not spelt out in the legal documents
of MD and ICI. Therefore the scope of both MD and ICI is not known by NATO and
partner states. Well intentional statements are taking place in the official
documents; however, there is no specific action plan to be performed by both
parties. This lack of vision over the ICI can curtail the development of cooperation
and collaboration among the participating countries and the NATO. Despite these
potential areas of cooperation the concept of security guarantees for partner
countries is not taking place. Recent events in Egypt and Libya (not a member
of MD) are proving that NATO cannot offer a security guarantee for the partner
countries which see such a guarantee as the major expectation from the ICI
accord. However there are positive examples in military cooperation such as UAE
and Qatari planes are attacking against DAESH forces.
20.
Another
significant factor in analyzing the fate of ICI is the leadership competitions
among the local partners. The non-homogenous political structures and economic
conditions in the partner countries are causing the leadership struggles in the
Region. This competition negatively affects the cooperation and cooperation for
regional security.
21.
The
political priorities of the NATO and partner countries are different. The
definition of democracy which is one of main anchorage points for NATO is
creating confusion among the partners which are mainly in monarchic structure
refusing the concept of political parties. Similarly, NATO, in principle, is a
strong advocate of not only democracy, but also for individual liberties
and the rule of law principle. These conceptual differences are creating
obstacles for both sides. On the other hand, the internal stability concerns within the partner
countries are the top priority in their national agenda and come before the
concerns over democracy and individual liberties. The case of Egypt,
Bahrain and Yemen are the examples to be further analyzed in this regard.
22.
Another
restraint is coming from the non-NATO member countries such as Russia, China,
India and Iran. Iran’s case has been explained earlier. Russia is interested in
the region and is playing a decisive role over the Syrian Crisis by supporting
the existing regime. Russia seems to be trying to get her influential position
before the collapse of the Soviet Union by inserting pressures to the regional
security issues. Another player is China which is dependent on oil coming from
the Region. Therefore, for her economic security China perceives herself as the
natural ally of the countries in the region. If given any chance China seems to
be ready to set up political and military institutions with the GCC countries.
Likewise, India has similar intentions over the Region. Rapidly growing economy
of India also seems to be ready to take further active roles in the GCC region.
Therefore, there are players other than NATO in the region which are ready to
take initiative and even risks.
23. I should also take attention to the
insufficient amount of concrete projects and implementations carried out by
NATO in the Region. Despite 500 potential areas of cooperation, so far no
specific project which contributes directly to the enhanced security for the
region has been undertaken by NATO with the exception of ICI Center to be
established in Kuwait and NATO’s Ocean Shield Operation against the pirates in
international waters. However, the number of concrete examples can be increased
with the establishment of a common intelligence organization, working on other
security issues such as eradication of poverty, ecological and environmental
catastrophes (global warming, climate change, sea level rise), national
economic insecurity and instability, corruption and bribery, infectious
diseases and environmental degradation, war and violence within States
(insurgency and non-stability creating acts of subversive groups), the spread
and possible use of radiological, chemical and biological weapons, combating
with terrorism and terrorist organizations, transnational organized crime,
human trafficking, child trafficking, drug trafficking, food and water
security, cyber security and energy security.
24. The recent policies of the European Union
(EU) indicate that the real borders of the EU are not confined to the continent
but go further up to the territories of important sources of production
materials and other markets. These new policies make EU another major role
player in the region. The EU has already opened liaison offices in the capitals
of GCC countries. The major obstacle for EU, despite her common defense and
foreign policy principles, is the strong ties between Israel and some of EU
countries.
25.
The case of Israel should be taken into
consideration for a perfect forecasting. Partner countries are strong backer
and financer of the Palestine which is having war with Israel. The case of
Mescid ul Aksa in Jerusalem is very important for all Muslims and comes second
after Mecca in the hierarchy of Islamic holy places. After the occupation of
the Palestine by Israel, the relations with Arab countries came to a
non-returnable point. Israel is still enlarging its territory against
Palestine. The strong ties between Israel and the USA and some EU countries
will also contribute to the distrust for regional security cooperation.
26.
Another security issue facing most of the
partners in both MD and ICI is the internal threats to the regimes in power. The
Arab Spring has shown these threats to whole World. Beginning in Tunisia, the
flame of wide spread uprising and political change requests has covered Egypt,
Bahrain and Yemen. Governments have been toppled and leaders have been force to
leave the countries seeking refuge in other countries. In these countries,
internal security is totally collapsed. Only in Bahrain, the regime was
successful in staying in the power with the help of the other Sunni government
in the region.
27.
The above given examples have created strong suspicions
in the partner countries about the real aims of NATO, the USA and other Western
countries. Hidden agendas of NATO have been rumored with other conspiracy
theories. All these contributed to the mutual distrust between the NATO and
partner countries. Naturally the mistrust will result in lesser amount of
political cooperation and collaboration for regional security purposes.
28.
It is a known fact that member countries of
NATO may have different priorities and interests regarding to the international
security issues. The relations with the Eastern Europe (newly independent
states of ex-Soviet Commonwealth) countries or with Russia; or relations with
China and other emerging powers of Southeast Asia may have more importance when
compared to the relations with MD and ICI countries for some members. This
affects the fate of the issue or institution in concern simply because NATO
decision making procedure is consensus based in other terms the unanimity is
the way to decide which is highly unlikely to obtain in some cases. Therefore,
issues like MD and ICI might be overlooked by some members thus causing the
ineffectiveness in solution finding activities. For instance, Germany declined
to accept to make military intervention in several Middle East disputes.
29.
The status of the Israel-Turkey relations is
also another factor to be taken into account while forecasting the fate of the
ICI. Israel is a strong supporter of the Alliance whereas some NATO members led
by the USA have already declared their preference for Israel over her Arab
neighbors. However, Turkey’s relations (which has the second biggest army in
the Alliance after the USA) with Israel within this context are severely
curtailed. The Blue Marmara vessel was carrying humanitarian aid to the
Palestinian people who are badly affected by the Israeli embargo was raided by
Israeli commandos and 9 Turkish citizens were killed. Turkey’s preference has
always been with Palestinians while having good military and political
relations with Israel. After the Blue Marmara case the relations were strained
and the level of diplomatic representation is lowered.
Conclusion and Suggestions
30.
As for the conclusion, two different
approaches can be used: pessimist outlook indicating that under the given facts
ICI and particularly MD cannot be successful to meet the expectations of both
sides and optimist outlook indicating that in international relations incremental
approach is the essential mode to develop the relations and having something in
the hand is better than having nothing.
31.
Pessimist outlook is attempted to be
summarized in an article written by Jean-Loup Samaan titled “NATO in the Gulf: Partnership without a Cause?”
Authors says: “Eight years
after NATO initiated its engagement with Gulf countries through the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the results have been modest, not to say
disappointing … Lessons from its eight years of existence show that the issue
at stake is not the purpose of the partnership but rather its methodology”.
32.
However, it should be underlined that ICI and
particularly MD does not have clearly spelt out vision, mission and performance
indicators. These factors are extremely important to assess the future
developments. Therefore, it is suggested that a concrete set of action program
along with performance objectives and criteria should be developed jointly with
the NATO and partner countries.
33.
There is mistrust among the peoples of the
partner countries causing lack of popular support for the cooperation. Public
diplomacy can play an important role in informing the public at large on the
main characteristics of the partnership program.
34.
NATO, in general, is based of western
political thoughts and principles such as democracy, secularism, human rights
and rule of law. On the other hand, the partner countries are monarchic in
nature and based upon Islamic Shariah principles. Therefore, a scientific study
should be developed to consolidate the western political ideals with the
eastern ones. It should be openly declared that security issues are beyond the political
regime types and NATO can easily cooperate with the countries based upon
Islamic principles. This will help to diminish the deep rooted mistrust between
the parties.
35.
Optimist outlook finds the developments as
encouraging although not perfect. Basing upon the existing framework a better
solution can be found. Optimists believe that smart solutions developed by the
NATO are mainly due to the shortage of financial resources. In the Gulf case
the financing the regional security is possible due to the richness of the
countries involved. Leaving the financial aspects aside, new models of
cooperation can be developed.
36.
About a year ago a Conference has been
organized by the American University in the Emirates and NATO in Dubai titled
as “NATO’s Approach to Gulf Cooperation: Lessons Learned and Future
Challenges”. The e-book with the same
title will be published soon by the Emirates Center for Security and Strategic
Studies including the papers submitted to the Conference. As indicated in the
Conclusion part of the upcoming book a consensus has been achieved in the
Conference on the following principles:
a)
“Clear progress has already been achieved
through the ICI, both in the political dialogue with Gulf countries and in
practical dimensions with ICI partners. NATO has increased its offer of
cooperation to ICI countries each year since the launch of the initiative in
2004, and with the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM)
for all of NATO’s partners, it has considerably expanded the number of
activities accessible to ICI countries.
b)
Although it is sometimes unpredictable and
frustrating as an ally, and despite several failures in the past, the USA still
has an abiding commitment to shared values of freedom, democracy, human rights
and security with NATO members and Gulf countries.
c)
In the future, concrete and practical
cooperation projects in areas of interest to the Gulf States should be pursued;
i.e. in nuclear security, energy security, maritime security and piracy, and
cyber security. This will align NATO’s ICI partnership with the security needs
of Gulf States, and will bring benefits to both sides. There should be more
formal and regular contacts in this regard in the future.
d)
Economic, financial and budgetary crises are
affecting the defense priorities of the USA, which necessarily affect NATO
priorities in turn (such as the size and orientation of the US Army, and
placing more emphasis on the Middle East and Asia Pacific regions). This does
not mean that the United States will lose interest in Europe, but the Middle
East and the Gulf will remain important US priorities. The outbreak of the Arab Spring has already
pressure on US policy towards the region, and cooperation will continue to be
framed by the Arab-Israeli dispute and the nuclear issue with Tehran.
Additionally, the Syrian case will play an important role in the policies of
the US toward the Middle East.
e)
There are reservations
among the leaders of the Gulf countries concerning the role of NATO in the
region. These countries like to see that the NATO and the USA be ready to take
more responsibilities for the defense of the Region, not only to the threats such as anti-ballistic missiles and
nuclear and cyber wars but also to regional security threats such as energy
security, piracy in high seas, and maritime security. Dealing with these kinds
of challenges to regional security seems to be beyond the capacities of the
states taking place in the Gulf Region.
f)
NATO should develop a
more concrete strategic vision for the security of the Gulf commensurate with
the importance of the region, especially to energy security. Partnership must
be reciprocal, comprehensive and not unilateral. NATO should not view its regional
partners as potential financers, whilst at the same time the ICI/GCC countries
should not expect all the major sacrifices and responsibilities to be
shouldered by the Alliance alone.
g)
Cooperation and
collaboration between the ICI and GCC countries and NATO in future should be
based upon the principles of collective security and cost- and burden-sharing.
h)
As agreed at the Chicago Summit in 2012 by the
Heads of States and Governments, and clearly stated at the Lisbon Summit, the
vitally important energy security component of NATO’s policies and activities
require further deliberation and elaboration.
i)
NATO activities must not be perceived as being
intrusive, and the Alliance mustn’t be seen as seeking to take advantage of the
current phase of domestic changes taking place in a number of countries in the
Middle East. Such misperceptions could backfire and undermine many years of
work undertaken jointly by NATO and the ICI countries to correct such
misperceptions, build mutual understanding and trust, and thereby contribute to
long-term regional security and stability.
j)
NATO should give
priority to public diplomacy to eliminate misperceptions and conspiracy
theories in the region. Gulf public opinion
must be better-informed concerning NATO policies toward the region. There is a need to continue
building trust and to maintain a dialogue-based public diplomacy strategy
alongside NATO’s cooperative activities with ICI countries. NATO and the US have
lost credibility and trust among some groups in the Middle East—especially as a
result of previous administrations’ unilateral actions. This can feed
conspiracy theories and perceptions of a “hidden agenda.” However, public
diplomacy can play a very effective role in combating such views.”
37. This
paper aimed at forecasting the future of the ICI. Theoretically speaking, the
answer to be given to the question is dependent upon the strategies used in the
game by the parties involved. The available strategies are: maximax principle,
maximin principle, minimax principle, zero sum principle, win-win strategy and
randomization principle.
38. The “maximax principle” aims
at achieving the best of the best possible outcomes. The “maximin principle” is
designed for pessimist players; instead of expecting the best of best the
player aims at the best of the worst possible outcomes which can also be called
as the “opportunity cost” to minimize the regret at the end. Some players may
choose the “zero-sum game” (win-lose) strategy which produces no value added at
the end of the game. However, it is possible to change the zero game strategy
into win-win strategy allowing each player to benefit from the game. However,
in most of the cases the randomization strategy is chosen by the players. No
clearly defined strategy exists for the players.
39.
To
me, it looks like the last strategy of randomization is being used by the
parties involved meaning that there is no clear strategy (or, methodology)
used.
40.
If I am asked which option I would vote for,
my answer would be: “I am an optimist”.
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