NATO’s Approach to Gulf Cooperation
Lessons Learned and Future
Challenges
Prof. D. Firuz Demir Yasamis
(Ed.)
Published with the assistance
and cooperation of:
Contents
Abbreviations
and Acronyms xxx
Foreword xxxx
Muthanna G. Abdul Razzaq
Message from NATO xxxx
Nicola de Santis
Introduction: NATO and Gulf
Cooperation 3
Firuz Demir Yaşamış
Keynote Address 3
H.E. Kurt Volker
1 NATO’s
Role in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf 000
F. Stephen Larrabee
2 Gulf
Security, NATO and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 000
Cuneyt Yenigun
3 Reinforcing
Security between the GCC States and NATO: Propositions and Obstacles 000
Ashraf
Mohammed Kishk
4 A
Statement on Energy Security 000
H.E.
Amb. Şefik Vural Altay
5 NATO
and Gulf Regional Security Cooperation 000
Rolf
Schwarz
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 000
Contributors 000
Notes 000
Bibliography 000
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ANZUS |
Australia, New Zealand,
United States Security Treaty |
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ARF |
ASEAN Regional Forum |
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ASEAN |
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations |
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AU |
African Union |
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AUE |
American University in
the Emirates |
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AWACS |
Airborne Warning and
Control System |
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BRICS |
Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa |
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CAOC |
Combined Air Operations
Center |
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CARICOM |
Caribbean Community |
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CAS |
close air support |
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CENTO |
Central Eastern Treaty
Organization |
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CFSP |
Common Foreign and
Security Policy |
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CIS |
Commonwealth of
Independent States |
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COMEDS |
Committee of the Chiefs
of Military Medical Services |
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CSCE |
Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe |
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ECOWAS |
Economic Community of
West African States |
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ESDP |
European Security and
Defense Policy |
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GCC |
Gulf Cooperation Council |
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GDP |
Gross Domestic Product |
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IAEA |
International Atomic
Energy Agency |
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ICI |
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative |
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IFOR |
(Dayton Agreement)
Implementation Force |
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IGAD |
Intergovernmental
Authority on Development |
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IMF |
International Monetary
Fund |
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IPCP |
Individual Partnership
Cooperation Program |
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ISAF |
International Security
Assistance Force |
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ISR |
Intelllgence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
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LAS MD |
League of Arab States Mediterrenean Dialog |
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NATO |
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization |
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NDC |
NATO Defense College |
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NRC |
NATO–Russian Council |
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NTCI |
NATO Training
Cooperation Initiative |
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OAS |
Organization of American
States |
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OAU |
Organization of African
Unity |
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OSCE |
Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe |
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OUP |
Operation Unified
Protector |
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PCM |
Partnership Cooperation
Menu |
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PGM |
Precision Guided Munitions |
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PSF |
Peninsula Shield Force |
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SADC |
Southern African
Development Community |
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SCO |
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization |
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SEATO |
Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization |
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SFOR |
Stabilization Force |
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SOFA |
Status of Forces
Agreement |
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TFE |
Task Force Endeavour |
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UNGA |
UN General Assembly |
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UNMIK |
UN Mission in Kosovo |
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UNSCR |
UN Security Council
Resolution |
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WMD |
Weapons of Mass Destruction |
Foreword
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T |
he American University in the Emirates is
proud to collaborate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in offering a
unique conference opportunity that affords regional dignitaries and security
experts a space in which to disseminate regional security-relevant information,
and to discuss key issues of interest to all participants.
Both NATO and AUE believe in the power of frank
communication between the diverse communities of the Gulf region to achieve progress
on matters that are central to our mid- and long-term security concerns.
This conference exemplifies the manner in which
AUE promotes a global approach to the education of its students, encouraging
them to contribute more effectively to national and regional development,
growth and security. Both undergraduate and graduate students of the University
have been welcomed to this conference to see and hear experts and practitioners
in security and strategic studies present on a variety of topics addressing
strategies intended to promote regional cooperation with the goal of maintaining
a peaceful environment in the Gulf, representing a new field for undergraduate,
Master’s and eventually doctoral studies at AUE.
Prof. Muthanna G. Abdul Razzaq
President and CEO, American University in the Emirates
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O |
n behalf of NATO’s Political Affairs and
Security Policy Division, it gives me great pleasure to welcome all
participants to this international conference in Dubai, which we have
co-organized with the American University in the Emirates as part of NATO’s
public diplomacy activities with the countries invited to the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative.
Public
Diplomacy for an organization such as NATO involves initiating, sustaining and
maintaining over time a process of mutual understanding. This requires a two-way
dialogue with opinion-formers, academics, media and a variety of civil society
representatives through which we seek to understand each other better. Public diplomacy
is therefore much more than public information; it is less about winning
arguments and more about engagement.
Public
opinion exists in a specific environment and it is not possible to understand
its trends unless there is a clear appreciation of the political, social and
cultural issues affecting the lives of the people involved.
Public diplomacy
is therefore not merely about communicating messages but also building
relationships—understanding the specific needs of other countries, cultures and
people, while at the same time promoting a better mutual understanding and
identifying common goals.
NATO’s
post-Cold War transformation has led to the establishment of a wide network of
partnerships with countries and organizations around the globe. In particular,
NATO has developed closer political relationships and security cooperation with
countries in the Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
This marks a shift in alliance priorities towards greater involvement in this
strategically important region of the world, the security and stability of
which is important to NATO, and vice versa.
NATO’s
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative forms the bedrock of its relations with the
countries of the region, and is open to interested countries in the broader
Middle East region, starting with – but not limited to – the individual members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
It seeks
to enhance security and regional stability through cooperative engagement with
the countries of the region to address common security challenges, in a way
that responds to the specific needs of the countries involved.
In 2012,
at NATO’s Summit in Chicago, NATO’s Heads of State and Government reaffirmed
their commitment to strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation through
the ICI and their openness to receiving new members in the Initiative,
including Saudi Arabia and Oman. They also warmly welcomed the generous offer
by the State of Kuwait to host an ICI Regional Centre, which will help us to
better understand common security challenges and discuss how to address them
together.
NATO and
Gulf countries face common security threats: terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and instabilities emanating from failing and
failed states; but we also share a common aspiration for a world that is more
secure, stable, and at peace.
Through
our discussions during this conference I look forward to developing new ideas
that will enable us, through appropriate follow up, to further enhance our
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partnership with the countries from this
important region of the world.
Nicola de Santis
Head, Middle East and North Africa Section,
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division,
NATO Headquarters
NATO
and Gulf
Cooperation
A
significant result of the Second World War was the division of the world into
two different spheres of interest. Germany, Italy and Japan were the losers of
the war; the USA, Britain and the USSR were the victors. The Allied powers,
however, comprised a mixture of incompatible ideologies—the USA and Britain
represented the world’s richest liberal capitalist democracies, whereas the
USSR was the ultimate embodiment of socialist ideology. Soon after the defeat
of the Axis powers the whole world was divided into three areas of influence:
the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc and the nonaligned countries. The Western
block comprises the USA, Canada and western European countries, later to be
joined by Greece and Turkey. The Eastern bloc, led by the USSR, included the
eastern European countries and several states in Central Asia. Each bloc was
based upon very different, competing political ideologies.
These countries all shared one common problem:
how to establish and maintain a global, sustainable peace. The Western and Eastern
blocks’ reply was simple and straight forward: global peace and stability would
be maintained via collective security, deterrence and the balance of power. This
would ultimately result in the leading countries of the world working toward
realizing two distinct objectives: take institutional remedies (such as the United
Nations (UN) to replace the League of Nations, the World Bank (WB), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organization (ITO)) while
strengthening the military capabilities including the nuclear technology and
armament by the establishment of the NATO.
Both sides spent a huge of amount of money on arms and several
institutions have been established. [Editor1] The UN and other related
international organizations such as the IMF and the WB had important roles to
play in alleviating the desperate conditions in the aftermath of war and in
restructuring a devastated Europe.
However, civilian institutions alone were not sufficient
in securing peace and preventing a global conflict that could wipe out humanity.
Therefore, new military alliances were formed: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
The 1980s were significant years in the
contemporary political development of the world. The USSR began to signal its
realization of the need to reform the Communist system; Gorbachev’s glasnost
(transparency) and perestroika (re-structuring) policies embodied this pressing
need, and were closely followed by calls for independence in various members of
the Soviet Union, almost all of which have since been recognized by the world
as sovereign members of the international community. The turning point in this
process was the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the re-unification of
Germany. Naturally, the collapse of the soviet system also meant the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON—the accompanying economic union.
The bi-polar political system was thus transformed
into a unipolar system, with the USA and its allies assuming control of the world’s
political and economic governance. As a result, NATO’s overall mission as a
military organization began to be questioned. What would be the new raison d’être
for the organization? Should it be dismantled? Or should it be directed towards
new mission mandated by new visions and global realities?
The other pressing factor related to Europe. Today’s
European Union can trace its heritage to the European Coal and Steel Community and
later the European Economic Community, born consecutively in the 1950s before
the establishment of the EU in the early 1990s, now a ‘political federation’ or
symbol of ‘European federalism.’ The EU has been very successful in bringing integration,
as well as political and economic power to the whole continent. However, there have
been significant calls for the military integration of the European countries
under a European Army, which might replace NATO.
Other pressing post-Cold War concerns included the
lack of an international organization to apply international sanctions decided
by the UN Security Council on those countries transgressing the principles of
the UN Charter. In the case of Rwanda in particular, and other non-humanitarian
wars and struggles among nations or among the tribes and clans of a single country,
have resulted in human catastrophes, with millions of innocent people either
dying or being forced to migrate. Failed states such as Afghanistan, Iraq,
Syria and Haiti have also contributed to the need for an international military
organization that may pursue crimes against humanity such as genocide and mass
killings. Events in central Europe – namely in Kosovo and Bosnia–Herzegovina –
have only strengthened this need.
The concept of security has evolved
considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and is no longer limited
to its traditional political and military meanings, today encompassing
technological, ecological and environmental aspects. Security is not just about
defending against military threats; people are now faced with so many other
threats, the consequences of which are in many ways similar to those of
military conflict. Human trafficking, drug and narcotics trafficking,
environmental and ecological disasters, food insecurity, water insecurity,
energy insecurity, and piracy on the high seas are but some examples.
The concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and
‘the right to protect’ (R2P) are also forcing contextual and conceptual changes
in the classic notion of sovereignty. The modern world is now beginning to
declare that crimes against humanity cannot be tolerated, even if they take
place within the boundaries of a sovereign state. The UN Security Council, based
on a number of clauses of the UN Charter, has adopted several resolutions
encouraging and legitimizing these two concepts. Rwanda was an ‘eye-opener’
case, which can also be said of South Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and the Central
African Republic.
More important than these factors, however, is
the changing center of power in the World, which is shifting from West to East.
The West, mainly the USA and Europe, throughout the recent history of human
kind has maintained the global center of power, representing the biggest share
of global economic wealth. With the economic rise of China and other so-called ‘Asian
tigers,’ this center is now shifting toward the East, and specifically to
China. As
of year 2010, China has become the largest economy in the World surpassing the
USA. [Editor2] By the 2030s, China is
expected to be the richest economy [Editor3] in the World although per
capita income will be seriously lower than the West. This remarkable global
economic and trade transformation will have numerous political and military
repercussions for international relations. All the major powers have begun to
readjust their security and economic strategies accordingly. Taking into
consideration the size of markets in China and India, the western states are
now having
negotiations on how to merge their economies to compete with the eastern
markets. The proposed EU–USA common market is a kind of answer to these
expectations. [Editor4] In addition, the other BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) with their rising
growth rates, will likely seek more effective international decision making
powers. Indeed, Korea and Turkey should also be added to the list of BRICS
countries.
All these factors indicate that the world is in
the process of a radical transformation. International politics and relations
after the collapse of the Berlin Wall are very different to those of the
preceding period; today’s international relations are also very different to
those of the 1990s, and there is no doubt that they will be very different in
the 2030s to their current state today.
However, will all these transformations lead to
political stability or rather to greater instability in the world? International
security concepts, strategies and institutions will need to be re-aligned with
these new tendencies and transformations, and this will necessarily include
both the UN and NATO.
Let us now turn to the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) area and its six member states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
Oman, and the UAE). This region faces several security issues. First of all,
the GCC Region is an oil rich region, possessing one third of global oil
reserves and accounting for one fifth of total global oil production. Saudi
Arabia is the reserve leader, followed by the UAE and Kuwait. Almost 70% of the
region’s export income is from oil; consequently the continuity of the wealth
derived from oil ultimately depends upon the safety and security of international
transport (pipelines, sea and land) routes. Since the GCC countries are rather
small in terms of their populations and armed forces, the security of these
routes is extremely important. Oil dependent Western countries need the same
security and sustainability of oil supply. The EU has a new strategy which
proclaims that EU borders are not in the continent anymore, but reach to where
import and export safety is essential, and NATO shares the same view.
In this regard the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI) is an important milestone. NATO recognizes that dealing with
today’s complex new threats requires broad international cooperation and
collective effort. That is why NATO continues to develop a network of
partnerships in the security field. The ICI was preceded by a series of high
level consultations conducted by the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO,
Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, with six countries of the region in May, September,
and December of 2004. These were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates. During these consultations, all of the countries
involved expressed their interest in the Initiative. The ICI was launched at
the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit in Istanbul, on June 28, 2004.
Following the Summit, from September to December 2004, the Deputy Secretary
General of NATO paid a second round of visits to the six GCC states to discuss
the way ahead. In the first three months of 2005, three countries – Bahrain,
Kuwait and Qatar –formally joined the ICI, and in June 2005, the United Arab
Emirates also joined the Initiative.
The ICI has since developed in both its political
and practical dimensions. While the political dialogue has evolved to include
high-level meetings, the practical dimension has been progressively enhanced
through the opening of new partnership tools and activities, as well as through
the contribution of these countries to NATO-led operations. The multilateral
dimension of the partnership has also developed, with the first NAC+4 meeting
held in November 2008, followed by two further such meetings in 2009 and 2010.
Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, an annual
Menu of Practical Activities focusing on agreed priority areas has been opened
to ICI countries and has been gradually enhanced. Whereas in 2007, the offer of
cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu
of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.
The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative
(NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims to complement existing
cooperation activities developed in the ICI framework through the establishment
of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defense College (NDC) in
Rome, which consists of a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on
current security challenges in the Middle East. ICI partners, as well as Saudi
Arabia, actively participate in these courses.
The importance of public diplomacy has been
underlined by ICI nations. High visibility events gave way to informal
discussions on security-related issues of common interest. The ICI
Ambassadorial Conferences in Kuwait (2006), Bahrain (2008) and the United Arab
Emirates (2009), which were attended by the Secretary General, the Deputy
Secretary General and the 28 NATO Permanent Representatives, as well as by
high-ranking officials, policymakers and opinion leaders from ICI countries,
focused on discussing and addressing the perception of NATO in the Gulf, as
well as ways to develop the NATO–ICI partnership in its two dimensions. The
fourth ICI Ambassadorial Conference took place in Qatar in February 2011 and
focused on deepening the NATO–ICI partnership. As Nicola de Santis mentioned in
his statement to the Conference:
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation has led to
the establishment of a wide network of partnerships with countries and
organizations around the globe. In particular, NATO has developed closer
political relationships and security cooperation with countries in the Gulf
region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This marks a shift in
Alliance priorities towards greater involvement in this strategically important
region of the world, whose security and stability matters to NATO and vice
versa.
The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the
Lisbon Summit in November 2010, identifies cooperative security as one of three
core tasks for the Alliance. It refers specifically to the ICI, and states:
We attach great importance to peace and
stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in
the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a deeper security
partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in
the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
With the approval of the new partnership policy
at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011, all NATO
partners have access in principle to the same range and number of activities.
This dramatically expands the number of activities accessible to ICI countries.
ICI partners have also increasingly demonstrated their readiness to participate
in NATO-led operations, acting as security providers. Today, several ICI
partners actively contribute to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Following
the launch of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates promptly provided air assets to the operation and were recognized
as contributing nations, playing a key role in the success of the operation.
NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),
launched at the Alliance’s Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, aims to contribute
to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader
Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO. The ICI
focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in
the security field. The six GCC countries were initially invited to
participate. To date, four of these – Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United
Arab Emirates – have joined. Saudi Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest
in the Initiative. Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the initiative is,
however, open to all interested countries of the broader Middle East region who
subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The ICI is based upon a number of important
principles, including:
·
Non-discrimination: all ICI
partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.
·
Self-differentiation: a
tailored approach to the specific needs of each of the ICI partner countries.
Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs (IPCPs) allow interested ICI
countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more
forward-looking and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the
main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in
accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the ICI.
·
Inclusiveness: all ICI
countries should see themselves as stakeholders of the same cooperative effort.
·
Two-way engagement: the ICI
is a “two-way” partnership, in which NATO seeks partners’ contribution towards
success, through a regular consultation process, placing special emphasis on
practical cooperation.
·
Non imposition: ICI partners
are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance;
NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.
·
Complementarity and mutual
reinforcement: efforts of the ICI and other international institutions for the
region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature.
·
Diversity: the ICI respects
and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts
of the respective partners.
The initiative offers a ‘menu’ of bilateral
activities from which countries can choose, comprising a range of cooperation
areas, including:
·
Tailored advice on defense
transformation, defense budgeting, defense planning, and civil–military
relations.
·
Military-to-military
cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected
military exercises and related education and training activities that could
improve the ability of participating countries’ forces to operate with those of
the Alliance.
·
Cooperation in the fight
against terrorism, including intelligence-sharing measures.
·
Cooperation in the Alliance’s
work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery.
·
Cooperation regarding border
security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons trafficking,
and other forms of illegal trafficking.
·
Civil emergency planning,
including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster
assistance.
The Individual Partnership Cooperation Program
(IPCP) allows interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical
cooperation in a more forward-looking and focused way, enabling countries to
outline the main short- and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the
Alliance.
Following the launch of the ICI, the NATO
countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group,
composed of political counselors from the 28 delegations of member countries to
NATO, which was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee,
which is now responsible for all partnerships.
The Committee is in charge of defining the
procedures for the development of a menu of practical activities with
interested countries and ensuring its successful implementation. It also reports
to the Council or to NATO’s Senior Political Committee and prepares the ground
for the decisions to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on the ICI.
In addition, the Committee engages countries
participating in the Initiative on a ‘28+1’ basis for the development of
individual work plans and follows up on their implementation.
This book comprises six papers that were
presented at the conference entitled, “NATO’s Approach to Gulf Cooperation:
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges,” held on October 21–22, 2013.
The first paper is the keynote speech of Kurt
Volker, ex-permanent representative of the USA at the NATO Council. In his
analysis Mr. Volker presents five observations about the Organization. He
believes that NATO is in one of the deepest crises of its history, and that the
security threats and challenges surrounding NATO are greater than at any time
since 1989. He also states that while partnerships have represented a bright
spot on the NATO agenda in recent years, the nature of partnership has changed.
Mr. Volker also observes that the United States is pulling back from the world,
and not willing to provide clear and strong American leadership at this time. He
asserts that the combined effect of all of these observations is that together,
NATO and the Gulf states face the gravest risks to security that they have
experienced since the Istanbul Initiative was created.
Dr. Cuneyt Yenigun states in his paper that “the GCC became one of
the transformed regional organizations by fortifying its structure with more
dynamic and applicable integrals in the area of security after the Cold War”.
He elaborates;
… the main rhetorical transformation of the GCC’s security was seen
in the Manama Summit in December 2000. The summit cemented the joint defense
responsibilities of the GCC states with the signing of the Mutual Defense Pact.
The treaty created a joint GCC Defense Council and a High Military Committee and
codified what is now the pillar of the GCC’s military doctrine, that the
security of all the members of the council is an “indivisible whole.” The
strategy was the same as the 4th and 5th articles of the
NATO Treaty’s collective security provision(s).
However, Dr. Yenigun mentions that some scholars are critical of
the ICI for “failing to develop any depth, of having no framework document, no
established military forum, low participation in activities (seminars,
workshops), and having no regular ministerial meetings.”
The fourth paper was written and presented by Dr. Ashraf Mohammed
Kishk. Dr. Kishk concentrates on events taking place after 2011. In his paper
Dr. Kishk analyzes three issues: features of growing post-2011 relations
between NATO and the GCC countries, propositions and mechanisms for reinforcing
security, and the obstacles to security maximization between the two parties.
The fifth speaker was Mr. Vural S. Altay, Ambassador of Turkey to
the UAE. Mr. Vural’s main theme is energy security in the GCC region. He
indicates that the energy sector remains the main driving force behind the
economies of the GCC countries. These countries greatly contribute to ensuring
global energy security and consequently the security of energy supply routes
are very important both for all. The last paper is that of Dr. Rolf Schwarz. In
his paper Dr. Schwarz mainly analyzes the conditions prevailing over the ICI
and asks a very important question: What has been achieved so far?
Amb. Kurt Volker
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en
years ago, in 2003, I was working at the National Security Council in the
United States Government, with responsibility for NATO policy issues, having
recently moved there from the office of then NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson.
2003 was an especially significant year—one that
saw the US invasion of Iraq in March, the NATO decision to take over the ISAF
operation in Afghanistan in August, and the early outlines of what later became
known as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
There was no single author to that Initiative;
it was the product of many individuals from many nations, but the thought
process was simple. Even as the United States was engaged in a war in Iraq, and
as NATO forces were fighting to bring stability to Afghanistan, we needed to
look beyond the military conflicts of the day, and instead start planning for
peace and security through cooperation and partnership.
No one – neither within NATO nor outside it –
would want NATO to see the world as merely a theater of operations. Rather,
NATO should see the world principally as a place (with some deadly threats and
challenges, to be sure) inhabited by friends and partners who share the same
values and goals as NATO—people who seek to live in peace, prosperity,
stability, and steadily expanding freedom. Thus was born the Istanbul
Initiative, a hopeful and ambitious outreach aimed at building future
cooperation beyond the conflicts of the day.
The Initiative also fit into a larger paradigm
about how NATO changed after the Cold War. Having existed for 40 years as a
defensive alliance, centered on a divided Europe, with heavy ground forces
deterring the use of force by a heavily armed Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,
NATO began to change as soon as the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.
NATO’s transformation encompassed five critical
areas:
·
The decision to begin playing
a role in crisis management and
peacekeeping, not merely to defend against attacks on NATO territory. Witness
the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan.
·
The development of
partnerships. In 1989, NATO had no partners, but today, it counts dozens of
them, countries in the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and even countries as far away
as Japan and Australia.
·
The inclusion of new European
democracies into an enlarged NATO (and European Union). NATO has grown from 16
members when the Berlin Wall fell, to 28 members today, and that enlargement is
still not complete.
·
The effort to build a new
kind of relationship with Russia, moving from adversarial relations with the
Soviet Union to attempts at partnership and cooperation.
·
The transformation of
military capabilities – from heavy, ground-centric combat forces to lighter,
more deployable, mobile, sustainable, interoperable, multi-national, and
flexible expeditionary forces.
Within the broad framework of the
transformation of NATO, the launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004
was a natural progression; One can look back on these last ten years as having
been largely successful in developing a real partnership between NATO and the
Gulf states, much as had been envisioned at the time.
Now – with all that being said – it is time for
a dose of realism about the world we live in today, in order to think clearly
about what is needed for the future.
Allow me to make a number of observations, and
let me say in advance that I am a passionate believer in democratic values, in
security, in the transatlantic relationship, and in NATO’s partnerships; but we
can only make progress and build a better future, if we are frank and honest
about the situation today.
First, NATO is in one of the deepest crises of its history; of the
five areas of NATO transformation mentioned above, four of them are in decline.
·
NATO is in the process of
shutting down operations, and has no political or public will – let alone
finances – to take on future crisis management operations any time soon.
·
NATO enlargement is stuck,
with no new invitations having been issued for 5 years, and none on the
horizon.
·
NATO–Russia relations are at
rock bottom, with Russia having no real interest in cooperation with NATO.
·
NATO capabilities are being
slashed, with massive cuts to defense budgets in Europe, and now also in the
United States.
Indeed, the only area of the post-1989
transformation still thriving is partnerships. Even this, however, is
bitter-sweet, for as we saw in the Libya operation, some of NATO’s partners
were willing to play a meaningful and indeed decisive role in the operation,
while most NATO Allies were not. This is a sad state of affairs for a great
Alliance.
A second observation is that
the security threats and challenges surrounding NATO are greater than at
anytime since 1989. The Syria conflict rages out
of control and with no end in sight, the Assad regime having killed over
110,000 people and created over 7 million displaced persons and refugees. The
conflict has fueled attacks in Iraq, Turkey, and other neighboring countries. Outside
powers, including Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, are playing a direct role in the
supporting the Assad regime.
The conflict risks spreading, both
geographically to other countries and regions, and also conceptually, as a
larger conflict between Shia and Sunni in the Broader Middle East.
We face an Iran that is far closer to a nuclear
break-out capability than it was in 2003. And
while we have seen a welcome change of tone in Iranian rhetoric, thus far we
have not seen even the hint of a change in policy, which would provide
guarantees that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon. And meanwhile, Iran continues to support Assad, Hezbollah, and
other terrorist groups.
Under President Putin, Russia has again become
an authoritarian state, with levels of pressure on civil society, the media,
and opposition groups not seen since the days of the Soviet Union. Belarus
remains a communist dictatorship in Europe, and democratic progress in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova risks being undermined and reversed.
Moreover, Europe and the United States are
relatively weak economically, due to deficit and debt crises on both sides of
the Atlantic, anemic economic growth unable to lift them out of these crises,
and political gridlock.
A third observation: while partnerships have been the bright spot
on the NATO agenda in recent years, the nature of partnership has changed.
In their initial conception – especially in the
Partnership for Peace – partnerships largely consisted of NATO assisting
partners in security sector development, and those partners contributing to
NATO-led operations. NATO was in the driver’s seat – defining the challenges to
be met, leading the effort, and then working with partners.
In the Libya operation, we saw a different
dynamic: the NATO operation was stagnating, limited only to an air campaign
unable to determine events on the ground. It was the intervention of NATO’s
partners – particularly the UAE and Qatar – that revived momentum and led to
the successful defeat of the Gaddhafi regime.
In this respect, we see a new dimension taking
over, which is perhaps even more significant than the initial phases of NATO partnerships.
Instead of partners assisting NATO, it is now
NATO’s partners that face security challenges in their own regions, and NATO
can be in a position to assist them. Take, for example, the Iranian challenge
in the Gulf region, or the threat to state stability in Africa, which
individual nations such as the UAE or Libya, or organizations such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council or the African Union need to address. NATO can help with
capacity building, and also by acting directly in concert with regional
partners.
A fourth observation: the United States is pulling back from the
world, and not willing to provide clear and strong American leadership at this
time.
The United States withdrew from Iraq
prematurely, allowing sectarian divisions to re-emerge, instability to
increase, and Iran to maximize its influence. We are now in the process of
withdrawing from Afghanistan according to a timetable, rather than
accomplishments on the ground. We chose to “lead from behind” in the Libya
operation, and not even attempt to address the fundamentals of the crisis in
Syria. We speak of a rebalancing away from Europe and the Middle East, pivoting
instead toward Asia.
While these are new policies under the Obama
Administration, one must be clear that they are broadly supported by the
American public at this time, and these policies do not face serious opposition
from a majority of either party in Congress.
While America still has the capability to influence events
decisively, it will take a significant domestic change in the United States for
it to mount the will to do so.
Fifth and finally: the combined effect of all of these preceding
observations is that together, NATO and the Gulf states face the gravest risks
to security that they have experienced since the Istanbul Initiative was
created.
One can never say with any precision exactly
what situation might arise, or when, which would require NATO and the Gulf
States to act in more coordinated fashion to address a real and growing
security threat. Perhaps it will be the Syria crisis itself that escalates
beyond a point which none of us can tolerate any longer.
But I have to believe that such a situation is
in the offing, and if so, then it is important that NATO and the Gulf states
take the practical steps possible today to plan for coordinated policies and actions
in the future. This would include a continuation, and perhaps expansion, of
cooperation in a variety of areas:
·
leadership, diplomatic,
military, and academic/expert exchanges;
·
enhancing military
interoperability and policy coordination mechanisms;
·
planning and exercising;
·
cross-embedding of personnel
in staffs and headquarters; and
·
joint participation in
peacetime security building efforts, such as security sector assistance in
Libya or elsewhere.
None of this suggests any change to the basic
principles underlying the Istanbul Initiative—including self-differentiation,
non-imposition, and two-way engagement. But it does suggest a more robust
agenda of practical forms of cooperation aimed at building the capacity to act
together more closely for contingencies we may not yet foresee, or be prepared
to tackle.
I would also point out that while NATO is the
framework for day-to-day cooperation and development of interoperability, in an
actual crisis, it may not be NATO per se
that attempts to address security challenges in this region.
Rather, it could be individual members of NATO,
together with individual partners in the region, who act in concert. Yet in
doing so, they could draw upon the habits of cooperation and the common
infrastructure built up during preceding years of cooperation in a NATO
framework.
A final word in closing: as an American, I want
to stress that I am well aware that the United States can often be seen as an
unpredictable and frustrating partner. My friend Ana Palacio, a former Foreign
Minister of Spain, once lamented to me when I was at the State Department that “you
make it so hard to be your ally.” But despite all our failings – our budget
fiasco, our ongoing military retrenchment, our mistakes in handling any number
of international issues – at bottom, we are still who we are: a nation
uncompromisingly committed to freedom, democracy, human rights, and security; a
nation that even in a moment of budget cuts has unparalleled reach and capacity
around the world; and a nation that is blessed with the greatest assembly of allies
and partners the world has ever known.
The United States may seem distracted, but we
are not diminished. For our NATO allies and our partners in the Gulf alike, the
United States still has an abiding commitment both to our shared values, and to
our shared security. Should that commitment ever be challenged, I am absolutely
sure we will rise to the occasion.
NATO’s
Role in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf*
|
N |
ATO is at an important strategic crossroads. The Organization was
formed to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe, so with the disappearance of the
Soviet Union, NATO had to adjust to a new and very different security
environment. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, NATO underwent an
important transformation, opening its doors to new members from the former
Warsaw Pact and developing a capacity for power projection.[1]
Today, twenty five years after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, NATO faces a new challenge. Its post-Cold War agenda – German
unification, partnership with Russia and Ukraine, integration of Eastern
Europe, and stabilization of the Balkans – is largely complete.
Most of the threats and risks that the United
States and its European allies face today are not in Europe but emanate from
beyond Europe’s borders. Many of them lie in the Middle East and Arabian Gulf.
There is very little consensus, however, on how
these threats and risks should be managed. Many NATO allies are wary of becoming
entangled in messy protracted conflicts in the Gulf and Middle East.
NATO’s involvement in the Afghanistan conflict
has reinforced this view. Most NATO members sent forces to Afghanistan not
because they felt threatened by developments there, but to show solidarity with
the United States. Many regarded Afghanistan as a type of peacekeeping mission
and were not prepared to engage in counter insurgency operations that exposed
their troops to physical risks and harm.
The Afghan experience left a bitter aftertaste
in the mouths of many European officials and in public opinion; consequently,
in the future it will be difficult to secure domestic support in many NATO
member states for military interventions in countries or regions where there is
no clear exit strategy and where the preconditions for political stability are
very weak or non-existent.
NATO
and Crisis Management in the Middle East
In
the last five years, NATO has been involved in three crises in the Middle East
and North Africa region: Libya, Mali and Syria. It is worth briefly examining
these crises to see what lessons can be drawn from the alliance’s involvement. Is
Libya a “model” for future NATO military operations in the Middle East? What
does it tell us about America’s approach to crisis management in the future?
Libya
The
first and most important lesson was what this conflict said about American
priorities and alliance management. Libya underscored the fact that in the
future the European members of NATO cannot automatically assume that the United
States will take the lead in managing every crisis. President Obama made clear
that the United States was prepared to use its unique military assets in the
initial stages of the conflict but that Washington expected the European
members of the Alliance to take the main responsibility for the conduct of the
military operation thereafter.
This does not mean that the United States will
not get involved in future contingencies beyond Europe’s borders. Rather it
means that Washington will be more selective about when, where and
how it becomes involved in future crises, and that in the future the United
States expects the European members of NATO to take more responsibility for
managing crises in their immediate neighborhood.
The Libyan crisis also highlighted the
importance of obtaining broad political support for operations in the Middle
East. The UN mandate and backing of the Arab League were critically important
in obtaining political support for the air campaign and giving it legitimacy.
Without the UN mandate and support of the Arab League many NATO allies and
partners would have refused to participate in, or lend political support to the
air campaign.
At the same time, the Libyan campaign
exposed a number of operational and planning weaknesses that need to be
addressed. Despite its overwhelming technological and numerical superiority
against a fifth-rate military opponent, the coalition faced shortfalls in
ammunition and weaponry in a number of areas. Many missions could not be
carried out and sustained without significant US military assistance. Without
US Tomahawk cruise missiles, drones, and electronic warfare aircraft to guide
combat missions, the Libya intervention would have been extremely difficult and
might not have succeeded. Thus, the Libyan campaign made clear that in the
future, the European allies need to pay greater attention to capabilities such
as PGMs, surveillance, and refueling aircraft as well as UAVs.
The deployment on the ground of special
operations forces by Britain, France and other nations (especially Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates) was critical to the success of the air campaign.
These forces helped to arm and train the rebel forces and also coordinated
close air support (CAS) as rebel units advanced into Tripoli. In the future,
NATO needs to have training teams at high readiness that can be deployed on the
ground in conflicts and can turn untrained indigenous combatants into an
effective fighting force.
Cooperation with the Gulf states was quite
extensive. The UAE and Qatar participated directly in the air strikes on Gaddafi’s
forces. The GCC also pressed for the establishment of a no-fly zone similar to that
established over northern Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion. While the
request was not accepted, it underscores the lengths to which the Gulf states
were willing to go to cooperate with NATO and suggests that there is broad
scope for future cooperation.
Finally, the Libyan campaign highlighted the
importance of continued engagement and follow-through in the post-combat stage.
The lack of political–economic engagement and follow-through in the post-combat
stage by NATO and the EU – particularly the latter – has put at risk Libya’s
current energy capacity and its prospects for a stable political transition.
Mali
Libya
was an organized NATO military operation. By contrast, Mali was a unilateral French operation with allied support.
The US provided military support in three areas – air refueling, ISR, airlift –
but France assumed operational responsibility for the mission,
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Mali
crisis related to French attitudes and policy. Mali made clear that France is
prepared and willing to use force and project military power in pursuit of its
national interests and regional security. There is a strong
bipartisan consensus in France in support of the use of force in North Africa,
which is regarded as a region of national strategic concern. This strong
bipartisan consensus enabled France to intervene rapidly and effectively in
Mali and contrasts markedly with the growing uncertainty in other countries in
the alliance regarding the value of maintaining and using military power.
The Mali
operation also highlighted the French discontent with multilateral approaches
and Paris’ preference for strengthening bilateral military cooperation. In the
last few years, Paris has become increasingly disillusioned with European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as well as working through NATO, which it
finds overly cumbersome and too bureaucratic. Instead France prefers to work
through bilateral mechanisms, which it views as more efficient and effective.
In Mali, France drew on a series of ad hoc arrangements rather than the
European Air Transport Command in Eindhoven (Netherlands). The German
withdrawal of personnel from the NATO AWACS during the Libyan operation is
viewed as an object lesson in this regard.
Finally,
French Army operations in Mali exemplify a number of qualities that many
analysts consider desirable for portions of the US Army. The
French Army is adept at lean operations and operating on a small scale, pushing
modularity below the brigade level and routinely putting together integrated
combined arms, task-organized forces at the company level and below, often on
the fly. The French also operate an armored vehicle fleet that stresses
mobility and firepower over protection and is consequently sufficiently light
to minimize logistical requirements and facilitate rapid deployment in austere
conditions, allowing fast and long-range movement once deployed.
The Mali intervention underscored the value of
prepositioning light equipment and associated high-performance mobile forces.
France was able to respond quickly to Islamist and Tuareg insurgents because
light armored motorized equipment and motorized military units were
prepositioned in the region.
This highlights the advantage of keeping these
types of lighter and more operationally agile forces either forward deployed or
ready for airlift rather than relying on modern, heavy armored mechanized
forces that usually must be deployed by sea and provided heavy equipment
transporters to operate in distant inland operations similar to Mali.
Syria
It
is hard to draw any firm conclusions about NATO’s experience in Syria because
to date NATO has kept a very low profile – some would say has been invisible –
in the crisis. The alliance forward deployed air defense units to western
Turkey and lent political support to Turkey when Syria shot down a Turkish
aircraft which Damascus claimed had violated Syrian airspace, but otherwise
NATO has largely remained on the sidelines.
The British vote in the House of Commons
against participation in a military strike against Syria caught many officials
– including Prime Minister David Cameron – by surprise. While in large measure
the vote was attributable to poor party management on Cameron’s part – Cameron
failed to rally his troops behind him in preparation for the crucial vote in
parliament – it also reflected broader trends in British domestic politics that
could have an important impact on US–British military cooperation in the future
and Britain’s role in NATO over the medium term.
There
has been a visible shift in the public mood over the past decade in Britain,
including within the Conservative party. Conservative MPs are calling for
Britain to play a more modest role in world affairs and are less willing to
follow the American lead in foreign affairs than in the past. A good deal of
this sentiment is attributable to the impact of the Iraq war. Tony Blair’s
decision to support George W. Bush in the Iraq war was highly unpopular with
the British public and has diminished support for US policy.
At the same time, the austerity measures
introduced by the Cameron government have resulted in deep cuts in funding for
the British armed forces.[2]
These cuts threaten to limit the ability of British forces to engage in future
military operations with US forces. It is too soon to conclude whether this
emphasis on a more modest British role will last. However, it would be a
mistake to assume that the special U.S. relationship with Britain will be
unaffected by these trends.
Regional
Cooperation and Outreach
Since
the end of the Cold War, NATO has focused increasing attention on developing
cooperation with states in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf. This has been achieved
through two initiatives: (1) the Mediterranean Dialogue and (2) the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative.
Initiated at the end of 1994, the Mediterranean
Dialogue signaled the Alliance’s recognition of the growing importance of
security challenges from the south. The Dialogue includes a diverse group of
countries: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Mauritania.
While bilateral cooperation has developed relatively smoothly, multilateral
cooperation has proven difficult because of members’ differences with Israel
regarding the Palestinian issue, and more recently the deterioration of
Turkish–Israeli relations.
The ICI, launched at NATO’s summit in Istanbul
in June 2004, focuses on intensifying practical cooperation with the states of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in areas such as counterterrorism, counter-WMD,
training and education, and interoperability.[3]
Four out of six members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE) are members of
the ICI. Saudi Arabia and Oman, while not members of the ICI, have a regular
political dialogue with NATO.
Three
members of the ICI have participated in NATO operations. Qatar and the UAE
participated in the NATO air campaign against Libya (Operation Unified
Protector), while the UAE and Bahrain participated in the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Qatar has also hosted the NATO
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) for air space management on its
territory.
Implications for the Future
NATO’s
role in the Middle East and Gulf will heavily depend on US policy and
leadership. However, the degree of US engagement will be strongly influenced by
domestic priorities and politics. There is a strong sense within the Obama
administration that America’s defense and foreign policy commitments must be
brought more closely in line with the nation’s economic resources and that
preserving American influence abroad depends on putting America’s house in
order at home.
This
does not mean that the United States is about to turn its back on the world and
retreat into “Splendid Isolation.” But, as noted, in the future the United
States is likely to be much more selective about when, where and how it is
involved in conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf. It also means that
America’s NATO allies will be expected to share more of the burden of global
leadership, particularly in areas on the European periphery such as the
Maghreb, where Europe has strong historical interests.
The Libyan intervention underscored the
difficulty of obtaining a NATO-wide consensus regarding a humanitarian
intervention. In the future any such intervention is likely to be undertaken by
ad hoc coalitions of the willing, some of whom may be NATO members while others
may not be. This highlights the importance of having capable regional partners –
especially in the Gulf – who can operate effectively with NATO forces. Thus,
one of NATO’s prime goals in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative should be
enhancing interoperability.
Iran’s nuclear program is likely to remain at
the top of the Middle East and Gulf security agenda and a major preoccupation
of the GCC states. Since the election of President Rouhani in June 2013, Iran’s
tone has softened and there have been some hopeful signs that Iran may be
willing to agree to serious constraints on its nuclear program. However, it is
too soon to say whether this will result in defusing the concerns of the
international community.
The prospect that Iran may acquire nuclear
weapons is likely to intensify the interest of the GCC countries in missile
defense. Indeed, missile defense could be an area of potential cooperation
between NATO and the GCC members within the framework of the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative.
Energy security is another area of possible
cooperation. The European members of NATO are highly dependent on oil and gas
from the Middle East and Arabian Gulf to fuel their economies and have a strong
interest in making sure that supply lines from the region remain open. As major
energy exporters, the GCC states also have an interest in secure supply lines.
Thus, exploring ways of enhancing maritime security could open up another
avenue for potential cooperation.
NATO
and the Challenge of Austerity
The
prospects for closer cooperation between NATO and the GCC countries will also
be affected by broader political and economic trends within NATO itself. In the
coming decade, NATO will have to operate in an environment of growing fiscal
austerity and declining defense budgets.[4]
The global economic crisis has forced most European governments to trim their
defense budgets: Germany will reduce defense spending by a quarter over the
next three years, Britain’s defense budget will be slashed by 7.5 percent until
2015, and the defense budgets of some of the smaller European nations have
taken even larger cuts.
These cuts come after several decades of
decline in defense spending by the European members of NATO. As European
countries have become more affluent, they have spent less on defense. Since the
end of the Cold War, defense spending by the European members of NATO has
declined by 20 percent. During the same period, the combined gross domestic
product (GDP) of the European members of the alliance has grown by 55 percent.[5]
In the last decade, the European contribution
to NATO defense spending has steadily declined. In the Cold War defense
expenditures in NATO Europe represented almost 34 percent of defense spending
by NATO, with Canada and the United States covering the remaining 66 percent.
Since the end of the Cold War, the share of NATO’s security burden borne by the
European members of the Alliance has dropped to 21 percent.[6]
Shifting
US Defense Priorities
The
challenges of austerity facing NATO coincide with a shift in US defense
priorities, The Obama administration’s new national security strategy calls for
major changes in the size and orientation of the US Army and US Marine Corps,
and places special emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East.
This “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific reflects
the growing importance of the region in international affairs and is part of a “strategic
rebalancing “… of American defense policy in light of broader global and
regional changes. However, this does not mean that the United States will lose
interest in Europe, as some Europeans fear. American officials have sought to
reassure European leaders that “Europe is and remains America’s partner of
first resort” for managing crises in Europe and its periphery. [7]
The Middle East and Arabian Gulf will remain
important US priorities. The outbreak of the Arab Spring has exerted a strong
gravitational pull on US policy. Obama’s speech to the United Nations General
Assembly at the end of September was almost entirely devoted to developments in
the Middle East and Gulf—a reflection of the degree to which both areas
continue to be top US policy priorities. China, by contrast, was mentioned only
once.[8]
In his speech to the UNGA Obama singled out two
issues in particular which would receive top priority: (1) the Arab-Israeli
dispute and (2) the nuclear issue with Iran. This is an extremely ambitious
agenda. It is a high risk policy. The rewards for success could be substantial,
but so could the costs of failure.
A lot
will depend on the evolution of the Syrian crisis. If Syria abides by the chemical
weapons agreement worked out between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, this could have a positive impact on security
in the Middle East/Gulf region and give the US-Iranian dialogue on the nuclear
issue important impetus.
However, if the agreement stalls or collapses,
US–Russian relations could sharply deteriorate and the Syrian crisis could
escalate. This would have a negative impact on the chances for a breakthrough
in US–Iranian relations and lead to greater regional instability in the Middle
East and Arabian Gulf region.
Gulf Security, NATO and the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative
Cuneyt
Yenigun
|
I |
n
ancient times, international systems and security transformed rather slowly. In
comparison, radical changes occurred in the twentieth century. The world
witnessed a multipolar system and both the unveiling and eventual failure of the
first universal global security organization, the League of Nations (LN). This
was followed by the establishment of a bipolar system and a new security
organization, the United Nations (UN). Two regional/ideological pacts forming security
organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were founded, and the latter ultimately
collapsed. Finally, the current unipolar world system emerged.
In
addition to states, new international actors – IGOs, NGOs, MNCs – and
individuals have emerged in the international arena. Inter-governmental
organizations have accrued at the global and regional levels, while three
categories of regional organizations have been established: multipurpose
institutions such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU); institutions with
an economic focus, such as the European Community (later EU); and security
organizations, such as the Warsaw Pact, NATO and CENTO.
As actors of secondary importance, IGOs, and
specifically regional security organizations, have emerged in international
arena in the second half of the century. Before World War I, there were a few
formal security institutions but no regional ones.[9]
In response to the political instability left in the wake of the war, the League
of Nations was established, albeit without one important actor, the United States
(although the creation of the institution was led by Woodrow Wilson). The
system could not survive indefinitely; it was broken by the destruction of
World War II, and today’s UN was established as the guarantor of global peace.
In an ideologically divergent world following the war new
regional security organizations began to be established, in particular by the leaders
of two pacts: the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The UN Charter both allowed and supported
the establishment of regional security institutions and arrangements as part of
existing regional organizations by calling upon them to “make every effort to
achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes … before referring them to the
Security Council.”[10]
The violent storm of transformation witnessed
by post-war regional security organizations came in three main waves: the early
Cold War, mid–late Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. The first wave was the
establishment of two ideological regional pacts. The second wave may be
characterized by regional security institutions interfering in both external and
domestic issues alongside the UN. (For instance, the Organization of African
Unity [OAU], the Organization of American States [OAS] and the League of Arab States’
[LAS] involvement in conflicts over Chad, the Dominican Republic, Kuwait, and
Lebanon, respectively). During this period of a strictly divided world, regional
security organizations had “an early role to play in conflict resolution,
therefore, they were a tool for the weak in the world of the strong.”[11] Late in this second wave, the Western pact stimulated the
establishment of regional security institutions to serve Cold War aims—SEATO in
South Asia, CENTO in the Middle East, and ANZUS in Australasia. Bipolarity had become
less rigid in the détente era of the late 1960s and new regional security
institutions were later to emerge in different regions to face local threats: the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) addressed apartheid in South
Africa, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed partly in response to the
Iran–Iraq War and revolutionary Iran, and the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) to the Vietnam War. The third wave of regional security transformations
occurred after the Cold War. The Post-Cold war system, or ‘new world order,’ saw
both a loosening of the strict hierarchical pact system and increased regional
autonomy. In this period the UN lacked the necessary resources and the commitment
of great powers to act as global policemen, creating vacuums that regional
organizations could fill.[12] Regional security in the third wave responded to international
developments in two ways, through the creation of new security organizations,
and/or amendments to or expansion of the security tasks stipulated in existing
regional organizations’ charters. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (
The GCC’s Increasing Security
Capabilities
The
GCC also transformed by fortifying its structure with more dynamic and
applicable security apparatus. It was established in the second wave – under
the ideological restrictions of the Cold War in 1981 – among the Gulf countries
(except Yemen), with their similar political systems based on the same
religion, joint destiny, and common objectives. It established a regional
common market and a defense planning council. The geographic proximity of these
countries, their general adoption of free trade economic policies, and the need
to confront regional security challenges were all factors that encouraged the establishment
of the GCC. Although created more than three decades ago, the process of deepening
economic and social ties has continued more slowly than the EU, for example.
According to some scholars the immediate
objective of the Gulf states was to protect themselves from the threat posed by
the Iran–Iraq War and the Iranian revolution. In the beginning, interestingly,
although it was established amidst a shared perception of threat, common
defense was not mentioned in its founding document. One year after its
establishment, however, the six members decided to establish a joint security
strategy and a type of multilateral defense force (or rapid reaction force)—the
Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). In the following years troops and air forces
carried out several multilateral exercises between 1983 and 1987 under the code
name Peninsula Shield. Military assistance, funded mainly by Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, was extended to Bahrain for up-to-date fighter aircraft and a modern
air base, and to Oman to improve its defensive capability in the Strait of
Hormuz. In 1984 the GCC Defense Ministers agreed on the creation of a
two-brigade (10,000-man) PSF. This joint intervention force was/is based in
Saudi Arabia near King Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin under the command
of a Saudi officer.
Military and defense implementations began to
work during the Iran–Iraq War. Bahrain and Oman received $1.8 billion in aid
from richer members, especially from Saudi Arabia, to build up their armed forces.
In March 1986 the PSF was deployed during the
Iranian Al-Faw Peninsula offensive when it was dispatched to Kuwait.[13]
By the beginning of 1990, the GCC began modernizing the PSF, turning it into a
mechanized infantry division with support units.
After the end of the Iran–Iraq War, the Gulf
states relaxed somewhat, but the invasion of Kuwait at the beginning of the
Post-Cold War era accelerated security provisions and practical developments
within the GCC.
In the third wave of development for security
organizations in post-Cold War era, soon after the conclusion of the Gulf War,
the GCC, Egypt, and Syria declared their intention to establish a deterrent force
to protect Kuwait. The GCC would provide the financing, while Egypt and Syria
were to supply military assets. The plan subsequently encountered a series of
setbacks, and ultimately failed due to Kuwait obtaining security commitments
from the US and UK and for the prepositioning of US military equipment.
In 1992, in addition to a headquarters staff,
the PSF consisted of one infantry brigade of about 5,000 men with elements from
all GCC states. Its mission, however, had not been publicly defined. At this
time, it was not clear, for example, whether the joint force would have
authority to intervene in a domestic emergency. The force could be enlarged at
a time of threat – it was apparently reinforced prior to the Gulf War in 1991 –
but did not play a big role in the war as a distinct unit; however a force about
3,000 men from the PSF did take part in the liberation of Kuwait in March 1991.[14]
An important step in deepening security was a
resolution taken in 1997, which linked the GCC member states with a military
communication network for early warning. But the main rhetorical transformation
of the GCC’s security was seen in the Manama Summit in December 2000. The
summit cemented the joint defense responsibilities of the GCC states with the
signing of the Mutual Defense Pact. The treaty created a joint GCC Defense
Council and a High Military Committee and codified what is now the pillar of
the GCC’s military doctrine—that all the members of the council would be
secured as an “indivisible whole.” The strategy mirrored the 4th and
5th articles of the NATO Treaty’s collective security provision(s);
the ministers declared in their communiqué:
The security of the council’s states is an
indivisible whole, and any aggression on a member state is aggression against
the other states, and facing aggression is considered a joint responsibility
whose burden is on all the member states … Interference from any entity in the
internal affairs of one of the member states is interference in the internal
affairs of all the nations of the council.
In February 2003, 10,000 troops and two ships
were deployed to Kuwait ahead of the Iraq War to protect Kuwait from potential
Iraqi attacks, but did not participate in operations against Iraq.[15]
In 2006, the PSF dedicated 7,000 personnel to function
as a joint intervention force to defend the joint border of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Iraq. In same year Saudi Arabia proposed the dissolution of the PSF
and the creation of a centralized security wing. The idea was welcomed but not
put into force. Another big step came in 2009, with the setting up of an Arab
Navy Task Force composed of the GCC and five additional countries – Jordan,
Djibouti, Sudan, Egypt and Yemen – and a Joint Rapid Reaction Force among the
GCC members.[16]
The activity of the Task Force is limited to assisting the Yemeni Coast Guard
in patrolling the Red Sea and/or the Gulf of Aden; but, at the very least, this
initiative showed that the Gulf countries (and even the other Arab countries)
could act together in an emergency through their developed capabilities. The
PSF, although hobbled by technical problems,[17] established
a maritime information-sharing center in Bahrain in 2010 as a deterrent to
piracy, and particularly for the protection of oil tankers.
Recent events in Bahrain have demonstrated the
PSF’s mobility, capability and willingness to take a role in the region, if
necessary. At the request of the Bahraini government on March 14, 2011, PSF
forces entered Bahrain. Forces from the member countries served as the PSF
constituting the first GCC deployment in relation to an internal threat. Its
operations were limited to preparing to assist the Bahrain Defense Forces
against any confrontation by any foreign armed intervention and in protecting
and securing vital locations in the country. This deployment demystified the
question of whether the force had the authorization for use in domestic issues.
It demonstrated clear evidence of developed mobility capacities after the
Kuwait invasion and responded to critics who accused the PSF of immobility or of
merely “being a symbol.”[18]
This action has, however, been criticized by the Iranian and Iraqi governments.
The Maliki government stated that a PSF presence in Bahrain would complicate
the situation and fuel sectarian violence. Bahrain condemned the Maliki
statement, claiming it was interference in Bahrain’s domestic affairs.[19]
Today, the PSF has 40,000 troops,[20]
spread among the respective countries of the member states, that are capable of
combining within one week, with deployment of artillery and troops from its
permanent base at King Khalid Military City.
In addition to the military wing and its
actions, the GCC countries have also begun to take on conflict management and
reconciliation missions in areas around the Gulf and its adjacent regions.
Despite Israeli objections, Saudi Arabia involved itself in the Palestine issue
in 2002 by promising Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for the
establishment of a Palestinian state according to the 1967 borders. In 2007
Saudi Arabia acted as broker between Fatah and Hamas and gained support from
the Arab League via the Mecca Agreement, but failed due to US pressure.[21] In 2012, the UAE convened a summit intended to achieve
reconciliation in Somalia,[22] whilst Qatar has played an intensive part in the Lebanon crisis,
mediating between both sides. Furthermore, Qatar pressed the Yemeni government
to make a truce and find possible solutions with Zaydi rebels in the northern
part of the country; it also served as mediator between Sudan and Darfur,
successfully reducing tensions.
Oman is a unique country with good triangular
relations between Iran, the GCC and the West; it has mediated in Iran–UK and
Iran–US capacities to secure the release of political prisoners, maintaining
good relations within the GCC and signing security agreements with Iran at the
same time.
NATO’s Transforming
Partnerships
Amid
the new security developments and ascendant regionalism in the new unipolar
system, NATO – its strongest member being the global pole – has been very
successful and is perhaps the best-evolved security organization in the world.
According to a majority of security strategists and international relations scholars,
NATO was ‘missionless’ after the dissolution of the communist pact and would
sooner or later fall apart.[23] However, NATO was able to evaluate and then evolve by enlarging,
adding twelve new member states, finding new missions, extending security
subfields and defining new threats to world peace. According to some experts,
NATO today is no longer an alliance but a “security management institution”[24] and also a negotiation platform. Indeed, the NATO–Russian Council[25] (NRC) serves this purpose. The spirit and mechanism of the NRC is
bringing together Russia and NATO member states in the NRC meetings as equals (“at
29”) in areas of common interest, instead of in the bilateral (“28+1”) format.
The first consideration in NATO’s reinvention
was the uncertainty regarding Russia’s future plans and intentions. On the one
hand, NATO continued as the former counterpart of the Warsaw Pact, and on the
other it had established good relations and acted as a sort of negotiation
table for the foundation of NATO–NRC.
The second factor was the new potential for regional
wars near NATO borders, especially in the Balkans. As a result, NATO undertook
various engagements and peace operations/missions “out of area” in its
periphery in places such as Bosnia (>1995), Kosovo (1998), Afghanistan
(2003), and Libya (2012) that other security organizations or ad hoc groupings
would have found difficult. It accomplished these missions sometimes by using “hybrid
operations.”[26] The Dayton Peace Agreement Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia
comprised 60,000 NATO forces. Its successor Stabilization Force (SFOR) and UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were hybrid operations with the UN and the EU. Its
mental flexibility gave NATO more space and cross-country mobility.
The third factor, commonly shared by NATO
members, was the emergence of new types of threats such as international
terrorism and the spreading peril of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).
Interestingly, the 5th article of the NATO Treaty was put into force
for the first time in Afghanistan in 2002 for this reason (international
terrorism).
The fourth factor in NATO’s longevity is
perhaps its usefulness as a tool and enforcement arm[27] of UN Security Council resolutions. IFOR and UNMIK (a NATO, EU,
OSCE hybrid operation) were examples of this.
The final factor is the US insistence on the
continuation of NATO as the founder member and the single world superpower.
Clinton’s soft-power policies belied NATO’s importance, but external reasons –
specifically Balkan turmoil – kept NATO alive within his first term. Later the
Bush government’s hawkish policies brought US pressure to keep NATO alive
effective.
Today NATO has developed the NATO–India
Dialogue and NATO cooperation with the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, Japan
and South Korea). In addition, in 2013 meetings on ‘New Strategic Policy for an
Alliance in Transition,’ the member states proposed that NATO should create a
Global Partnership Council to build upon existing partnership programs. This
approach reflects NATO’s quest for global partnership in the world, which it
believe would be beneficial for all. Ultimately, there are 50 countries in
Afghanistan working together with NATO members (28 members, 22 non-members);
NATO has organizational relations with 10 Arab countries, 6 from the
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and 4 from the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
(ICI); NATO reached out to the Arab League and worked together in the Libya
crisis; and NATO and the AU have been working together in such areas as airlifting
AU troops in and out of Somalia.
General Successes: The
Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue
After
the Cold War, NATO evaluated and evolved by establishing partnership mechanisms
in peripheral regions. This initiative has strengthened NATO, and includes the
Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the ICI. The PfP
was officially launched in 1994 to: “… increase stability, diminish threats to
peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual
Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.” The PfP
encompasses almost all areas, including political matters between NATO members
and PfP participants. Its primary focus is to develop effective defense organizations
under civilian and democratic institutions in the twenty-two signatory
countries, including the former Warsaw Pact countries. The MD was founded in a
peaceful context after the Madrid Peace Process between NATO and seven
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania
and Tunisia) in 1994. The MD has dual functions and formats: a multilateral
format (28+7) and a bilateral format (28+1), for the purpose of building good relations
and better mutual understanding and confidence throughout the Mediterranean
region, promoting regional security and stability, and explaining NATO’s
policies and goals. In 2011 the Political and Partnerships Committee was
established, which is responsible for all partnerships. Political consultations
provide an opportunity to share views on a range of issues relevant to the
security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development
of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue.[28]
Developing Partnership: The Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative
A
third initiative for the extension of its sphere of partnership was launched by
NATO in Istanbul in 2004. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative offers a “menu”
of bilateral activities that countries can choose from, including the following:
·
advising on defense transformation,
budgeting and planning;
·
interoperability in military
exercises, education and training;
·
fighting terrorism;
·
combating the proliferation
of WMDs;
·
cooperation in border
security; and
·
cooperation on civil
emergency planning.[29]
The MD offers a choice of multilateral (28+7)
or bilateral (28+1) formats for relations, while the ICI acquiesced only to
bilateral relations (28+1); but the most important difference is that the MD
encompasses political counsels, whereas the ICI only concerns military
relations within the region. Some scholars argue that the MD is more successful,[30] whilst others claim that the ICI has adopted a more effective
approach. The ICI is similar to MD, but not the same in practice; its main aim is
not to establish a dialogue between Euro-Atlantic and GCC civilizations, but to
cooperate in defined technical areas. Hence, expectations and assessments of
achievement should be adjusted accordingly. After the establishing the
dialogue, the MD states have begun to demand technical support and financial
funds which NATO has lacked in the last decade. As a result, some projects have
not come to fruition within the MD project. In contrast, ICI members do not
have financial problems and this advantage balances technical projects and
funding components between the two sides.[31]
Although the PfP has acted as a template for
the ICI, it cannot be lumped together with it. The implied purpose of the PfP
was to open a gateway to former Warsaw Pact members for NATO membership; and so
it happened that twelve members states of the PfP (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia) have subsequently joined NATO. In contrast, within the ICI the GCC
members neither desire – nor does NATO plan for them – to acquire full
membership. The PfP also includes a political dimension, and civil–military
orchestration, but the ICI’s program and plan do not feature this purpose.
According to some scholars the ICI initiative
is appropriate for some important reasons: the Gulf region is important for the
Alliance and NATO’s engagement in the Gulf is perceived as a stabilizing
factor.[32] On the other side, a NATO rear admiral claims the “Gulf is a hot
point, and NATO feels it is important to be there and demonstrate a new
willingness to operate out of area.”[33] The GCC has emerged as a “pragmatic partner”[34] for the Euro-Atlantic zone, and both sides hold similar approaches
on a number of issues. In addition, GCC states are among the few stable
countries and allies in the Arab Middle East, so may be useful partners for
NATO. The GCC countries also hold a great degree of legitimacy and high popular
support compared to the Arab republics. They have proven adaptable with a great
degree of flexibility in arranging themselves according to new developments.[35] In the last few years almost all GCC governments have passed
financial packages that have sought to improve citizens’ living conditions,
such as costly social security projects, and development projects in education,
public services, and health. Unlike the other Arab states, GCC citizens on the
whole have wealth, happiness, and satisfaction. The GCC states have also
arranged carefully-calibrated political reforms[36] such as the creation of parliaments, the establishment of
ombudsman-like mid-institutions, upper and lower houses within the parliament,
advisory sub-state institutions, elections, and increasing parliamentary
powers.
The ICI was addressed to the GCC members;
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE accepted the offer, whilst Saudi Arabia and
Oman neither responded positively, nor rejected it officially. Because of this absence
of two major countries in the Gulf, the ICI essentially deals with the
northern, smaller constituents among the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia believes it
should have been consulted prior to the Initiative and does not seek a NATO
force presence in the Gulf because the GCC has its own security institutions,
namely the PSF, and US military bases have already been deployed in the Gulf
countries. If the PSF is not sufficient to handle any given issue, then at that
time NATO and the GCC could work together. Oman’s reason is more credible and justified.
Oman has a unique foreign policy among the Gulf countries, by maintaining
peaceful and multidirectional diplomatic ties with peripheral countries. It has
very close relations with the Euro-Atlantic zone, particularly with the US and
the UK, and has been pursuing very cooperative relations with its neighbors in
the Gulf in parallel to good relations with Iran, hence Oman is a unique
country in the GCC. Multidirectional foreign policy by Oman provides benefits
to itself and to the other actors in the West at the same time. Oman has
mediated between Iran and the US on a number of cases, including that of the
three US citizens who were arrested in Iran in 2009 on illegal entry and
espionage charges and were released during 2010 and 2011. An Iranian scientist
held by the US since late 2011 on charges of violating US sanctions was
released in April 2013, again via Omani mediation. Oman thinks joining the ICI
will reduce its credibility with Iran, and Oman definitely does not want to
spoil this silent but successful channel of diplomacy with a country with which
its shares some control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
So far the ICI has enjoyed some important
achievements, not in terms of multilateral relations, but rather in bilateral
relations (NATO and willing states), especially among four of the GCC members.
Agreements were signed on security and protection of classified topics between
NATO and Kuwait in 2006, Bahrain in 2008, and the UAE in 2009. The UAE and
Bahrain accepted the call of NATO and joined the International Stabilization
and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Qatar and the UAE worked in
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya; the UAE sent six F-16s and six
Mirage fighter aircraft during the intervention, and Qatar provided direct
military assistance to rebel groups with shipments of goods and communication
support. Kuwait has been establishing a Regional NATO Center in its country for
training and educational activities. The UAE has become a unique case by
appointing its first ambassador to NATO to invigorate its relations with the
Alliance. Four countries have requested border-surveillance equipment and
assistance in setting up domestic security operations mentioned in ICI
documents.
Anti-piracy cooperation is one of the most
successful areas, and counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation with the GCC is
intensive; indeed, although Saudi Arabia is not part of the ICI, it has signed
CT cooperation agreements with several NATO members including the US, UK,
Italy, and Turkey, as well as Oman, Iran and eleven other countries. The UAE,
Kuwait and Bahrain work together and develop their skills and capacities on CT.
Oman, while also out of the ICI, has benefitted from US security assistance to
bolster its ability to monitor the Strait of Hormuz,[37] as well as its land borders, especially with Yemen. Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman all demand greater US expertise and
assistance on cyber-crime. While the Arab Navy Task Force patrols the southern
shore of the GCC, NATO Operation Ocean Shield is monitoring the same area with
around 40 warships[38] from all countries, including NATO members, simultaneously. The “NATO
Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College in Rome (a ten week
strategic-level course) continues successfully for ICI members as well as Saudi
Arabia, and currently NATO has intelligence-sharing agreements with Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the Emirates.
In 2010, the New Strategic Concept in NATO
adopted at the Lisbon Summit identified cooperative security as one of the three
tasks of NATO, and referred specifically to the ICI by aiming at deepening
security partnership in the Gulf.[39] It is the first time the term “Gulf” is mentioned in a NATO
Document. In 2011, the ICI Group comprising political counselors from NATO
members was replaced by the Political and Partnership Committee, which is responsible
for all partnerships including the ICI.
According to Razoux, some obstacles to complete
success of the ICI remain. For the GCC states these include:[40]
·
Negative perceptions (or
reputation) of NATO[41] as being a military arm of US policy.
·
The absence of Saudi Arabia
and Oman from the ICI.
·
The lack of common strategic
vision in the GCC especially concerning Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.
·
The persistence of rivalries
inside the GCC which hinder GCC attempts at diplomatic initiatives.
·
Preference of bilateral
agreements with the US, UK, and France instead of NATO.
·
The continuation of the
Palestinian conflict.
·
The rejection of the Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that NATO forces would be deployed on their
territory.
·
The Gulf’s preference for
dealing with people rather than institutions in diplomacy, and the difficulty
in defining the GCC as a “unitary actor.”[42]
Meanwhile, the obstacles to the ICI among the
NATO members include:
·
The reluctance of some new
members to accept NATO’s engagement in the Gulf.
·
Energy deals, arms sales, and
civil nuclear cooperation programs fuel rivalry among the great powers within
the NATO.
·
NATO’s financial budget cuts
and the high cost of defense programs hinder cooperation with the ICI.
·
Hesitation to become involved
with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
NATO and the GCC countries have hitherto failed
to set up a multilateral mechanism,[43] or have deliberately chosen to follow more concentrated
interest-driven policies.[44] But at the same time the spirit of the ICI remains, mentioning
28+1 relations instead of 28+4 or 28+6 relations. That’s perhaps why it should
not be counted as a failure, and why Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE pursue
the bilateral approach. The first three and Oman host US military bases, while
the UAE provide the French Navy with a base in the capital. Kuwait has signed
defense agreements with the UK, US, and France; Qatar has defense agreements
with France and hosts US Central Command; the UAE has signed defense agreements
with France and the UK. According to some experts, these agreements pose an
environment in which NATO may struggle to find a role, and it seems that the
Gulf does not see any security guarantee issues; on the contrary, the “risk of
congestion”[45] is a bigger problem in any case.
Nonetheless, some scholars still criticize the
ICI for failing to develop any depth, of having no framework document, no
established military forum, of low participation in activities (seminars,
workshops), and of having no regular ministerial meetings.[46]
Conclusion
Despite
intensive recommendations concerning the participation of two important actors,
Saudi Arabia and Oman, their membership has not been forthcoming. Saudi Arabia,
the key actor of the GCC, does not think that NATO forces will be beneficial or
constructive in the Gulf, and considers itself to be the primary addressee
before the other smaller actors of the GCC. But the NATO–ICI process has
already started with four countries at the bilateral level; several agreements
were signed, and some have been implemented, so turning back is not easy at the
moment. If and when Saudi Arabia believes it necessary, it joins meetings and
activities, such as its participation in the ten-week training course in
Naples, and working together vis-à-vis such natural alignments such as the Arab
Navy Task Force and NATO Operation Ocean Shield in piracy prevention and
patrolling in the Gulf of Aden. Between 1998 and 2003 Saudi Arabia hosted 60,000 US forces at the
Prince Sultan Air Base; in the event of any external threat the Saudis believe
they can work together with the US and perhaps NATO. For example, Saudi Arabia
and the US work together in support of counterterrorism in Yemen. Because both
of them share the same approach, the Houthi rebellion and its alleged external
link[47] on the Saudi border could destabilize the security of two states
and also the entire Gulf region.
Oman’s situation is different and more credible,
it pursues multilateral diplomacy in the region and the world. Oman was the
first Gulf state to formally allow the US military to use its national
facilities. It has hosted US forces in military operations since 1980 and works
CT and anti-piracy actions with the US and indirectly with NATO. Unlike the
other GCC countries, although Oman has good relations with Iran, neither the US
nor the West in general has criticized its current relations, perhaps in view
of its value as a mediator or to keep open an informal back channel to
negotiate with Iran if necessary. Oman did not officially joined the ICI at its
launch, but already has indirect military ties with NATO via its US military
bases. The Oman–US facilities access agreement was signed in 1980 and has been renewed
four times (most recently in 2010): the US can use Oman’s airbases in Muscat,
Thumrait and Masirah Island.[48] It seems Oman is more worried that the NATO title will irritate
Iran than ameliorate US forces. The ICI was launched as an open invitation to
regional countries, and this does not mean it will not work without two GCC
countries. The format does not necessarily need to be based on a 28+6 format to
function.
Those critical of ICI
relations are going with multi-bilateral relations (28+1), because of this the
process is going slowly and recommendations are for multilateral bases; the
nature of the ICI was established on the 28+1 format, unlike MD which offers two
track options, 28+1 and 28+7. Therefore criticizing ICI as being a “one way
track” is excessive and a false accusation. [Editor6] Despite being slow, irregular
and lacking ministerial meetings, overall northern side relations are developing,
continue to be better than in the MD, and still fit with the “smart defense”
mentality thanks to the ample financial capacities of Gulf partners. However,
as Samaan suggests[49] the “NATO-Gulf Strategic Dialogue” or ministerial meetings[50] could be launched with a biannual interval, with Saudi Arabia and
Oman being able to attend the meetings as observers. Such dialogue would afford
a platform to exchange new ideas and support future cooperation in an official 28+4+2
format.
According to some, the ICI menu is too rich and
too broad, and this impedes a deepening relationship. Perhaps if the ICI
chooses to limit the scope of the partnership it might pick up steam. Specific
areas of priority could be counterterrorism, defense cooperation, border
security, and maritime security. The above-mentioned subtopics are more urgent
and would be more likely to create a “win-win” process or bring about integrative
negotiation for all within the region.
Although the GCC was established in the context
of a potential Iranian and/or Iraqi threat, and the ICI launched due to the
global/regional plans of NATO, which also implied (Iran as) an external threat
to the GCC countries in its document, neither the Gulf states nor Iran seek a military
solution in a possible Iran–GCC crisis, because both sides know this kind of
escalation or military option will bring negative consequences. So far, NATO
has established the NRC with the Russian Federation, the NATO–India Dialogue,
the MD with seven Mediterranean countries, and good relations with four Pacific
countries: why then does it not establish a negotiation and dialogue platform
with Iran? NATO has transformed itself from a purely military organization to a
diplomatic and military actor in international/strategic relations in the last
two decades. The US still hesitates to establish contact with Iran individually,
although the Obama administration and the Rouhani government have a strong
desire to end their long-standing confrontation, and Iran’s nuclear program is
slowing according to the IAEA.[51] Rouhani represents an opportunity to establish good relations for
both sides. Obama and Rouhani have exchanged courteous letters and French
President Hollande became the first Western leader to meet Rouhani during the
UN meeting in September 2013. It is a convenient time in which NATO could be a useful
tool as a point of contact similar to the NRC. Like the NATO–Russian Council, a
“NATO–Iran Council”[52] could be established and used as a platform in tripartite
negotiations among the Euro-Atlantic zone, Iran and the ICI members as partners
in the Gulf. In addition to this, in theory there is nothing to prevent Iran
joining ICI discussions; on the contrary there is an open call to “regional
countries” including on the other side of the Gulf. This kind of dialogue could
provide a round-table platform to discuss regional issues, essential
flashpoints, exchange ideas and avoid misunderstandings.
Therefore, NATO should give priority to public
diplomacy to eliminate misperceptions and conspiracy theories in the region.
NATO and the US have lost credibility and trust among some groups in the Middle
East, especially following the Bush government’s unilateral actions. This can give
rise to conspiracy theories and the perception of a “hidden agenda.”
Constructive and transparent seminars, speeches, articles, TV interviews,
meetings, and conferences which explain what NATO is doing and planning in the
region should be redoubled. Such training and public agendas should be included
within a logical and implementable “oriental policy” for NATO.
Reinforcing Security between the GCC
States and NATO: Propositions and Obstacles
Ashraf Mohammed
Kishk
|
C |
ontrary to the old saying that an alliance ends when
its task ends, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has adapted to the
post-Cold War world through various strategic partnerships. It has also
intervened in a number of conflicts that have posed a threat to the interests
of its members outside its territories, namely in Bosnia in 1995 and Yugoslavia
in 1999, in addition to the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and the Libyan Crisis in 2011.
In his speech at Chatham House (the Royal
Institute of International Affairs) in London, the Secretary General of NATO,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, outlined future risks and threats facing NATO: terrorism,
piracy and arms smuggling. He indicated that cooperative efforts between NATO
and its partners should include military training and education as well as ‘smart
defense’ in cyber security, which can be achieved by strengthening connections
with partners and cooperating with Russia, China, Afghanistan, Australia and
organizations such as the European Union.[53]
Responding to a question on the reason for the increasing
intervention of NATO in international disputes, one NATO official replied, “Simply
because NATO has a global army whereas the United Nations does not have an army.”
Pursuant to NATO’s new policy, the Middle East
and the Arabian Gulf region were on NATO’s priority list due to their strategic
importance. This led to the launch of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994
with seven countries, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with the
GCC states in 2004. Despite the time difference between the two initiatives,
they have many common goals.[54]
The ICI is significant for the GCC states in light of the continuous imbalance between
the Gulf regional powers on the one hand, and regional and international
developments on the other hand. This has led the GCC states to establish
international alliances with major countries and effective organizations
worldwide including NATO. Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait joined the ICI,
which focuses on many areas of cooperation including defense consultation, the
fight against terrorism and the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, border security and civil emergency planning, which are
important issues for GCC security.[55]
The above does not mean that this initiative is
unilateral, meaning that it presents NATO as a security producer and GCC states
as security consumers. The relation between the GCC states and NATO is based on
the principle of “mutual strategic need”: NATO is a major international
organization that has strategic interests in the Arabian Gulf region; the GCC
states also have global security alliances with many international powers
including key NATO members. Hence there are many common security challenges
facing the two sides.
Given the importance of the above, the problem
in this partnership lies in the gap between the real security needs of the GCC
states and the security cooperation offered by NATO. Therefore, more than nine
years after this initiative was launched, it is logical for the GCC states and
members of the initiative to ask three questions at the official and
non-official levels: 1) What are the accomplishments made by the initiative
considering the ambitious goals they were seeking? 2) Does the initiative fulfill
the real security and defense needs of the GCC states? 3) Given NATO’s
increasing role in international and regional issues, what is the future of the
partnership between NATO and the GCC states, what are the activation
mechanisms, and what are the obstacles? To answer these questions, this paper
reviews four key elements: 1) features of post-2011 growing relations between
NATO and GCC countries; 2) propositions and mechanisms of reinforcing security;
3) obstacles to security maximization between the two parties; and 4) findings.
Features of Growing Post-2011
GCC–NATO Relations
Despite
the presence of many aspects of cooperation between the GCC members of the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and NATO since it was launched in 2004
until 2010, transformations occurring in the Arab World since 2011 to date have
shown without doubt that it is difficult to separate regional security and
global security, which led the two parties to activate this partnership by
taking the following steps:
·
The closing statement at the
2012 Chicago NATO Summit indicated that, “NATO is committed to strengthen
cooperation with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) members and welcome
the proposal of the State of Kuwait to host ICI’s centre on its territories.
The center should assist in understanding the common security challenges and
how to address them.” It is worth mentioning that Kuwait announced the
allocation of 5,000 square meters to establish a NATO headquarters and regional
training center.[56]
·
Some of the GCC states wish
to benefit from NATO’s unique experience particularly in military education and
training. In this framework, the UAE and the Sultanate of Oman (although Oman
is not an ICI member to date) announced the establishment of “national defense”
colleges in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The colleges aim to qualify military
and civil leaders and increase their capabilities in order to identify and
assess national, regional and global security challenges and the needs for
management and employment of state resources in order to protect national
interests.[57]
This is the same working mechanism as the NATO Defense College (NDC) based in
Rome.
·
Some GCC states, which are
members of the ICI, seek a comprehensive introduction to the experience of this
military organization which carries out a significant role in global security
and various international crises. This is illustrated by the permanent
diplomatic mission initiated by the UAE in the NATO headquarters in Brussels in
2012, headed by an extraordinary ambassador.[58]
·
Some
GCC states, which are members of the ICI, contributed to NATO’s operations in
Afghanistan. There were also Gulf contributions in NATO’s operations in Libya
in 2011, which is considered a specific development in the relations between
the two sides.[59]
·
Official
mutual visits between NATO officials and their Gulf counterparts (members of
the ICI) including the visit of Deputy Commander of NATO forces to the Kingdom
of Bahrain in April 2013, which involved discussions on the role of the Bahrain
Defense Force in international duties and missions as part of global security
and peace operations.[60]
These are all positive indicators that can be
built upon in the process of future cooperation between NATO and ICI Gulf
member states.
Mechanisms and Implications
of Maximizing Security between
the GCC States and NATO
Before
talking about the implications of security maximization, NATO must assess realities
in the Gulf and its regional and international idiosyncrasies in several aspects:
First, while the importance of the Gulf region
is growing, the security threats facing it are growing as well. Therefore, a
new defense strategy has been adopted by the United States, as outlined by
former US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta before the Asia Security Summit in
June 2012:
By 2020, the [US] Navy will reposture its
forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the
Atlantic to about 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six
aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers,
Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.[61]
This new ‘posture’ is being taken in order to
face rising Chinese power via what he called a “rotation” strategy—in reference
to rotational US military deployments. This means that the future commitment of
the United States to the security of the Gulf countries in this new policy
might change; therefore, Gulf countries will be in need of international alliances
to achieve regional balance.
Second, recognizing the existing relationship
between Gulf security and Arab and regional security in general, as illustrated
by the Gulf War in 1991 to liberate Kuwait.
Third, recognizing the Gulf countries’
connections and alliances, as they will be keen to maintain their bilateral
relations with the United States. Therefore, if a difference arises within NATO
between the United States and its partners, the Gulf countries’ relations with
the US shall have priority over their relations with any other parties. This
entails consensus inside NATO regarding its policy towards the Gulf countries.
Fourth, the broad concept of security rather
than a concept confined to the military aspect, which can be supported by NATO
putting the resources and expertise it has in this regard.[62]
Therefore, security maximization should be a
response to the intertwined Gulf reality as follows: a) supporting Gulf ‘self-security’; and b)
NATO supporting the defense capabilities of the Gulf countries.
The main problem faced
by the Gulf countries is that they are oil-based economies and small countries
located in the vicinity of powerful neighboring countries. Therefore, they are
continually seeking to achieve balance with their neighbors, and therefore chose
alliances with major powers in the world. However, this path is surrounded by
challenges, including those posed by regional and international developments.
Alliances do not last; therefore, the bolstering of nations’ power shall remain
the most important strategic option, and NATO can contribute in this regard by
assisting in increasing the capabilities of the Gulf armed forces by developing
programs that are commensurate with the nature of such forces. NATO can also
support defense integration policies and improve armament
among Gulf countries. To date, these countries have not been able to achieve
defense self-sufficiency, even though they are the top arms purchasing
countries in the world. Accordingly, NATO can provide the Gulf countries with
various weapons, as relying on a single source is another one of the problems
of these countries. The Gulf states’ problem with Iran is not about
quantitative imbalance only but also qualitative as well. For instance, the
Gulf countries are considered to be in a state of air exposure against the
advanced air weaponry in the possession of Iran. NATO and its vast military
resources can address this deficiency by achieving equilibrium. The figures below demonstrate the
implication of this theory:
Figure 3.1
A Zero-sum Game (a conflict
leading to war)
Figure 3.1 illustrates that in light of the
absence of equilibrium and a decline in confrontation between intervening and
counteracting powers, conflict may develop into a war as it rotates according
to the zero-sum game where every party seeks to achieve all gains knowing at
the same time there are losses for the other party. Under such circumstances,
there is an absence of any indicator of cooperation between the intervening and
counteracting powers.
Figure 3.2 illustrates that the presence of
equilibrium as part of the structure of regional interactions can control the
conflict so that it rotates within its acceptable limits without reaching a state
of war. Relations among the three parties are a combination of cooperation and
conflict.[63]
Figure 3.2
A Positive-sum Game (an
orderly conflict)
By comparing the traditional armed forces of
the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council with Iran, a vast imbalance
surfaces. According to the Military Balance 2012 report issued by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), active Iranian army
forces comprise 532,000 soldiers versus 363,600 for the six Gulf countries.[64]
Performing Periodic and Regular
Joint Military Maneuvers
Each
security partnership has objectives. For the Gulf countries, “achieving
deterrence” is the top goal, which entails:
… submitting evidence to the enemy that cannot
be ignored regarding the availability of retaliation ability which should
punish him violently upon any attempt on his part to start war to achieve
certain gains at the account of the deterring country.
Such
deterrence can be achieved by performing joint maneuvers between NATO and the
ICI member states—particularly naval maneuvers similar to the ones performed
between these parties in 2008. Such exercises may be considered partly a
response to the Iranian maneuvers that are conducted periodically to show off the
progress it has achieved in terms of the development of its naval armaments. In
this context, an important question arises: namely if Iran were to carry out a
hostile action such as blockading the Strait of Hormuz or polluting its water
to hinder shipping within in it, would NATO interfere? Key NATO member states
have previously participated in protecting energy resources in the Arabian Gulf
region during two crises, defending ships during the Iraq–Iran War in the 1980s
(also known as the ‘Tanker War’) and also during the Gulf War of 1991. However,
NATO did not participate, as an organization, in these crises. NATO is not the
world’s police force; in other words, it cannot give endlessly. However, the
issue of security commitment remains a major subject. The Gulf countries’
tendency toward building an international defense umbrella to counter regional
security threats – including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in
addition to the potential spillover of instability in neighboring countries
(Syria, Yemen and Iraq) – will remain a strategic option, at least in the short
term. This is an inevitable option to which NATO can contribute.[65]
NATO’s military doctrine and
how the Gulf states can benefit from it:
There
is no doubt that NATO is one of the most powerful military alliances in the
world, for two main reasons. First, NATO is committed to developing its
military doctrine to adapt to all changes. This doctrine is based on the
principle of continuing to maintain a collective defense role, as well as the
member states’ unity and security as “all-for-one and one-for-all” as
stipulated in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the NATO Charter. Second are the strategic
concepts issued by NATO to bridge the gap between the Charter provisions and
security developments, with the aim of establishing a “new consensus” among
NATO member states on contemporary security threats and mechanisms with which to
address them. Two strategic concepts were issued in 1999 and 2010, and the GCC
states can benefit from NATO’s experience in this regard as follows:
·
The GCC Charter can be
amended to stipulate “explicitly” that any attack against one member will be
considered an attack against all, setting in motion the possibility of
collective security for the GCC member states.
·
Developing a strategic
concept for the GCC states, which entails a security review of the nature of the
threats to these countries. This can be done every five or ten years. The
threats may require new mechanisms to address them, which should be considered as
developments in the GCC Charter rather than contradictions.
·
In light of the efforts of
the GCC states to turn from cooperation to unity, they may benefit from NATO’s
experience with regard to methods of formation, deployment and force assembly. The working
mechanism of NATO forces and the proposal of the Saudi King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz in 2005 to disassemble the Al-Jazeera Shield Force are almost
similar. The joint Gulf forces can be deployed in more than one Gulf state such
as NATO forces while establishing a mechanism to mobilize them when necessary.[Editor7] This will entail radical
change in the quality of joint Gulf military formations, rendering them leaner,
more agile and quickly deployable, and enabling them to carry out rapid and
successful military tasks. In other words, these will be forces prepared for “crises”
just like NATO forces, which is particularly important considering the
continuous state of instability in the Arabian Gulf region and the various security
challenges it faces, including terrorism and piracy.
·
It is worth mentioning that
one of the principles governing NATO’s work is ‘burden sharing” among its
member states, in addition to the possibility of non-separation between
military, political and economic aspects of NATO, all of which ultimately pour
into “the survival of the entity” and its ability to preserve the interests of
its member states. This approach may be used in developing the GCC and
achieving a greater state of unity.
NATO and Energy Security
NATO is aware of the threats
facing Arabian Gulf security, which it considers to be direct threats to the
interests of its members, foremost among which is energy security. Direct focus
on this issue was initiated by NATO in the 2006 and 2008 NATO Summits in Riga
and Bucharest, respectively. The two closing statements concluded that NATO’s
security interests could be affected by the interruption of supplies of natural
resources, which necessitates cooperation between NATO and those organizations concerned
with maintaining these resources. In May 2006, addressing the European
Parliament, the Secretary General of NATO said, “NATO will consider the use of
force if energy supplies are threatened.”[66]
The NATO strategic concept issued in 2010 explicitly stipulated that NATO
places energy security among its top priorities. There is no doubt that the
NATO decision to establish a center to specialize in energy security during the
2010 Chicago Summit reflects increasing concern about this issue. Events in the
Arab region such as the Libyan crisis in 2011 and the siege at Algeria’s Amenas
gas field in January 2012 also showed the necessity of protecting energy
resources. Although NATO has officially announced plans regarding energy
security, Jamie Shea, Director of NATO’s Political Directorate, presented an
academic vision inferring that NATO’s role in energy security revolves around
contributing in four areas, namely: information assistance, security
assistance, naval reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, and securing supply
lines.[67]
NATO is already engaged in some of these areas through its Task Force Endeavour
(TFE), which monitors the Mediterranean to secure passing vessels and ensure
they are not involved in terrorism or illicit trade. This is not the first time
NATO has participated in efforts to ensure energy security, as key members have
previously been involved in two relevant crises. The first was the Iraq–Iran
War, in which some NATO member states participated in a military operation to
secure energy supplies by protecting oil tankers crossing the Gulf. The allies
were able to capture some Iranian vessels that were placing countermines in the
Gulf and engaged in gunfire with Iranian forces that exploited the oil rigs to
attack ships. Although NATO did not perform this operation as an organization,
it represents an example of cooperation based on a “coalition of willing
countries” to secure a strategic region.[68] The second was the 1991
Gulf War in which the United States, France, Britain and Italy participated to
ensure Iraq did not secure control of Kuwait’s oil resources or those located
in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which would have meant a change in the
strategic balance in the Arabian Gulf region.
Energy
security is linked to the issue of maritime security in general, and its
specific challenges such as piracy. NATO has had a significant role in
addressing this issue under United Nations Resolutions 1816, 1838 and 1851. This
is not the first time that NATO has performed such a task; in the summer of
2007, a multi-national NATO maritime group sailed around Africa for the first
time to “demonstrate” its fear and concern “over maritime security of remote
and exposed waterways” and “prove its ability to deploy naval forces in areas
beyond NATO traditional European waters.” During this two-month mission, the
group made a 12,500 nautical mile circumnavigation around Africa and conducted
exercises with South African Navy ships. Moreover, the group rescued Yemeni
soldiers who survived a sudden volcanic explosion on one of the islands off the
Yemeni coast.[69]
Benefitting
from NATO’s Experience in Crisis Management
NATO carries out an important role in offering consultation and
training to Gulf armed forces. NATO has a crisis management service and
performs a major role in this regard, namely training conducted by the Rome-based
NATO Defense College twice a year with the participation of NATO member states
and partner states in the 1994 Mediterranean Dialogue and 2004 ICI.
Looking at the nature of Iran’s nuclear crisis, the
Gulf countries urgently need to undertake joint exercises to establish a crisis
management concept to be applied in the event of a potential crisis as a result
of Iran’s nuclear program. NATO has extensive experience in this regard. It is
also one of the items on the ICI’s agenda. In this context, it is worth
mentioning the announcement of the GCC Secretary General on October 10, 2012 regarding
the establishment of a nuclear radiation monitoring center,[70] which could be supported by NATO given its vast experience in this
field. If NATO can find a new mechanism for cooperation with the GCC as a
regional organization, it might pave the way for Saudi Arabia and Oman to join
the ICI.
The Role of NATO in Gulf
regional security
Based on the above, NATO can support Gulf regional security in its
broad meaning. Many visions have been proposed in this regard through
sponsorship of a regional security structure by NATO similar to the 1975
Helsinki Conference and to include the GCC states in addition to Iraq, Yemen
and Iran as well as the establishment of a forum similar to the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is worth mentioning that during
the Cold War, the CSCE provided a space for discussion among NATO member states
and members of the Warsaw Pact about security, economic and human rights
issues. Conferences held in this framework continued until 1994, when the CSCE
was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
NATO has what it takes in this regard. In addition to the ICI with the GCC
states, NATO has close ties with Iraq through its contribution to the training of
the Iraqi armed forces. On the other hand, NATO officials are keen to establish
academic communication channels with Iran, such as the attendance of Iranian
academics at events held by NATO, which would afford NATO a more accurate
perception of Iran’s regional policies. This can contribute in constructing a
comprehensive perception about the visions of regional parties for any proposed
regional security structure.
One
of the theories proposed in this regard is that of American author Kenneth Pollack, who in Foreign Affairs
called for the creation of a regional defense alliance similar to NATO. The
alliance might not be restricted to the GCC, Iraq and Iran, and could also
include neighboring countries such as Turkey.[71]
Figure 3.3
Developing Gulf Regional Security,
1971–2013
Source:
Kishk, op. cit., 2009.
On the other hand, studies on NATO’s approach toward
what are known as “failing” states (the majority of which cite Yemen) conclude
that it is better for NATO to prevent state “failure” because the cost to NATO
of involvement after the fact is vast. In the case of Yemen, this state’s failure
potentially means the failure of the entire Gulf region as it is considered a
geostrategic extension of these countries. NATO’s post-intervention role also remains
important.[72]
On the other hand, the Arab transformations
which began in 2011 and the resulting exit of pivotal states like Egypt from
the traditional regional balance equation placed the GCC countries in a state
of strategic exposure, in a vacuum which is considered a favorable atmosphere
for the intervention of Iran in the affairs of these countries. The Iranian approach
towards the Kingdom of Bahrain presents a clear example of this. Such
developments call for enhancing global security partnerships, including
alliances with NATO, particularly in light of the unsuccessful attempts at GCC
regional alliances. The idea of bringing in Morocco and Jordan to the GCC was
proposed in 2011. Additionally, there was a strategic agreement between the GCC
states and Turkey in 2008.[73]
It must be stressed that one important factor
in the success of such forums is NATO’s ability to develop a strategic dialogue
with the ICI partner states and states outside the ICI about common interests.
It must have a clear understanding of regional and global security challenges
and develop flexible mechanisms with which to address them.[74]
Along with diplomats and heads of defense
agencies, the dialogue should also include researchers and academicians, who
may exchange ideas and develop future forms of cooperation similar to the
annual Manama Dialogue, which is considered a regional international framework
to extend bridges of common understanding of regional and global security
challenges and how to address them. Moreover, NATO and the GCC ICI member
states should seek to develop an “ambitious policy agenda” in order to reinforce
security and counter related vacuums in the Middle East, while coordinating
regarding common concerns about Iran’s traditional and non-traditional military
ambitions.[75]
NATO can also play a role with regard to the
Palestinian issue. Although NATO officials are always keen to stress that NATO
currently has no role in this dispute, when asked the former Secretary General
of NATO said that Alliance intervention would be conditional upon three outcomes:
1) the establishment of a viable Palestinian state; 2) the presence of a clear
mandate from the UN Security Council; 3) and request from the concerned parties
for NATO intervention.
Nonetheless, NATO is not completely removed from the
events of this conflict, which is considered a major source of tension in a region
of strategic interest to NATO. In this context, two issues are worth
mentioning. First is the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Israel and
the United States on January 16, 2009 regarding the prevention of arms
smuggling into the Gaza Strip. The role of NATO in this agreement is described
as follows: “the United States shall work with its regional partners and NATO
to address the continued smuggling and supply of armaments to Hamas.” Secondly,
NATO’s supreme commander visited the Palestinian territories and met with
President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 to inform him about the Mediterranean Dialogue
and to talk about potential cooperation in training and sharing of information,
which are steps that can be built upon if the regional and international
environment were fit for NATO intervention in this conflict.[76]
Obstacles to GCC–NATO
Cooperation
1. Given NATO’s role in the security of the Gulf states, practical
considerations are more important than theories. Therefore, before talking
about the future, it is necessary to determine the achievements on the ground so
far of the Gulf–NATO partnership. Also talk about trust is easy, but how can
this trust be achieved?[77]
2. It is noted that there is variation in the level of cooperation
between NATO and the GCC ICI member states, ranging from complete rejection to
complete cooperation. For example, the UAE now has a diplomatic mission in NATO
in Brussels, whereas Saudi Arabia and Oman have not yet joined the ICI. This
variation limits the effectiveness of the initiative.
3. There are multiple security obligations for the GCC. On the one
hand, the United States has proposed a GCC missile defense project called
Missile Shield. At the same time, the GCC states have defense obligations as
part of the bilateral framework with major Western states. Additionally, the
GCC states plan to implement a Gulf Union proposal including relevant defense
aspects, which means that the many obligations involved may sometimes cause
conflict.
4. The extremely complex Arab and regional environment for NATO is
radically different from that in which the 1994 Mediterranean Dialogues and
2004 ICI were launched. It is true that NATO was not entirely removed from the
transformations occurring in the region, particularly through its intervention
in the Libyan crisis, but this was “circumstantial and momentary,” as indicated
explicitly by the NATO Secretary General in an opinion article in the Saudi Asharq
Al-Awsat newspaper in June 2011, in which he wrote: “We enjoyed a strong mandate from the Security Council and clear
support from the region’s countries, which is a unique mix we have not
witnessed in other situations.”[78] Therefore, the existing GCC and regional
context may have enabled opportunities for NATO to strengthen its relevant policies,
but at the same time created challenges that should be taken into account.
5. The security guarantees issue will remain one of the most controversial
in Gulf–NATO relations, as it conflicts with Article 5 of the NATO Charter.
This possibly calls for a reconsideration of the nature, form and goal of
cooperation for mutual benefit. In addition, NATO announced a new defense
strategy at the 2012 Chicago Summit implying that the Organization would adopt a
‘smart defense’ concept, namely “setting priorities and relying on multilateral
solutions for crises instead of unilateral solutions in order to save costs and
share burdens among the alliance member states.” There is no doubt that this
new trend for the alliance should limit its role in regional and international
crises. Although Gulf regional security is gaining strategic importance for
NATO, its role in maintaining this security, as stressed by some academic
researchers from NATO, will remain dependent on its transformations and
capabilities; burdens should be shared between NATO and its regional partners
because there is no force that can carry out every mission in the world, and
there is no guarantee of NATO intervention in all future crises (which also
depends on the important issue of legitimate intervention). On the other hand,
the United States will not reduce its presence in the Gulf in order to make way
for a bigger role for NATO.[79]
6. Growing Atlantic–Israeli relations: although Israel is not a NATO
member, recent years have witnessed significant growth in relations between the
two sides, embodied by two events. First, In 2009, NATO agreed to the
participation of Israel, pursuant to its request, in Operation Active Endeavour
launched by NATO in the Mediterranean. This means that the states that are
hostile to Israel may have to face NATO.[80]
Second was the holding of the annual convention of the Committee of the Chiefs
of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS) in Israel for the first time,
spanning five days in 2012. This was the first time the convention had been held
in a non-European, non-NATO-member country. The mechanisms of international
cooperation between NATO member states and their partners in the field
of assisting the injured during battles, disasters and humanitarian missions
were discussed.[81]
Findings and Recommendations
·
The relationship between NATO
and the GCC states confirms the overlap between regional and global security,
meaning that the development of any future defense strategies by the GCC states
must be harmonized with international strategies.[82]
·
In light of the principle of
mutual strategic needs and the principle of burden-sharing, ongoing common
security challenges including maritime security, nuclear proliferation and
failing states necessitate further development of the ICI’s content and working
mechanisms. There are issues that should be incorporated in NATO’s agenda that
represent the Gulf perspective, including Iran’s nuclear program and its impact
on the strategic equilibrium in the Arabian Gulf region.[83]
·
The main questions dominating
academic meetings between NATO officials and the GCC states remain whether NATO
has a practical strategic vision for Arabian Gulf security that is commensurate
with the importance of this region, or if this vision is part of a broader NATO
perception of its global security role. Regardless, the concepts and lexicon
are not sufficient to achieve security in the Gulf region. True partnership is
built upon real commitment by both parties.
·
Partnership must be mutual
and not unilateral, meaning that the question posed by the GCC states should
not remain: what does NATO offer us? Also, NATO should not look at the GCC
states as a financer of its military operations and “smart defense plans”.
·
Gulf publics needs to be better
more informed about NATO policies. Knowledge should not be confined to those military
and civil personnel who have the opportunity to visit NATO headquarters and its
academic institutions; rather, NATO publications and activities in Arabic
should be made available in Arab libraries that lack such literature.
A Statement on Energy Security
|
I |
t
is a great pleasure for me to be part of this important event. At the outset, I
would like to congratulate the American University in the Emirates (AUE) as
well as the NATO Secretariat for having co-organized this conference on the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
My special thanks go to Prof. Firuz Demir
Yaşamış, Interim Director of Security and Strategic Studies as well as of the
Master of Arts in Diplomacy Program of AUE, for giving me the opportunity to
take part in this final panel. I am sure that the discussions that have taken
place here today will contribute to further enhancing the ICI partnership
between NATO and ICI member countries from this important region of the world.
On a personal note, being an alumnus of the
NATO Defense College and a diplomat having dealt with NATO affairs in the past,
and having also served at the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Abu Dhabi in 2009–2010
during the first two years of my tenure in this country, it is good to be among
some of the members of the larger Atlantic Community and members of the NATO
Secretariat on this occasion here in Dubai.
I would like to underline that we in Turkey are
very proud and happy to give the name of our beautiful city of Istanbul to this
important initiative (ICI) that connects some of the countries of the GCC to
the Western Alliance of which Turkey is a part. We are glad to see that Saudi
Arabia and Oman have also shown interest in joining the ICI. As a long-standing member of the Alliance, Turkey is ready
to contribute to the development of closer relations between NATO and the Gulf
countries, both in the framework of the ICI and on a bilateral basis. In this
regard, increased participation of the ICI countries in the training activities
offered by the PfP Training Center in Ankara might be useful in their efforts
towards enhancing cooperation and promoting interoperability with NATO.
On a particular note, I would like to extend
our appreciation to the Government of the UAE, being the first Arab and Gulf
Country to have a permanent mission at the NATO premises in Brussels, headed by
Ambassador Mohammed Al-Naqbi. The UAE Mission at the NATO HQ was inaugurated in
April 2013, and we welcome this breakthrough in NATO’s relationship with the
Gulf. This kind of “embedded relationship” between ICI partners and the NATO HQ
will pave the way for more integrated and closer contacts at all levels.
As you all know, Turkey joined NATO back in
1952, almost 61 years ago. And since the very beginning, she has contributed militarily
to the security of the Western Alliance and the free world as a buffer zone
between the Western and Eastern blocks. As the southern flank country of the
Alliance, and having the second largest army within NATO after the US, Turkey
has made immense contributions and many sacrifices to protect the southern
borders and territories of NATO, especially during the Cold War era.
The situation is equally valid under today’s
circumstances. Geographically, Turkey is the closest NATO member to the
conflict zones of the Middle East. Unfortunately, nowadays we are witnessing
very serious and grave conflicts in our region, especially in Iraq and Syria,
which pose “a serious security threat” to Turkey and NATO, as well as to all
other countries in the Middle East region, including the Gulf states. The Arab Spring is far from over, and there
are a lot of question marks as to the future of the region. This necessitates
much closer cooperation and collaboration between NATO and regional countries,
under various different partnership programs and mechanisms.
In this respect, Turkey is no longer merely the
flank country of the Western Alliance or simply located on the edges of Europe,
Asia or the Middle East. Nowadays, we find ourselves at the epicenter of a
widening geography.
Needless to say, the Gulf region is very
important to Turkey. We have historical, cultural, political, and economic ties
with this region. The history of Arab–Turkish relations is that of two
brotherly peoples, bound together by close cultural, social, religious, and
historical ties.
For centuries, our peoples lived side by side,
shared a common destiny and contributed extensively to world civilization. During
the last decade, we have developed and diversified our relations with the GCC
countries both on a bilateral and multilateral basis.
The Turkey-GCC High Level Strategic Dialogue
Mechanism, which was established in 2008, is the first mechanism that the GCC
has ever established with a third country for consultation on a regular
basis. The Strategic Dialogue aims to develop
existing good relations between Turkey and the GCC countries in a more
structured manner. For this purpose, a regular mechanism for cooperation and consultation
has been established, mainly to cover the fields of politics, economics,
defense, security, and culture. According to the Joint Action Plan, which was
approved in 2010, 11 joint working groups were established.
I have to confess, of course, that being one of
the last speakers of any conference is a difficult task that carries a high risk
of repeating what has already been said by its distinguished speakers and
panelists.
Therefore, I will try to refrain, as much as I
can, from making this mistake, and to approach the concept of “security” from a
different perspective which is very important for this region, namely energy
security.
Energy security remains at the top of the
agenda of our times because of the simple reason that energy is crucial not
only for our daily lives, but also for our countries and economies as well.
The affordable and uninterrupted extraction and
flow of energy is of significant importance for the well-being of our peoples,
as well as for the economic development of our countries. In this regard, the
issue of energy security lies at the heart of the security and prosperity of
our populations and future generations.
When we talk about energy security, we must
underline the fact that there are two sides to this coin, one being supply
security, the other demand security. Needless to say, both are crucial. From
the supply security side, a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification
of routes, suppliers, and energy resources and the interconnectivity of energy
networks remain of critical importance. Therefore, energy security is often
associated with issues of foreign policy, national security, economic welfare,
and global stability. The developments in energy markets have an increasing
impact around the globe as a consequence of the growing interdependencies among
our countries. Because of this and under present circumstances, when we address
this subject we must also take into consideration the political and
geopolitical conjuncture that surrounds us.
It is of particular importance that we maintain
political stability and peace in our regions, and we should aim to minimize the
negative effects of developments in energy markets through international
cooperation.
The GCC region is very rich in terms of energy resources,
namely fossil fuels and renewable energies beginning with solar. GCC countries
are amongst the biggest producers and exporters of oil and natural gas to world
markets. Beyond that, especially in recent years, they have also become major consumers
of their own products owing to their growing economies and populations.
The energy sector remains the main driving
force behind their economies, and they greatly contribute to the energy
security of the globe. This will continue in the years to come; therefore, the security
of the means of energy supply is very important—by that I mean the sea-lanes
and pipelines through which these products are transported. As you heard during
the second panel, which addressed “Piracy and Maritime Cooperation,” much is
being done in this sphere. The continuation of this process is vital to the
global economy as well as to the individual economies of the region. As 20
percent of Turkey’s foreign trade is carried through the region, the
continuation of counter piracy efforts is of particular importance to my
country too. As it stands, Turkey contributes both to Operation Ocean Shield
and CTF-151. We also assist in exploring
the ways in which action at sea may be enhanced. Naval forces remain relevant
in the fight against piracy and NATO is a well-equipped actor. On that basis we
have supported both an enhanced mandate for Ocean Shield and the extension of
its mandate until the end of 2014. We would like to see more robust action on
the part of the international community and in particular NATO to address root
causes of piracy.
As you know, Energy Security entered the agenda
of NATO back in 2006, following the crisis between the Russian Federation and
the Ukraine, which negatively affected the flow of natural gas to Western
Europe. Since then, NATO has been addressing this issue.
We welcome
NATO’s progress achieved in this area since the Riga Summit in 2006 and we
appreciate the work of the relevant NATO committees and bodies, which
constitutes an added value to the domain.
Most recently, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Heads of States and
Governments noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken
since the Lisbon Summit and describe the way forward to integrate energy
security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities, as and where
appropriate.
We will continue to support the role that the
Alliance will play in energy security, based on agreed principles and the
guidelines. Nevertheless, we think that any concrete role NATO could eventually
play should be upon request,; should aim at complementing existing national and
international efforts; and should be subject to a decision by the North
Atlantic Council.
NATO
and Gulf Regional Security
Cooperation
Rolf Schwarz
|
L |
ooking at Regional Cooperation from NATO’s
perspective, we can first of all say that NATO’s relations with the Gulf region
are part of the Alliance’s wider outreach to countries and organization around
the globe. Secondly, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit
in November 2010, clearly states that “cooperative security” is one of the
Alliances’ core tasks, that NATO does not consider any country to be its
adversary, and that the best way of assuring NATO’s security is through a wide
network of partner relations with like-minded countries around the globe.[84]
Third, NATO’s new Strategic Concept further
recognises that the threats facing NATO’s security today can emanate from
instability or conflict beyond NATO’s borders, including extremism, terrorism,
and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics,
and people.[85]
Many of these trans-national challenges are shared by the Gulf countries, and
therefore cooperation between NATO and the Gulf states seems, from a NATO point
of view, most logical and natural.
The Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI): What Has Been
Achieved?
Launched in 2004, NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI) is a relatively young initiative, but it has in its nine years
of existence already made major inroads into NATO–Gulf cooperation. This was
most evident during the recent Libya crisis, where the close interaction
between the Gulf states – in particular Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) – and NATO member states has helped to move towards the swift
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which
authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya. Indeed, one can
argue that the Gulf states have moved from being security consumers to being security
providers.
This is also
exemplified by the political and operational support provided in one way or the
other by the ICI countries to the NATO-led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. From this, one can clearly see how far cooperation
between NATO and the Gulf states has evolved to produce concrete joint
operational missions.
Indeed, the crisis in
Libya in 2011 is probably the best illustration of the benefits of NATO–Gulf
cooperation. The crisis highlighted the interconnectedness of security in the
21st century; being on NATO’s doorstep affected not only the
security of NATO member countries but also the security of NATO’s partners in
the region. In fact, it was calls from the region – notably from the GCC and
Arab League Ministerial Meetings in March 2011 – that led to the decision by
the UN Security Council to approve UNSCR 1973 and later to NATO’s decision to
implement that resolution by, among other things, enforcing a no-fly zone over
Libya.
One might argue that
the fact that NATO had been engaged for many years with these Arab countries
through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)
and has thereby built mutual understanding, confidence and trust, enabled – politically
– the Alliance to engage with regional actors in implementing the UN mandate.
In that sense, the Libyan crisis also underlined the full potential of NATO’s
cooperation with the countries of the region through the concrete contributions
by Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE to the NATO-led Operation Unified
Protector.
The unprecedented level
of cooperation between NATO and the Gulf States underlines that the ICI
partnership has come a long way, even though Oman and Saudi Arabia have not yet
officially joined the initiative. Indeed, the advantages of the ICI partnership
are that they offer a forum for political and military consultations that
facilitate mutual trust that can lead to concrete security cooperation. Indeed,
the level of political dialogue has increased tremendously over the years.
The secretary general
and his deputy, together with the entire North Atlantic Council, have visited
all four ICI partners: Kuwait in 2006; Bahrain in 2008; the UAE in 2009; and
Qatar in 2011. During these visits and resultant meetings, representatives from
the other two GCC member states, Oman and Saudi Arabia, as well as the
secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council participated. In 2012 alone,
the secretary general of the GCC, the prime minister of Qatar, and the minister
of state for foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia visited NATO headquarters to hold
consultations. Additional high-level political consultations took place in the
framework of the ICI through the North Atlantic Council seminar on February 14,
2012 in order to discuss ways to deepen the ICI partnership ahead of the NATO
Chicago Summit. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, three Gulf foreign ministers
(from Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE) represented their governments in different
meetings. If one adds the bi-annual ISAF ministerial meetings, as well as the
ministerial meetings during Operation Unified Protector in 2011, one can easily
make the case that political dialogue between NATO and the Gulf states is
closer and more regular than ever before. If one adds also issue-specific
meetings, such as on anti-piracy, military affairs or education, one can also
include Saudi Arabia and Oman in this equation and thus argue that, confidentially,
NATO’s regular consultations with all the Gulf states has advanced considerably
and seen concrete expression in joint operations (OUP and ISAF) where Gulf
nations have supported NATO missions through military, financial and other
contributions.
Working within the ICI
framework has also allowed NATO member states to contribute towards better
mutual understanding, especially given joint education and training efforts,
and has thereby diminished the misperceptions that existed when the ICI
initiative was launched. Indeed, the founding document of the ICI mentions in
article 9 that “this initiative would carry NATO into a new set of relationships with countries that may have a limited understanding of the Alliance as
it has been transformed” (emphasis added).
With the decision in 2011 of the United Arab Emirates to assign an
ambassador to the NATO headquarters and to open a related mission – making it
the first Middle Eastern country ever to do so – one can ascertain that this
characterisation no longer applies.
The relationship
between NATO and the Gulf countries has been elevated significantly, and both
sides know each other well and appreciate the cooperation they have attained.
The offer by Kuwait to host a Regional ICI Centre in Kuwait
City, announced at the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, will further advance the
level of interaction and understanding.
The Arab Spring and NATO’s Partnership
with the Middle East
Contrary to public perception, NATO is not new to the Middle East region: the Alliance has two
complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks, the Mediterranean Dialogue (since
1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, and builds on these to
tailor cooperation toward the specific needs and priorities of partners,
particularly in view of the recent developments of the Arab Spring.
Unprecedented changes
have taken place in the Middle East region, and its people
have decided to take their destiny into their own hands, calling for better
living conditions and more democratic and accountable governments that respect their
fundamental human rights and provide them with better services. These changes
are political, social and economic in character, and they are therefore
primarily a matter of domestic political stability. The three most prominent
cases are Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.
NATO’s existing MD and
ICI cooperation is well structured and able to adjust to the changes witnessed
in the region. There is clearly a need to reach out to new elites, continue
engagement through more political dialogue (such as visits to and by NATO
officials), and via practical cooperation within individual programmes (“Individual
Partnership and Cooperation Programmes”). NATO has also made it clear that it
stands ready, as an Alliance, to support the ongoing transitions in the area of
security institution building, defence modernisation, security sector reform,
building integrity, and best practices in defence budgeting and the democratic
control of armed forces.
The NATO Summit in
Chicago in May 2012 sent a strong signal of cooperation
to the Middle East and North Africa region. NATO’s heads of state and government affirmed that at a time of unprecedented change in the
Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to strengthening and
developing partnerships with countries in the region with which “we face common
security challenges and share the same goals for peace, security, and
stability.” NATO leaders further affirmed that, “NATO supports the aspirations of the people of the
region for democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law – values which
underpin the Alliance.”
NATO–Gulf Relations:
Challenges and the Way Ahead
Clear
progress has already been achieved through the ICI, both in the political
dialogue with Gulf countries and in practical dimensions with ICI partners.
NATO has increased its offer of cooperation to ICI countries each year since
the launch of the initiative in 2004, and with the decision at the Berlin
foreign ministerial meeting in April 2011 and subsequent establishment of a
single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all of NATO’s partners, the
number of activities accessible to ICI countries has expanded considerably. Looking
to the future, a challenge will be to develop concrete practical cooperation
projects in areas of interest to the Gulf states – notably energy, maritime and
cyber security – to underline the fact that NATO’s ICI partnership responds to
the security needs of Gulf states and brings mutual benefits. There is also a
need to work towards more regular contacts and political dialogue between NATO
and the GCC – such as the visit by the GCC Secretary General to NATO
headquarters in January 2012 and the visit by the NATO Deputy Secretary General
to Riyadh in December 2012 – with the aim of establishing working relations
between the two secretariats.
Finally, there is a need to continue building
trust and maintain a dialogue-based public diplomacy strategy for NATO’s
cooperative activities with ICI countries.
Much care must be taken in ensuring NATO is not misperceived as
intrusive or wishing to take advantage of the current phase of domestic changes
taking place in some countries of the Middle East. Such misperceptions could
backfire and set back many years of work undertaken jointly by NATO with ICI and
MD countries to correct misperceptions, build mutual understanding and trust,
and thereby contribute to long-term regional security and stability.
Findings,
Conclusions and
Recommendations
|
A |
s
a result of the presentations and discussions of the various papers presented
by the attendees, the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Conference, on which a strong consensus has been achieved by all participants,
comprise the following.
1.
Clear progress has already
been achieved through the ICI, both in the political dialogue with Gulf
countries and in practical dimensions with ICI partners. NATO has increased its
offer of cooperation to ICI countries each year since the launch of the
initiative in 2004, and with the establishment of a single Partnership
Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all of NATO’s partners, it has considerably expanded
the number of activities accessible to ICI countries.
2.
Although it is sometimes
unpredictable and frustrating as an ally, and despite several failures in the
past, the USA still has an abiding commitment to shared values of freedom,
democracy, human rights and security with NATO members and Gulf countries.
3.
In the future, concrete and
practical cooperation projects in areas of interest to the Gulf States should
be pursued; i.e. in nuclear security, energy security, maritime security and
piracy, and cyber security. This will align NATO’s ICI partnership with the
security needs of Gulf states, and will bring benefits to both sides. There
should be more formal and regular contacts in this regard in the future.
4.
Economic, financial and
budgetary crises are affecting the defense priorities of the USA, which
necessarily affect NATO priorities in turn (such as the size and orientation of
the US Army, and placing more emphasis on the Middle East and Asia Pacific
regions). This does not mean that the United States will lose interest in
Europe, but the Middle East and the Gulf will remain important US
priorities. The outbreak of the Arab
Spring has already pressure on US policy towards the region, and cooperation
will continue to be framed by the Arab-Israeli dispute and the nuclear issue
with Tehran. Additionally, the Syrian case will play an important role in the
policies of the US toward the Middle East.
5.
There
are reservations among the leaders of the Gulf countries concerning the role of
NATO in the region. These countries like to see that the NATO and the USA be ready
to take more responsibilities for the defense of the Region, not only to the threats such as anti-ballistic missiles and
nuclear and cyber wars but also to regional security threats such as energy
security, piracy in high seas, and maritime security. Dealing with these kinds
of challenges to regional security seems to be beyond the capacities of the states
taking place in the Gulf Region.[Editor8]
6.
NATO
should develop a more concrete strategic vision for the security of the Gulf commensurate
with the importance of the region, especially to energy security. Partnership
must be reciprocal, comprehensive and not unilateral. NATO should not view its regional
partners as potential financers, whilst at the same time the ICI/GCC countries
should not expect all the major sacrifices and responsibilities to be
shouldered by the Alliance alone.
7.
Cooperation
and collaboration between the ICI and GCC countries and NATO in future should
be based upon the principles of collective security and cost- and burden-sharing.
8.
As agreed at the Chicago
Summit in 2012 by the Heads of States and Governments, and clearly stated at the
Lisbon Summit, the vitally important energy security component of NATO’s
policies and activities require further deliberation and elaboration.
9.
NATO activities must not be
perceived as being intrusive, and the Alliance mustn’t be seen as seeking to take
advantage of the current phase of domestic changes taking place in a number of countries
in the Middle East. Such misperceptions could backfire and undermine many years
of work undertaken jointly by NATO and the ICI countries to correct such misperceptions,
build mutual understanding and trust, and thereby contribute to long-term
regional security and stability.
10. NATO should give priority to public
diplomacy to eliminate misperceptions and conspiracy theories in the region. Gulf public opinion must be better-informed
concerning NATO policies toward the region. There
is a need to continue building trust and to maintain a dialogue-based public
diplomacy strategy alongside NATO’s cooperative activities with ICI
countries. NATO and the US have lost credibility and trust among
some groups in the Middle East—especially as a result of previous
administrations’ unilateral actions. This can feed conspiracy theories and
perceptions of a “hidden agenda.” However, public diplomacy can play a very
effective role in combating such views.
Kurt Volker
F. Stephen Larrabee
Cuneyt Yenigun
Ashraf Mohammed Kishk
Şefik Vural Altay
Rolf Schwarz
[Editor9] Firuz
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*
The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author and do
not reflect those of the RAND Corporation or any of its sponsors.
[1]
For a detailed discussion, see: Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Daniel S. Hamilton, (ed.),
Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st
Century (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004).
[2]
For a detailed analysis see: F. Stephen Larrabee, et al. Stuart E. Johnson,
John Gordon IV, Peter A. Wilson, Caroline Baxter, Deborah Lai, Calin
Trentkov-Wermuth, “NATO and the Challenges of Austerity” MG-1156-OSD (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), pp. 6–18.
[3]
See: The White House, “Fact Sheet: The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” Office
of the Press Secretary, June 29, 2004.
[4]
For a comprehensive discussion, see: Larrabee, et al., NATO and the
Challenges of Austerity, RAND Corporation, MG-1196-OSD, pp.
1–3, 99–101.
[5]
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO After Libya,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4, July/August 2011, p. 3.
[6]
Ibid., 2011, p. 3.
[7]
See: former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s remarks at the 2012 annual
Munich Security Conference, February 4, 2012. Former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta also sought to reassure European allies that the US focus on Asia would
not result in a neglect of Europe, noting that “our military footprint in
Europe will remain larger than in any other region in the world. That’s not
only because the peace and prosperity of Europe is critically important to the
United States, but because Europe is our security partner, our security partner
of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world.” See:
Panetta, remarks at the 2012 Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2012. The
joint appearance of Panetta and Clinton at the conference was a first and was
designed to underscore that the United States would not abandon its European
allies as it turned its attention toward the Asia-Pacific region. See:
Elizabeth Bumuller and Steven Erlanger, “Panetta and Clinton Seek to Reassure
Europe on Defense,” New York Times,
February 5, 2012.
[8]
For the text of Obama’s speech see: the Washington Post, September 24,
2013.
[9]
Louise Fawcett, “Regional Institutions,” in Paul D. Williams (ed.), Security
Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), p. 360.
[10]
UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 52.
[11]
Fawcett, op. cit., p. 362.
[12]Richard
Price and Mark Zacher, The United Nations and Global Security, New York,
Palgrave, 2004, pp. 173-184.
[13]
Matteo Legrenzi, “The Peninsula Shield Force: End of a Symbol?” Insights
no. 3, July 2006, p. 11.
[14]
Ravi Sheknar Narain Singh, Asian Strategic and Military Perspective
(Lancer Publishers, India, 2005), pp. 375–6.
[15]
Malcolm C. Peck, The A to Z of the Gulf Arab States (Lanham, MD:
Scarecrow Press, 2010),
p. 31.
[16]
“Gulf states launch joint military force for security,” Al-Arabiya, December
15, 2009 (http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/12/15/94203.html).
[17]Frederic
Wehrey, “Combating Unconventional Threats in the Gulf: Convergence and
Divergence between the GCC and the West,” in Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessi
(eds.), The Uneasy Balance, Potential and Challenges of the West’s Relations
with the Gulf States (Rome: Nuova Cultura Press, 2013), p. 103.
[18]Legrenzi,
op. cit., pp. 11–12.
[19]
Eman Ragab, “Bridging the Gulf with Iraq,” Op-Med: Opinion on the
Mediterranean, Washington, July 2013, p. 2.
[20]
Muqbil Al-Saeri, “A Talk with PSF Commander Mutlaq bin Salim Al Azima,” Asharq
Al-Awsat, London, March 28, 2011
(http://www.webcitation.org/5xYJcDTUV).
[21]
Fride, “The Gulf in the New World Order: A Forgotten Emerging Power,” Working
Paper, Madrid, September 2010, p. 11.
[22]
Wehrey, op. cit., p. 104.
[23]
John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold
War,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 34–41; Kenneth Waltz,
“The Emerging Structure if International Politics,” International Security,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 54, 57.
[24]
Celeste A. Wallander and Robert Keohane, “Risk, Threat and Security
Institutions,” in H. Haftendorn, R.O. Keohane and C.A. Wallander (eds.), Imperfect
Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), pp. 26, 34.
[25]
The NRC replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for consultation
and cooperation created by the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the formal basis for
NATO–Russia relations. The NRC is a mechanism for consultation,
consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, in which the
individual NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners on a wide
spectrum of security issues of common interest; see: (http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about/).
[26]
Michael Pugh, “Peace Operations,” in Paul D. Williams (ed.), Security
Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), p. 404.
[28]
For more information, see: NATO, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_60021.htm).
[29]
For more information, see: NATO, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)” (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58787.htm).
[30]
Pierre Razoux, “What Future for NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative?” NATO
Research Paper no. 55, Rome, January 2010, p. 3.
[31]
Ibid., p. 3.
[32]
Ibid., p. 1.
[33]
Matteo Legrenzi, “NATO in the Gulf: Who is Doing Whom in Favor?” Middle East
Policy, vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 2007, p. 73.
[34]
Andrea Dessi, “Potential Challenges of EU–US Relations with the GCC,” in Alcaro
and Dessi, op. cit., p. 137.
[35]
Gulf Research Center (GRC), Assessment of the Security Situation in Iran,
Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and the Arab Gulf States, Gulf Paper, April 2013, pp.
7–8.
[36] Wehrey, op. cit., p. 97.
[37] Wehrey, op. cit., p. 106.
[38] Ibid., p. 102.
[39]
NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,” November 2010, p.
9
[40]
Razoux, op. cit., pp. 4–8.
[41]
See also: Florence Gaub, “The Odd Couple: NATO and the GCC,” in Alcaro and
Dessi, op. cit., p. 118.
[42] See also: Dessi, op. cit., p. 144.
[43]
Tobias Schumacher, Transatlantic Cooperation in the Middle East and North
Africa and the Growing Role of the Gulf States, Mediterranean Paper Series,
German Marshall Fund of the US, Washington, 2010, p. 23.
[44]
GRC, op. cit., p. 1.
[45]
Jean-Loup Samaan, “NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Case?” NATO
Research Paper no. 83, Rome, October 2012, p. 6.
[46]
Gaub, op. cit., p. 119.
[47]
GRC, op. cit., p. 5.
[48]
Kenneth Katzman, “Oman: Reform, Security and the US Policy,” US Congressional
Research Service, Washington, July 12, 2013, p. 9.
[49]
Samaan, op. cit., p. 7.
[50]
Razoux, op. cit., p. 11.
[51]
GRC, op. cit., p. 6.
[52]
Razoux, op. cit., p. 8, cites Mahmoud Vaezi.
[53]
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Delivering Security in the 21st
Century” (http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/2012).
[54]
Kuwait joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in December
2004, Bahrain in February 2005 and the UAE in June 2005.
[55]
The full text of the ICI can be found on the NATO website (www.nato.int/).
[56]
See the closing statement of the NATO Chicago Summit on the NATO
website (www.nato.int/).
[57] The Defense College in the UAE was established
pursuant to federal decree no. 1 for the year 2012; Emirates News Agency (WAM),
August 2012.
[58] Dr.
Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “On the occasion of the visit of the NATO’s delegate to
Bahrain: Any added value of NATO to the Gulf security?” Bahrain Centre for
Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT) website, February 29,
2013.
[59] Rolf Schwarz, “NATO relations with the Gulf Region,”
in Riccardo Alcaro and Andera Dessi (eds.), The Uneasy Balance: Potential
Challenges of the West Relations with the Gulf States (Rome: Instituto
Affari Interntionali, 2012).
[60] Published
in Bahrain’s Al-Watan newspaper, April 13, 2013.
[61] See the
text of speech by the former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta before the
Asia Security Summit (http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-panetta/).
[62] Ashraf
Kishk, “The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Agreement between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council: Obstacles
and Propositions,” NATO Defense College, Rome 2009.
[63] Ashraf Kishk, Strategic requirements to turn to a
state of Gulf union, op. cit.
[64] International
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 2012.
[65] Dr.
Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “The Gulf and the NATO: Towards More Balanced
Relations,” Oman newspaper, January 2010.
[66] Dr.
Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “The NATO from new partnership to intervention in Arab
crises,” International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Center for Political
and Strategic Studies, Cairo, July 2011.
[67] Kishk,
On the occasion …,” op. cit.
[68] Ashraf
Kishk, “Arab Spring: Challenge or Opportunity for the NATO: Libya as a Model,”
Fourth Transatlantic Security Forum, “Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of
the Arab Uprising,” Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2011.
[69] Mohammed
Saif Haider, NATO in the Gulf of Aden: Fighting against Piracy and other
Purposes, Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies, 2012.
[70] Al Hayat
Newspaper, 11 November 2012.
[71] Kenneth
M. Pollack , “Securing the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.
[72] Rolf
Schwarz, “Preventing State Failure: A proposed agenda for NATO” in Christopher
M. Schnaubelt, Complex Operations (Rome: NATO Defence College,
2010).
[73] Dr. Ashraf Kishk, Strategic requirements to turn to a
state of Gulf union, Strategic Study, Bahrain Centre for Strategic,
International and Energy Studies (DERASAT), June 2013.
[74] Gulnur
Aybet, The Four Stages of NATO partnership Frameworks: Rethinking regional Partnerships with the
Middle East and North Africa (In Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO Capabilities
Operations and Partnerships) Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2013.
[75] Jean
Loup Samaan, NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Cause?, NATO Defense
College, Rome 2012.
[76] Dr.
Ashraf Kishk, Limits of NATO’s expected role in the Palestinian cause, Omani
Oman newspaper, August 2011.
[77] Excerpt
from speech of Dr. Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary General of the Gulf
Cooperation Council before the “NATO-Gulf Strategic Dialogue” seminar, the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 28 May 2013, Manama.
[78] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and the Arab Spring,” Asharq
Al-Awsat, June 3, 2011.
[79] Discussions of the NATO-Gulf Strategic Dialogue seminar,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Manama, May 2013, op. cit.
[80] Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “NATO’s New Policies and their
Regional Implications,” Oman newspaper, January 12, 2011.
[81]
Islam Memo website, May 28, 2012.
[82]
Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “On the occasion of the visit of the
Manama Dialogue, Gulf Regional Security and World Security,” published on the
Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT)
website, February 2013.
[83]
“New Perspective on NATO–Gulf Partnership,” NATO Review magazine,
March 2013.
[84] See articles 3, 16 and 26 of NATO’s New Strategic
Concept, adopted in November 2010.
[85] See article 11, ibid.
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