The Role of Judicial Interventions in Turkey's Democratic Backsliding

 

 

 

Prof. Dr. Firuz Demir Yaşamış

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract

This article introduces the concept of the judicial coup to explain how judicial institutions may be incrementally repurposed to reshape political competition while preserving formal constitutional continuity. Distinct from judicial capture, which emphasizes executive control over courts, judicial coups involve purposive institutional work by judicial actors themselves. Through reinterpretation of legal hierarchies, selective compliance with superior court rulings, and procedural reconfiguration, courts can contribute to the restructuring of accountability mechanisms without suspending legality.

Using process tracing and drawing on hoop and smoking-gun tests, the article analyzes judicial interventions in Turkey as an illustrative case of institutional conversion. The findings demonstrate how rule-bound bureaucratic institutions may be administratively reoriented toward executive-centered governance while maintaining formal legality. By conceptualizing judicial coups as a form of institutional work, the article bridges democratic backsliding research and public administration theory, highlighting how bureaucratic autonomy and rule-bound authority can be repurposed without overt institutional breakdown.

Keywords: Judicial coups, Bureaucratic autonomy, Institutional conversion, Rule of law, Democratic backsliding, Public administration theory

 

Evidence to Practice

The findings of this study suggest that preventing judicial coups requires reinforcing specific administrative safeguards at points where institutional conversion becomes possible. The following implications emerge directly from the mechanisms identified in the Turkish case.

·        Institutionalize Merit-Based and Transparent Appointment Systems in Judicial Public Services:  Because judicial coups rely on reconfiguring appointment and promotion rules, reform efforts should prioritize insulating judicial career pathways from partisan discretion. Independent appointment commissions with published evaluation criteria, transparent scoring procedures, and multi-actor representation reduce opportunities for loyalty-based staffing that enables institutional conversion.

·        Enforce Hierarchical Compliance and Constitutional Supremacy: The refusal of lower courts to implement binding constitutional rulings represents a critical mechanism of institutional erosion. Administrative reforms should clarify enforcement procedures for noncompliance, establish disciplinary triggers for hierarchical defiance, and publicly document compliance rates to prevent normalization of rule reinterpretation.

·        Constrain Discretion in Pre-Trial and Regulatory Decisions: Expansive use of pre-trial detention and regulatory sanctions demonstrates how procedural tools can be weaponized without formal legal change. Clear statutory limits, mandatory written justification standards, and periodic independent review of discretionary decisions can reduce the scope for strategic reinterpretation.

·        Increase Transparency in Electoral and Media Oversight Bodies: Because electoral councils and media regulators can function as para-judicial actors, their decision-making processes should be fully transparent. Publication of dissenting opinions, open hearings, and independent auditing mechanisms strengthen accountability and reduce the risk of institutional drift toward partisan enforcement.

·       Develop Institutional Drift Monitoring Mechanisms: Judicial coups unfold incrementally rather than dramatically. Public administration systems should incorporate early-warning indicators, including patterns of appointment concentration, escalating use of emergency procedures, increasing noncompliance with higher-court rulings, disproportionate regulatory targeting of opposition actors and monitoring cumulative patterns rather than isolated events enhances democratic resilience.

 

 

Introduction

In recent years, Turkey has experienced an accelerated process of democratic backsliding characterized not by overt military intervention but by the strategic reconfiguration of legal and administrative institutions of the public administration. Among the most consequential yet under-theorized dynamics in this process is the transformation of judicial institutions from guardians of constitutional order into instruments of executive consolidation. Rather than merely succumbing to political pressure, segments of the judiciary have actively participated in restructuring political competition, constraining opposition actors, creating severe bureaupathologies and reshaping the public sphere.

This article introduces and develops the concept of judicial coups to explain this phenomenon. Unlike classic coups d’Etat, judicial coups operate through formal legal mechanisms and institutional procedures. They unfold incrementally, through judicial rulings, prosecutorial strategies, administrative regulations, and electoral oversight decisions that cumulatively alter the balance of political power while preserving the appearance of legality.

To ground this concept within institutional theory, the article draws on Douglass North’s definition of institutions as formal and informal rules structuring political interaction. Judicial bodies such as courts, electoral councils, and regulatory authorities are organizations embedded within these institutional frameworks. When the rules governing appointments, oversight, compliance, and professional norms are altered, institutions themselves are transformed. In line with Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s distinction between inclusive and extractive institutions, the Turkish case illustrates how legal-administrative institutions can shift from enabling political pluralism to entrenching executive dominance.

The article further engages contemporary debates in public administration regarding state capacity and democratic governance. As Francis Fukuyama argues, effective governance depends not only on electoral legitimacy but also on professional, rule-bound, and autonomous bureaucratic institutions. When judicial institutions lose autonomy and become politically instrumentalized, state capacity is redirected from public value creation toward regime preservation. This shift fundamentally alters what John J. Kirlin describes as the value-creating functions of government, fairness, accountability, and procedural integrity.

Empirically, the article analyzes a series of interrelated judicial and para-judicial interventions in Turkey, including:

Interference in opposition political parties (e.g., the Republican People’s Party- CHP and the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party- DEM),

The annulment of electoral outcomes,

The strategic role of Criminal Magistrate Judgeships,

Regulatory interventions by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK),

Conflicts between high courts regarding constitutional authority.

Through process tracing and temporal mapping, the study identifies four dimensions of institutional transformation:

Structural and organizational capture,

Electoral and political manipulation,

Procedural coercion through legal mechanisms,

Control over the public sphere and political discourse.

Rather than treating the judiciary as merely a victim of executive aggrandizement, this article demonstrates how judicial actors engage in institutional work that actively facilitates democratic erosion. In doing so, it expands the literature on democratic backsliding by incorporating judicial coups as a distinct mechanism of institutional transformation.

Finally, the article contributes to public administration scholarship by identifying how professional norms, merit-based appointment systems, and hierarchical compliance mechanisms within judicial bureaucracies can be systematically reengineered to undermine democratic resilience. The Turkish case thus offers broader lessons about the vulnerability and potential recovery of administrative institutions in hybrid and competitive authoritarian regimes.

Positioning Within Public Administration

Although judicial politics is frequently analyzed within comparative political science, courts are also complex bureaucratic organizations embedded within administrative systems. They recruit personnel, allocate public resources, operate hierarchical compliance structures, and deliver a core public service: the administration of justice. As such, transformations within judicial institutions raise central concerns of public administration, including bureaucratic autonomy, merit-based staffing, procedural integrity, and accountability mechanisms. The developments analyzed in this article therefore represent not only democratic backsliding, but also institutional degradation within judicial administration. By conceptualizing judicial coups as a form of institutional work inside bureaucratic structures, the article bridges democratic erosion scholarship and public administration theory.

Courts are not only constitutional guardians but also bureaucratic organizations responsible for delivering a core public service: the administration of justice. Their internal staffing rules, compliance hierarchies, and professional norms are matters of public administration. The transformation analyzed in this article therefore represents not only democratic erosion but administrative degradation. Conceptual Framework: Judicial Coups as Institutional Procedure

Institutions, Organizations, and Agency

To conceptualize judicial coups rigorously, it is necessary to distinguish between institutions, organizations, and actors. Following Douglass North, institutions are the formal and informal rules that structure political and administrative interaction. These include constitutional provisions, appointment procedures, norms of judicial independence, hierarchical compliance obligations, and professional codes. Organizations, such as constitutional courts, electoral councils, ministries of justice, and regulatory agencies, operate within and reproduce these institutional frameworks. Actors (judges, prosecutors, political executives) exercise agency within these structures.

Democratic backsliding, therefore, is not merely organizational turnover or partisan conflict; it is a transformation of the rules that govern how public authority is exercised. Building on Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, institutions can be understood as inclusive when they constrain power and ensure pluralism, or extractive when they centralize authority and restrict competition. Judicial coups represent a mechanism through which inclusive legal-administrative institutions are incrementally converted into extractive ones.

Judicial Capture vs. Judicial Coup

Although judicial coups share features with judicial capture, the two concepts denote distinct mechanisms of institutional transformation. Judicial capture refers to a process in which external political actors (most often the executive) gain structural control over judicial institutions through appointments, disciplinary reforms, court-packing, or budgetary leverage. The judiciary is treated primarily as an object of political control; agency lies outside the court.

By contrast, a judicial coup is a sustained process in which judicial actors themselves engage in purposive institutional work that reconfigures rule systems, compliance hierarchies, and political competition while maintaining formal legality. Here, agency lies within the judiciary. Courts are not merely controlled; they actively participate in institutional conversion.

Three distinctions clarify this difference. First, location of agency. Capture is executive-driven and restructures courts externally. Judicial coups involve judicial actors co-producing regime consolidation through institutional action. Second, mechanism of change. Capture operates through structural control over personnel and institutional design. Judicial coups operate through reinterpretation of rules, transformation of precedent, and selective enforcement that cumulatively alter institutional functioning. Third, is mode of operation. Capture often entails visible institutional restructuring. Judicial coups unfold incrementally within existing legal frameworks, preserving formal legality while altering administrative practice.

Judicial capture may create enabling conditions for judicial coups, but it does not necessarily produce them. A captured court may remain passive; a judicial coup requires active institutional reengineering by judicial actors. Judicial coups therefore represent not an advanced stage of capture but a qualitatively distinct form of institutional transformation centered on judicial agency.

From Judicial Capture to Judicial Agency

Existing scholarship on democratic backsliding typically conceptualizes courts either as victims of constitutional capture or as arenas reshaped by executive interference. These perspectives effectively explain executive-driven restructuring but under-theorize judicial agency in regime consolidation. The Turkish case illustrates how segments of the judiciary may engage in purposive institutional reconfiguration by initiating rulings, redefining constitutional hierarchies, and deploying procedural mechanisms that reshape political competition. Judicial coups thus involve not only capture but institutional agency.

Judicial Coups as Institutional Work

Judicial coups can be understood as a form of institutional work which is purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining, or disrupting institutions. Judicial actors engage in institutional work when they redefine hierarchies of legal authority, decline to implement binding higher-court rulings, expand procedural tools beyond established norms, or reinterpret electoral regulations in ways that reshape competition.

These actions do not abolish institutions; they operate within formal legal frameworks while altering institutional function. The outcome is institutional conversion rather than institutional collapse. The analytical focus thus shifts from regime breakdown to administrative transformation within rule-bound systems.

Defining Judicial Coups

This article defines a judicial coup as a sustained process of purposive judicial interventions that reconfigure institutional rules and accountability mechanisms while preserving formal legal continuity. This definition emphasizes four elements: sustained process, purposive agency, rule reconfiguration and legal continuity. Unlike military coups, judicial coups do not suspend the constitution; they reinterpret constitutional meaning while maintaining procedural continuity. Unlike judicial capture, they involve active judicial participation in institutional transformation.

Judicial Coups and Public Administration

From a public administration perspective, judicial coups represent a transformation in the bureaucratic function of courts. As bureaucratic organizations, courts depend on professional autonomy, hierarchical compliance, and rule-bound decision-making. When judicial bureaucracies prioritize political alignment over legality, administrative capacity is redirected from public value production toward regime maintenance. This shift undermines procedural fairness, accountability, and impartial enforcement of core administrative responsibilities of government. Judicial coups thus constitute not only democratic erosion but administrative degradation: a reorientation of bureaucratic institutions away from neutral adjudication toward political instrumentalization.

Theoretical Contribution

Integrating judicial coups into the democratic backsliding literature advances three contributions. First, it identifies judicial agency as an independent mechanism of institutional transformation. Second, it bridges institutional theory and democratic erosion scholarship. Third, it extends public administration theory by demonstrating how rule-bound bureaucracies can be systematically repurposed for regime consolidation without overt institutional breakdown. While illustrated through the Turkish case, the framework is applicable to other hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes where formal legality coexists with institutional conversion.

Research Design and Methods

Research Strategy

This study employs a qualitative research design combining temporal mapping and process tracing to analyze how judicial interventions contributed to democratic backsliding in Turkey. Rather than treating judicial actions as isolated events, the study reconstructs sequences of institutional decisions to identify patterns of rule reconfiguration and cumulative institutional transformation. The research design is theory-guided: judicial coups are conceptualized as sustained processes of institutional work. Accordingly, the empirical analysis focuses on identifying mechanisms linking judicial actions to broader shifts in institutional functioning.

Case Selection

The cases examined in this article were selected through purposive sampling based on three criteria:  

Institutional significance: involvement of high judicial or para-judicial bodies.

Political impact: measurable consequences for electoral competition or opposition actors.

Institutional precedent: decisions that altered norms or hierarchies of authority.

The selected cases include annulment of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), conflicts between the Court of Cassation (Yargitay) and the Constitutional Court (AYM) in the Atalay case, expansion of authority of Criminal Magistrate Judgeships which will be abbreviated as CMJ furher, regulatory sanctions imposed by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) and judicial interventions targeting opposition political parties. These cases are not statistically representative but analytically illustrative. Together, they reveal recurring mechanisms of institutional conversion across distinct judicial arenas.

Process Tracing Approach

The study uses theory-testing process tracing to evaluate whether judicial interventions function as mechanisms of institutional transformation. Following David Collier (2011), process tracing enables the identification of causal mechanisms through systematic examination of diagnostic evidence. Specifically, this study applies elements of hoop tests (evidence that must be present for the argument to remain plausible) and smoking-gun tests evidence that strongly confirms the proposed mechanism. For example, the refusal of lower courts to implement binding Constitutional Court decisions serves as hoop-test evidence of hierarchical norm erosion. Explicit judicial reinterpretations of electoral law to invalidate opposition victories serve as smoking-gun evidence of purposive institutional reconfiguration. Rather than asserting causality based on temporal correlation, the analysis traces how specific judicial decisions altered institutional rules, expectations, and compliance structures. The empirical analysis employs process tracing to assess whether judicial interventions constitute purposive institutional reconfiguration rather than isolated compliance or routine legal interpretation. Specifically, the study uses hoop tests and smoking-gun tests to evaluate competing explanations. Hoop tests establish whether necessary conditions for judicial coups—such as repeated rule reinterpretation and hierarchical non-compliance—are present. Smoking-gun tests assess whether patterns of coordinated juicial action provide strong evidence of purposive institutional work unlikely to arise from alternative explanations. The analysis employs process tracing to evaluate whether observed judicial actions meet the criteria of a judicial coup. [1]

Temporal Mapping

Temporal mapping is used to situate judicial interventions within broader sequences of political and administrative change. This approach allows identification of escalation patterns, repetition of institutional strategies and shifts from isolated decisions to systemic practice. By sequencing events across time, the study demonstrates how incremental judicial actions cumulatively redefined institutional norms without formal constitutional rupture.

Data Sources and Triangulation

Given the politically sensitive nature of the subject, the study relies on systematic triangulation to enhance evidentiary reliability. Sources include official court decisions and legal texts, parliamentary records, publicly available judicial opinions, reports from international monitoring organizations, peer-reviewed academic studies and reputable investigative journalism. Triangulation was conducted by cross-verifying factual claims across at least two independent sources whenever possible. Divergent interpretations were noted and evaluated rather than excluded. This approach strengthens inferential validity and mitigates risks of partisan distortion, especially given the contested nature of judicial politics in Turkey.

Scope Conditions and Limitations

This study does not claim that all judicial actors uniformly support executive consolidation. Nor does it assume a monolithic judiciary. Rather, it identifies patterns of institutional work undertaken by specific judicial actors that cumulatively reshape institutional functioning. Additionally, while the Turkish case provides an analytically rich example, the findings are intended to generate theoretical insights rather than statistical generalizations. The framework of judicial coups is potentially transferable to other hybrid or competitive authoritarian contexts but requires contextual adaptation. Literature Review

Democratic Backsliding: Mechanisms and Debates

The contemporary literature on democratic backsliding emphasizes the incremental erosion of liberal-democratic institutions rather than abrupt regime collapse. Scholars argue that overt military coups have declined, while executive aggrandizement, legal manipulation, and strategic electoral interference have become dominant modes of democratic erosion. For example, Nancy Bermeo (2016) distinguishes contemporary backsliding from classic breakdown, emphasizing executive aggrandizement and strategic manipulation conducted within formal legal frameworks. Similarly, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (2021) identify polarization, legislative capture, and incremental abuses of power as key causal mechanisms. More recently, Grzegorz Ekiert and Isabela Mares Dasanaike (2024) introduce the concept of “dictatorial drift” describing the transition from hybrid regimes to more consolidated authoritarian rule.

While this literature richly documents executive strategies, it typically conceptualizes courts as either constraints on executive overreach, or institutions that become captured by illiberal incumbents. The active role of judicial actors as drivers of backsliding remains under-theorized.  

Gap 1: The backsliding literature lacks a mechanism-centered account of judicial agency in institutional transformation.

Judicial Politics and Constitutional Capture

A second stream of scholarship examines the political role of courts in regime change. Ran Hirschl (2004) introduces the concept of juristocracy, arguing that courts increasingly shape major political outcomes. Kim Lane Scheppele (2018) develops the concept of constitutional capture to describe how elected executives reshape judicial institutions to entrench dominance.

In the Turkish context, scholars such as Şebnem Gümüşçü and Berk Esen analyze Turkey’s evolution into competitive authoritarianism, highlighting executive dominance and electoral manipulation. Anna Grzymała-Busse and others similarly emphasize the politicization of oversight institutions in hybrid regimes.  These accounts provide important insights into judicial capture and executive interference. However, they largely frame courts as objects of political restructuring rather than as actors engaged in purposive institutional reconfiguration.

Gap 2: Existing judicial politics literature emphasizes capture but does not conceptualize courts as agents of institutional work that actively reshape rules and hierarchies.

Public Administration and Bureaucratic Instrumentalization

A third body of scholarship addresses how bureaucratic institutions are transformed under populist or authoritarian governance. Francis Fukuyama argues that democratic legitimacy depends on bureaucratic autonomy and rule-bound administration. B. Guy Peters and others note that politicization of the civil service undermines institutional performance and accountability.

Studies such as Bauer et al. (2021) demonstrate how populist governments instrumentalize bureaucratic agencies, replacing meritocratic norms with loyalty-based appointment systems. Yet within public administration research, judicial bureaucracies are rarely examined as sites of administrative degradation. Courts are typically treated as legal institutions rather than as bureaucratic organizations embedded in administrative systems. As B. Guy Peters argues, bureaucracies are inherently political institutions whose autonomy depends on institutionalized norms and merit-based protections.

Gap 3: Public administration scholarship underexplores how judicial bureaucracies can be systematically repurposed through institutional work.

Turkey in Comparative Perspective

Empirical research on Turkey (Yasamis, 2024) documents democratic erosion through electoral manipulation, media control, and executive aggrandizement. Comparative cases such as Hungary and Poland further illustrate judicial politicization. However, existing analyses often emphasize regime typology (hybrid regime, competitive authoritarianism), focus on executive strategy and document outcomes rather than mechanisms. Few studies systematically trace how judicial decisions cumulatively alter institutional norms and administrative hierarchies. Comparative experiences in Hungary and Poland demonstrate how elected governments have reshaped judicial institutions through legal reforms, court-packing strategies, and disciplinary mechanisms targeting judges (Bankuti et al., 2012; Sadurski, 2019; Scheppele, 2018).

Positioning the Contribution

This article intervenes at the intersection of these literatures. It extends democratic, backsliding theory by identifying judicial coups as a distinct mechanism, moves beyond capture frameworks by conceptualizing judicial agency as institutional work and bridges judicial politics and public administration by analyzing courts as bureaucratic organizations undergoing institutional conversion. Rather than merely documenting democratic decline, the article explains how legal-administrative institutions are reengineered through sustained judicial intervention.

Analysis

In recent years, Turkey has experienced significant economic deterioration and rising inflation. Economic uncertainty has heightened electoral volatility, increasing the political stakes of institutional control during competitive elections. Within this context, judicial interventions have assumed growing political significance.

Institutions: Definition and Analytical Scope

This article adopts a rule-centered definition of institutions. Following Douglass North (1990), institutions are understood as formal and informal rules that structure political and administrative interaction. These include constitutional provisions, statutory frameworks, appointment procedures, compliance hierarchies, and professional norms governing judicial conduct.

This definition distinguishes institutions from organizations. Courts, electoral councils, and regulatory authorities are organizations i.e., structured bodies that operate within institutional rule systems. Actors such as judges and prosecutors exercise agency within these organizational and institutional constraints.

Accordingly, this study does not treat “institutional erosion” as the disappearance of organizations. Rather, it conceptualizes erosion as the reconfiguration of rule systems that alter how organizations function. Institutional change in this sense involves shifts in appointment norms, compliance expectations, interpretive standards, and enforcement practices. By clarifying this distinction, the analysis focuses on how judicial coups transform institutional rules while leaving formal organizational structures intact.

Judicial Coups, Institutional Conversion, and Democratic Resilience

This article has argued that democratic backsliding in Turkey cannot be fully understood through frameworks of executive aggrandizement or judicial capture alone. Instead, it has introduced the concept of judicial coups to describe a sustained process through which judicial actors engage in purposive institutional work that reconfigures legal-administrative rules while preserving formal legality.

Building on Douglass North’s conception of institutions as rule systems structuring political interaction, the analysis has demonstrated how judicial interventions alter both formal procedures and informal compliance norms. In line with Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s framework, the Turkish case illustrates a transformation from inclusive to extractive legal-administrative institutions. Unlike abrupt regime breakdowns, judicial coups operate incrementally. Through electoral annulments, reinterpretation of constitutional hierarchies, expansion of pre-trial detention practices, and regulatory interventions targeting opposition actors, judicial bodies have not suspended legality but repurposed it. This process reflects institutional conversion rather than institutional collapse.

Theoretically, the article contributes to three literatures. First, it expands democratic backsliding scholarship by identifying judicial agency as a distinct mechanism of erosion. Second, it moves beyond judicial capture frameworks by conceptualizing courts as actors engaged in institutional work. Third, it bridges judicial politics and public administration by analyzing courts as bureaucratic organizations embedded within administrative systems.

From a public administration perspective, the Turkish case underscores a critical vulnerability: bureaucratic autonomy can be hollowed out without formal abolition of institutions. As Francis Fukuyama argues, state capacity depends on rule-bound and professional administration. When loyalty displaces legality as the organizing principle of judicial bureaucracies, institutional capacity becomes redirected toward regime preservation. This transformation undermines what John J. Kirlin describes as government’s obligation to create public value through fairness, accountability, and procedural integrity. Judicial coups therefore represent not merely democratic erosion but administrative degradation.

Democratic Resilience and Institutional Safeguards

The Turkish experience also offers broader lessons regarding democratic resilience. If judicial coups represent institutional conversion through legal continuity, resilience must focus on reinforcing the institutional mechanisms that prevent such conversion. Three vulnerabilities stand out: Appointment and promotion systems vulnerable to political influence, hierarchical compliance norms that can be selectively disregarded and regulatory discretion exercised without transparent accountability. Resilience requires strengthening institutional safeguards at these precise points of vulnerability. Judicial Capture: Anatomy and Mechanisms

Judicial interventions examined in this study unfold in three identifiable phases. The first phase involves structural judicial capture through institutional redesign. The second phase reflects consolidation through hierarchical defiance and reinterpretation of constitutional authority. The third phase involves expansion of procedural tools that reshape political competition. This sequencing suggests cumulative institutional conversion rather than isolated rulings.

One of the most consequential phases in the judiciary’s transformation in Turkey occurred between 2014 and 2017, when structural reforms and the creation of parallel judicial mechanisms fundamentally reshaped the judiciary’s role in governance. These reforms not only consolidated executive influence over judicial appointments and disciplinary measures but also introduced new instruments for controlling individual freedoms and civil liberties, effectively enabling a form of institutional capture.

The establishment of the CMJs in 2014 marked a significant departure from previous judicial structures. Ostensibly created to expedite minor criminal cases and enhance access to justice, these new courts functioned as gatekeepers for detention orders, seizures, and restrictions on freedom of expression. In practice, they became a parallel mechanism through which executive authorities could implement measures without recourse to traditional checks and balances.

The CMJs were strategically distributed across the country, often in politically sensitive districts, and their decisions were largely insulated from immediate review by higher courts. This insulation created a structural advantage for the executive, as challenges to detention or censorship orders faced procedural delays and jurisdictional hurdles. Moreover, the magistrates were staffed with judges whose appointments and promotions were increasingly subject to executive influence, further consolidating control over judicial behavior.

The functional impact of these courts was profound. Empirical evidence indicates a marked increase in pretrial detentions and procedural interventions in politically charged cases following their establishment. For instance, opposition journalists, academicians, civil society activists, and members of rival political parties became frequent subjects of magistrates’ rulings. By effectively bypassing traditional judicial safeguards, these courts played a crucial role in restricting political freedoms while maintaining a veneer of legality, exemplifying how institutional design can facilitate judicial capture.

The 2017 constitutional amendments that restructured the Commission of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) represented another pivotal moment in the judiciary’s transformation. Prior to these reforms, the HSK operated with a degree of independence, overseeing appointments, promotions, and disciplinary proceedings across the judiciary. The amendments expanded the executive’s influence by increasing the proportion of HSK members appointed directly by the president and reducing the role of the judiciary in self-governance.

This structural reconfiguration had several immediate consequences. First, it created a personnel pipeline aligned with executive priorities, ensuring that judicial appointments and promotions were increasingly determined by political loyalty rather than merit. Second, the HSK acquired enhanced authority to impose disciplinary measures, including suspensions and transfers, which could be used to deter dissent or noncompliance with executive directives. Third, the restructuring affected the balance of power among courts, as the HSK’s centralized control over judicial personnel and case assignments allowed for strategic distribution of politically sensitive cases.

The combination of the CMJ and the HSK reforms illustrates the cumulative nature of institutional capture. While each reform had discrete effects, their interaction produced a judiciary that was structurally predisposed to support executive objectives, constrain opposition actors, and circumvent traditional safeguards. Importantly, these changes did not occur through overt coercion but through legal and procedural mechanisms that preserved the appearance of judicial independence, exemplifying the concept of a judicial coup as a process rather than a single event.

Four interrelated mechanisms emerge from this period of institutional transformation. Firstly, by consolidating influence over judicial appointments, the executive ensured the presence of loyalists in key positions, particularly in politically sensitive jurisdictions. Secondly, the creation of parallel courts with limited oversight minimized the risk that executive-favorable decisions would be overturned. Thirdly, enhanced powers of the HSK allowed for the suppression of dissent within the judiciary, creating a culture of compliance and self-censorship. Finally, through control over case distribution, politically sensitive matters could be directed to favorable judges, shaping outcomes without formal legal violations.

These mechanisms collectively illustrate how structural reforms can transform the judiciary from a neutral arbiter into an instrument of political control. By embedding loyalty and procedural advantage within institutional design, the judiciary became a central actor in the broader process of democratic backsliding.

Quantitative and qualitative data from this period support the analytical claims. World Justice Project (WJP) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) indicators demonstrate a decline in judicial independence and rule of law metrics post-2014, particularly in areas concerning the impartiality of lower courts and the oversight of politically sensitive cases. Case studies of individual magistrates’ rulings reveal patterns such as prolonged pretrial detention intended to penalize detainees even in the absence of eventual convictions, censorship, the assignment of detainees to prisons far from their residences and families, and politically motivated prosecutions. These practices confirm that institutional changes have had measurable impacts on civil liberties and political participation.

In sum, the 2014–2017 reforms provide a clear illustration of how judicial structures can be repurposed to serve executive objectives, creating conditions for both legal compliance and political manipulation. This period establishes the foundation for understanding subsequent interventions, including electoral manipulations, constitutional conflicts, and international law noncompliance, which will be examined in later sections of the article.

Judicial Intervention and Democratic Backsliding: The Bayrampasa Case

On September 17, 2025, Ozgur Ozel, leader of the main opposition party CHP, reported at a political rally that the Bayrampasa Mayor, affiliated with CHP, was detained and provisionally removed from office. According to Ozel, local administrators affiliated with Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the parties in power, proposed that the mayor transfer his office to the AKP, after which the judicial case would reportedly be discontinued. The mayor refused. The district manager of MHP and his son were also detained and expelled from MHP membership. They were reportedly asked to declare that they had given 1 million Turkish liras to the mayor as a bribe, a claim they denied. They remained in detention waiting for trial. Reports indicate that similar procedures have been applied in more than 17 CHP municipalities, suggesting a pattern of judicial interventions affecting elected officials. (Sözcü, September 17, 2025)

The case demonstrates several critical challenges to democratic governance. Judicial intervention targeted an elected mayor, as evidenced by the detention and provisional removal of the officeholder, which undermines the independence of elected officials. Additionally, political pressure on the mayor, including proposals to transfer the office in exchange for halting the legal case, weakened the practical effect of electoral mandates. Coercion of witnesses further reflects manipulation of judicial processes, as the district manager and his son were pressured to provide false testimony. The selective application of law, wherein the case seemed contingent upon political compliance, signals a broader pattern of democratic backsliding. Finally, the impact on voters was profound, as the forced transfer of office from the CHP to the AKP undermined citizens’ confidence in electoral integrity and political representation.

In conclusion, the Bayrampasa case provides a concrete example of judicial instrumentalization. Judicial processes were reportedly used to enforce political objectives, affecting elected officials’ ability to carry out their mandates and challenging the integrity of local governance. The application of similar measures across multiple municipalities highlights the potential systemic impact of such interventions. The transfer of local offices under judicial and political pressure not only affected elected officials but also altered the representation of voters, potentially reducing public confidence in electoral outcomes and political institutions. From an administrative perspective, this episode reflects discretionary expansion within a loyalty-based appointment structure.

Electoral Intervention: Judicial Encroachment on Electoral Sovereignty

Electoral integrity is widely recognized as a cornerstone of democratic governance. Free, fair, and credible elections ensure that political power reflects the will of the people, serving as a primary mechanism of accountability. In Turkey, the judiciary has increasingly intervened in the electoral process, raising critical questions about its independence and role in sustaining democratic norms. Judicial interventions in elections are particularly consequential because they not only affect immediate political outcomes but also shape broader perceptions of legitimacy and rule of law.

The most salient example of judicial intervention in Turkish electoral politics is the annulment of the March 2019 Istanbul mayoral election by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK). Istanbul, as Turkey’s largest city and economic hub, carries immense symbolic and strategic significance. The initial election resulted in a narrow victory for Ekrem Imamoglu, representing the opposition CHP, over the ruling AKP candidate. Shortly after the results were announced, the YSK, citing alleged irregularities related to unstamped ballots and procedural complaints, ordered a repeat election.

This decision illustrates several dimensions of judicial encroachment on electoral sovereignty. First, the YSK acted as an arbiter with substantial discretionary authority, interpreting electoral regulations in a manner that effectively altered the outcome of the vote. Second, the timing and procedural handling of the annulment amplified political uncertainty, undermining citizens’ confidence in the electoral process. Third, while ostensibly motivated by legal concerns, the decision reflected broader patterns of executive influence over judicial institutions, highlighting the permeability of electoral oversight mechanisms to political pressures.

Analysis of the Istanbul case, along with subsequent electoral disputes, reveals multiple mechanisms through which the judiciary can intervene in elections. Firstly, courts or electoral bodies can leverage ambiguities in electoral law to justify overturning results or imposing restrictions on candidates. The YSK’s interpretation of ballot-stamping requirements exemplifies this tactic. Secondly, judicial or quasi-judicial institutions can selectively review complaints and procedural disputes, influencing which cases receive attention and how quickly decisions are made. In 2019, the expedited review of opposition complaints contrasted with delayed or ignored ruling party grievances, signaling a strategic use of procedural discretion. Thirdly, decisions are often made behind closed doors, with limited transparency or public reasoning, reducing accountability and allowing for politically motivated interpretations. The YSK’s deliberations regarding Istanbul were largely opaque, limiting external scrutiny and even was against the law since the supplementary members of the Council who are not entitled were also allowed to vote. Finally, by framing electoral interventions as neutral legal actions, judicial institutions can provide de facto legitimacy to executive objectives, masking political influence under the guise of legality. In Istanbul, the annulment effectively aligned with AKP interests, despite procedural justifications.

From a comparative perspective, Turkey’s experience resonates with broader patterns observed in other hybrid regimes where courts or electoral commissions have intervened to benefit incumbents. In Hungary and Poland, for example, courts have interpreted electoral or administrative rules to favor ruling parties, raising concerns about the politicization of electoral oversight. Similarly, in Latin America, courts have occasionally annulled opposition victories under procedural pretexts, illustrating the global relevance of judicial electoral intervention as a mechanism of backsliding. (Gamboa and friends, 2024)

Normatively, judicial interventions in elections undermine the principle of popular sovereignty, erode public trust in democratic institutions, and create conditions for sustained political polarization. The Istanbul case is particularly instructive because it demonstrates that even in contexts with established electoral institutions, judicial authority can become a tool for manipulating outcomes, shifting the locus of power from voters to courts.

Empirical evidence from the 2019 Istanbul case underscores the interplay between institutional design and political agency. V-Dem indicators show a decline in electoral integrity and the impartiality of electoral management bodies following the annulment. Media reports and legal commentaries highlight that executive influence over YSK appointments facilitated the intervention, while longitudinal analyses suggest that opposition candidates faced systemic disadvantages in accessing timely judicial remedies. These data collectively illustrate that judicial interventions are neither isolated nor accidental; they are embedded within broader patterns of institutional capture and political engineering.

Electoral interventions by judicial bodies constitute a distinct pathway of democratic backsliding. Unlike overt military or executive takeovers, judicial interventions operate incrementally, leveraging legality to reshape political competition. In Turkey, these interventions complement other mechanisms -such as institutional capture, constitutional manipulation, and international law non-compliance-producing a cumulative effect that gradually erodes democratic norms. By situating electoral interventions within the broader context of judicial coups, this analysis highlights the judiciary’s active role in facilitating autocratization. Again, from an administrative perspective, this episode also reflects discretionary expansion within a loyalty-based appointment structure.

The Annulment of the 2019 Istanbul Election as Administrative Rule Reinterpretation

The annulment of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election by the YSK illustrates how para-judicial bureaucracies can engage in institutional conversion through administrative reinterpretation. The YSK, although constitutionally autonomous, functions as a permanent administrative body responsible for organizing elections, certifying results, and ensuring procedural compliance. Its authority derives not only from electoral law but from professional norms of neutrality and procedural consistency.

In the annulment decision, the Council did not suspend electoral law; rather, it reinterpreted procedural irregularities in a manner that selectively invalidated the metropolitan mayoral result while leaving district-level results intact. This asymmetrical application of procedural standards represented a departure from established administrative consistency norms. Such reinterpretation did not abolish electoral procedures but recalibrated them, thereby altering expectations of bureaucratic neutrality. From a public administration perspective, this episode demonstrates three mechanisms of institutional degradation:

Discretion Expansion: Administrative discretion was exercised without clear, previously established thresholds for annulment.

Norm Reinterpretation: Established consistency principles were selectively applied.

Precedent Transformation: The decision created an administrative precedent that expanded the Council’s authority to intervene in electoral outcomes.

Rather than a dramatic rupture, the case reflects incremental rule conversion within an administrative body. The YSK operated within its formal mandate, yet its decision altered the practical meaning of electoral oversight. This illustrates how judicial coups may unfold through bureaucratic reinterpretation rather than overt institutional suspension.

Erosion of Constitutional Supremacy: The Atalay Crisis and Judicial Hierarchies

Constitutional supremacy is a foundational principle of liberal democracy, ensuring that all branches of government operate within the limits of a codified legal framework. It guarantees that laws and executive actions are subject to judicial review and that constitutional courts serve as the ultimate arbiters of legality. In Turkey, the erosion of constitutional supremacy has emerged as a central feature of democratic backsliding, particularly through conflicts between the AYM and other judicial bodies.

The Atalay case represents a watershed moment in Turkey’s recent constitutional trajectory. In late 2023, disputes arose between the Court of Cassation (Yargitay) and the AYM over the legal status and procedural rights of a high-profile defendant, known pseudonymously as Atalay. The Constitutional Court issued a series of rulings affirming fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial and limitations on pretrial detention. However, the Yargitay systematically refused to implement these rulings, asserting procedural and jurisdictional prerogatives that effectively challenged the authority of the AYM.

This confrontation exemplifies a broader pattern of constitutional erosion. By refusing to comply with the AYM’s decisions, the Yargitay not only undermined the principle of judicial hierarchy but also signaled that legal authority is contingent on political alignment rather than codified norms. The executive branch tacitly supported this stance, leveraging institutional ambiguities to maintain control over high-stakes judicial outcomes.

Several mechanisms underpin this erosion of constitutional supremacy. Firstly, lower or parallel judicial bodies may selectively implement or ignore constitutional court rulings, thereby weakening the enforceability of constitutional protections. The Yargitay’s refusal to recognize AYM directives in the Atalay case exemplifies this tactic. Secondly, courts can assert ambiguous jurisdictional claims to challenge or circumvent the authority of constitutional adjudicators, creating legal uncertainty and institutional conflict. Thirdly, when the executive tacitly or explicitly endorses judicial defiance, it amplifies the structural erosion of constitutional authority, signaling to lower courts that compliance is optional. Finally, repeated violations of constitutional rulings normalize selective enforcement, fostering a judicial culture in which adherence to constitutional supremacy is contingent rather than mandatory.

The Atalay crisis illustrates the dual threat posed by constitutional erosion. On one hand, it compromises the protection of individual rights, as constitutional safeguards are rendered ineffective. On the other, it undermines democratic accountability by enabling judicial bodies to operate independently of legal constraints, thereby facilitating outcomes that favor particular political actors. The crisis highlights how judicial institutions, when aligned with executive interests or internalized loyalty hierarchies, can contribute directly to the consolidation of authoritarian power.

Comparatively, Turkey’s experience mirrors developments in other countries experiencing judicially mediated backsliding. In Hungary, for instance, the Constitutional Court’s independence has been systematically curtailed, with executive-aligned courts interpreting or ignoring rulings to favor government policy. Similarly, in Poland, judicial reforms have allowed politically loyal tribunals to challenge constitutional court authority, producing conflicts that weaken the enforcement of constitutional norms. (Pech and Scheppele, 2017) These cases underscore that constitutional erosion is not merely a Turkish phenomenon but part of a broader trend in hybrid and semi-authoritarian regimes where courts themselves become instruments of democratic decay.

Empirical indicators corroborate the erosion of constitutional supremacy in Turkey. Between 2023 and 2024, V-Dem measures indicate a decline in judicial independence and an increase in legal uncertainty regarding constitutional enforcement. Analyses of court decisions indicate patterns of selective compliance with rulings of the Constitutional Court (AYM), while assessments by the Venice Commission [2] and European Union institutions have identified structural concerns regarding the effective enforceability of constitutional protections. Together, these data confirm that constitutional erosion is both systematic and institutionally embedded.

The Atalay crisis exemplifies how judicial bodies can erode constitutional supremacy, a fundamental pillar of democracy. By declining to implement superior court rulings (including those of the AYM and the European Court of Human Rights [3]) reinterpreting jurisdictional boundaries, and operating within supportive executive contexts, judicial institutions may reshape the boundaries of legal authority and alter accountability relationships. This erosion complements other mechanisms of democratic backsliding (such as institutional capture and electoral intervention) demonstrating that the judiciary can act as both a facilitator and driver of autocratization. Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the Turkish case and the broader phenomenon of judicially mediated democratic decline.

The current political and judicial environment demonstrates multiple mechanisms through which democratic institutions and practices have been weakened. Structural judicial capture, exemplified by reforms in the HSK and the operations of magistrates has led to institutional and structural erosion, ultimately consolidating executive power. Electoral interventions, such as the annulment of the 2019 Istanbul election and the disqualification of candidates, reflect manipulation of electoral and political processes aimed at suppressing political pluralism. Similarly, the annulment of diplomas of potential opposition candidates and judicial prohibitions preventing opposition figures, including CHP and DEM leaders, from exercising political rights further exemplify efforts to undermine electoral competition.

Constitutional erosion has occurred through conflicts involving the AYM and the Yargitay in 2023-2024, accompanied by noncompliance with rulings, thereby delegitimizing independent legal norms. Resistance to international oversight in high-profile cases, such as those of Demirtas and Kavala, illustrates control over the societal and public sphere, shaping public opinion and constraining civil society. Political party regulation, including interference in the CHP, threats to the DEM and the closure of the Virtue Party, represents another avenue for electoral and political manipulation. Prosecutorial and lawyer malpractices, particularly during investigations involving the IMM, indicate procedural and operational coercion, institutionalizing compliance within the legal system. Additionally, media and civil society suppression, enforced by RTUK and the courts, further consolidates control over public opinion and societal discourse. Allegations of bribery and financial influence targeting judges highlight procedural coercion and institutional erosion, reinforcing mechanisms that secure compliance with political objectives. Collectively, these judicial and para-judicial strategies serve to weaken democratic institutions, constrain political pluralism, and centralize political authority.

The analysis of judicial and para-judicial mechanisms illustrates how democratic backsliding in Turkey is systematically facilitated by institutions formally legal but operationally aligned with executive objectives. By examining structural and operational dimensions of judicial intervention, as well as quasi-judicial oversight of media, it becomes evident that democratic erosion is deeply embedded in institutional design and practice.

Structural capture remains central. Reforms to the HSK and the establishment of CMJs institutionalized judicial compliance with executive priorities. Judges’ appointments, career incentives, and geographical placements were aligned with loyalty requirements, while the denial of the natural judge principle and allegations of bribery reinforced obedience, ensuring pre-ordered judicial outcomes.

These CMJs were designed explicitly to facilitate executive control and suppress dissent. By enabling rapid case processing and circumventing ordinary oversight, they issued arrest warrants, extended pre-trial detentions, and authorized coercive measures against opposition figures, journalists, and civil society actors.

Judicial interventions in elections exemplify operational manipulation of democratic mechanisms. The annulment of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election and disqualification and banning of opposition candidates from political life highlight how courts can undermine electoral integrity, reduce political competition, and erode public trust. Conflicts between the AYM and the Yargitay illustrate how the judiciary itself can erode constitutional authority. Selective enforcement -or disregard- of constitutional rulings fragments institutional authority, consolidating executive power.

Noncompliance with European Court of Human Rights rulings (Demirtaş, Kavala) reflects the judiciary’s capacity to bypass international accountability, signaling impunity and reinforcing executive control.

Courts have actively intervened in opposition party structures. The closure of the Virtue Party, ongoing threats to the DEM and interference in CHP internal operations demonstrate judicial encroachment into political governance. Removal of elected officials and abolition of assemblies undermined opposition organizational capacity.

Operational abuses by prosecutors and lawyers amplify judicially mediated backsliding. In the IMM investigations, prosecutors pre-ordered judicial decisions, fabricated evidence, detained opposition figures unlawfully, and intimidated defendants and families. Complicit lawyers coerced confessions and demanded excessive payments.

In a recent development, the 45th Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance’s decision on September 24, 2025, to suspend the CHP provincial congress in Istanbul was met with opposition from the Supreme Election Board (YSK), illustrating tensions in Turkey’s judiciary that can be interpreted within the broader context of judicial coups.

Media control is enforced through judicial and para-judicial mechanisms. RTUK can impose fines, suspend licenses, and issue broadcast bans. Executive-aligned appointments and selective enforcement foster self-censorship, constrain public debate, and amplify judicial and prosecutorial repression. Alleged bribery further undermines judicial independence, embedding political compliance into the judiciary and weakening public trust in legal institutions.

Analytical Categorization of Impacts on Democratic Backsliding

While the previous section described mechanisms and cases, this section examines how these mechanisms translate into tangible democratic impacts, analytically categorized into four dimensions. Firstly, judicial and para-judicial mechanisms have produced significant impacts across multiple dimensions of democratic governance. In terms of institutional and structural erosion, mechanisms such as structural judicial capture, CMJ and HSK reforms have weakened institutional independence and formal safeguards. These practices lead to pre-ordered judicial outcomes, bypass checks and balances, and undermine the separation of powers. Secondly, electoral and political manipulation represents another critical dimension, encompassing interventions such as electoral annulments, disqualification of opposition candidates, judicial prohibitions on exercising political rights, and direct interference in party governance. These actions reduce political pluralism, weaken opposition forces, erode public trust in elections, and systematically exclude political rivals from office. Thirdly, procedural and operational coercion occurs through daily abuses in judicial and prosecutorial processes, including prosecutorial malpractices, lawyer coercion, and bribery. Such practices erode the rule of law, compromise the presumption of innocence, and normalize politically motivated legal persecution. Finally, control over the societal and public sphere extends legal coercion into media, civil society, and public discourse. Mechanisms such as RTUK sanctions, targeting of media outlets and non-governmental organizations and resistance to international oversight limit public accountability, enforce executive narratives, foster self-censorship, and reduce pluralism. Collectively, these mechanisms demonstrate a comprehensive strategy that consolidates power while systematically undermining democratic norms.

The analysis of Turkey’s judiciary reveals a multi-dimensional process through which courts have both enabled and driven democratic erosion. The four mechanisms (institutional capture, electoral intervention, erosion of constitutional supremacy, and resistance to international oversight) do not operate in isolation. Rather, they interact in ways that reinforce executive dominance, weaken institutional checks, and reshape the boundaries of legal authority.

The AYM-Yargitay Controversy as a Case Study

The 2023-2024 Atalay crisis epitomizes the systemic consequences of judicial conflict. By openly refusing to implement the Constitutional Court’s rulings, the Yargitay challenged the apex of domestic legal authority, creating a direct confrontation with the AYM. This controversy illustrates several critical dynamics. Conflict between high courts undermines the coherence of the legal system, producing legal uncertainty and weakening citizen trust in the judiciary. The executive tacitly benefits from such disputes, as it can exploit ambiguity to pursue policy objectives without facing consistent judicial constraints. Repeated confrontations normalize selective enforcement, signaling that even constitutional rulings can be contested internally. Judicial conflicts amplify the effects of institutional capture and electoral interventions, as courts no longer function as neutral adjudicators but as actors competing for political influence.

The AYM-Yargitay conflict highlights the interconnected nature of the four mechanisms identified. Institutional capture enabled compliant judges to dominate key courts, while electoral interventions demonstrated the judiciary’s capacity to influence political outcomes. Erosion of constitutional supremacy was made visible through direct defiance of the AYM, and resistance to international oversight reinforced a broader pattern of noncompliance with supranational mandates. Together, these dynamics form a comprehensive framework of judicially mediated democratic backsliding.

Similar judicial conflicts have been observed in other hybrid regimes. In Poland, for example, executive-backed tribunals have challenged the Constitutional Tribunal, producing institutional paralysis and legal uncertainty. In Hungary, parallel judicial structures have enabled the government to bypass constitutional constraints. Turkey’s experience is particularly instructive because it demonstrates how high courts themselves -not just lower courts- can become arenas of political contestation, actively reshaping the limits of legal authority.

The AYM-Yargitay controversy underscores the fragility of constitutional democracy when judicial institutions are politicized. It challenges the assumption that courts inherently function as guardians of rights and legality, highlighting that judicial agency can be co-opted to serve partisan objectives. This phenomenon has profound implications for democratic theory, illustrating that the judiciary can be both a bulwark and a driver of autocratization, depending on the interplay between institutional design, political incentives, and executive influence.

Comparative Examples of Judicial Capture

Judicial capture refers to the process by which political actors influence the judiciary to serve partisan objectives, thereby undermining judicial independence and the rule of law. This mechanism is a key indicator of democratic backsliding, as it allows the executive or ruling party to limit checks on its authority and selectively target political opponents.

Since 2010, the Hungarian government has systematically restructured the judiciary, including lowering the retirement age of judges (forcing experienced judges into retirement) and appointing loyalists to constitutional and ordinary courts. The Constitutional Court’s powers were reduced, and political influence over judicial appointments increased. Consequently, the courts became less independent, allowing the executive to advance policy agendas without meaningful judicial oversight. (Bozoki and Benedek, 2024)

Under Netanyahu, attempts were made to limit the powers of the Supreme Court, including reducing judicial review over executive actions and increasing political control over judicial appointments. These reforms prompted mass protests and debates over the erosion of the rule of law. Consequently, the judicial capture threatened the system of checks and balances, weakening the judiciary’s role as a counterweight to executive power. (Cohen and Shany, 2025)

Comparative examples from several countries illustrate how judicial capture can weaken democratic institutions. In Hungary, measures such as lowering judges’ retirement age, politicizing judicial appointments, and reducing the powers of the Constitutional Court enabled the executive to gain greater control, thereby weakening judicial independence and limiting institutional checks on power. Poland experienced similar trends, with political control over judicial appointments and disciplinary measures against judges aligning courts with government priorities and undermining the rule of law. In Israel, proposed limitations on Supreme Court oversight and increased political influence over judicial appointments reduced the judiciary’s ability to check the executive, raising concerns about democratic erosion.

Cross-national evidence demonstrates that judicial capture is a recurring mechanism of democratic backsliding. In Hungary and Poland, governments reshaped judicial institutions through politicized appointments and reforms that reduced court independence, weakening checks on executive authority. Similarly, proposed judicial reforms in Israel threatened the Supreme Court’s ability to oversee executive actions. In Latin America, Venezuela and Ecuador saw the judiciary aligned with executive priorities, limiting opposition influence and legislative oversight.

These cases, from Hungary, Israel, and Poland and other countries, highlight how judicial capture, whether through systemic reforms or targeted interventions, can erode democratic norms. Such interventions undermine the independence of elected officials, weaken the enforcement of electoral mandates, and reduce public trust in political institutions.

Judicial Mechanisms and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey

The cumulative effect of these mechanisms (structural capture, electoral and party interventions, operational malpractices, media and civil society suppression, and para-judicial enforcement) demonstrates that democratic backsliding in Turkey is systematically facilitated by judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. The magistrates exemplify the structural engineering of judicial compliance, while RTUK demonstrates how quasi-judicial bodies extend coercion into media and public discourse. Together, these institutions show that courts and allied bodies are active agents of institutional conversion within a formally constitutional framework embedding obedience, suppressing opposition, and normalizing politically motivated legal repression across multiple domains.

The summary of findings mentioned above provides a comprehensive framework of judicially mediated democratic backsliding in Turkey, linking specific mechanisms to illustrative cases and their impact on democratic institutions. These measures enabled the executive to exert structural control over judges through career incentives, geographical appointments, and status manipulation, ensuring that judicial decisions aligned with political directives.

Electoral interventions further illustrate the judiciary’s role in shaping political outcomes. The 2019 Istanbul mayoral election annulment and various candidate disqualifications highlight how courts directly influenced electoral competition, undermining public trust in democratic processes. Similarly, the AYM-Yargitay conflict underscores the erosion of constitutional supremacy, demonstrating how institutional fragmentation within the judiciary can amplify executive advantage and weaken the rule of law.

Resistance to international oversight is evident in the noncompliance with European Court of Human Rights rulings in the cases of Demirtas and Kavala. By disregarding supranational legal obligations, domestic courts signal impunity for rights violations and limit the effectiveness of international accountability mechanisms. Judicial intervention also extends to political party regulation, with the closure of the Virtue Party in 2001 and threats against the HDP in the 2020s, as well as direct interference in the main opposition party CHP. In Istanbul and Ankara, courts removed elected officials and abolished Municipal General Assembly meetings, stripping party leadership of authority and undermining internal democratic governance.

At the operational level, malpractices by public prosecutors and lawyers play a crucial role. In high-profile IMM investigations, prosecutors pre-ordered judicial decisions, fabricated evidence, and unlawfully detained opposition figures, while some lawyers coerced false confessions and demanded large payments, further eroding the presumption of innocence. These practices are complemented by media and civil society suppression and alleged judicial bribery, creating a comprehensive network of coercion and political compliance that reinforces the executive’s dominance.

In a recent development, Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and the official candidate of the CHP for the next presidential election, who is currently imprisoned, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and disqualified from political activity by a court ruling for his use of a derogative term. This decision was subsequently upheld by the higher appellate court, thereby ending his prospects of being nominated for the next presidential elections.

Collectively, these mechanisms illustrate that democratic backsliding in Turkey is not merely a result of political maneuvering but is systematically facilitated by judicial institutions. By combining structural reforms, operational malpractices, and selective interventions, the judiciary has become an active agent in consolidating executive power, weakening opposition, and undermining both domestic and international democratic norms.

Consequences of Judicial and Para-Judicial Interventions

The cumulative impact of judicial and para-judicial mechanisms in Turkey demonstrates a systematic process of democratic backsliding that directly contributes to functional transformation of judicial authority. At the institutional level, structural reforms such as the restructuring of the HSK and the establishment of the CMJs have severely weakened judicial independence. Courts increasingly deliver pre-ordered outcomes, bypass established checks and balances, and undermine the separation of powers, allowing the executive to consolidate authority under the guise of legality.

These developments have been reinforced by direct interference in electoral and party politics. The annulment of elections, disqualification of opposition candidates, revocation of diplomas, and judicial prohibitions on exercising political rights collectively eliminate potential rivals, reduce pluralism, weaken opposition structures, and erode public trust in democratic processes. By reshaping political competition through legal mechanisms, the judiciary has effectively become a tool for suppressing pluralism and entrenching executive dominance.

Beyond electoral interventions, procedural practices within prosecutorial and investigative processes have raised concerns about the consistency of due process guarantees. The use of contested testimony, broad charging strategies, and reported irregularities in politically salient cases have contributed to perceptions of selective enforcement and weakened accountability norms. Opposition figures and municipal officials alike face long periods of pre-trial detention and legal harassment, undermining the presumption of innocence and eroding confidence in fair judicial procedure.

Finally, the reach of judicial and para-judicial control extends into the broader public sphere. Media outlets and civil society organizations have been targeted through sanctions imposed by bodies such as RTUK, while international oversight has been systematically resisted. These measures limit accountability, enforce executive-aligned narratives, and foster a climate of self-censorship that further restricts democratic discourse. Taken together, these interventions reveal a judiciary that no longer safeguards constitutional order but instead functions as a central mechanism of democratic erosion. The diverse judicial and para-judicial interventions examined in this article are not isolated or accidental; rather, they form part of a coherent strategy to reshape Turkey’s political and legal order. These mechanisms converge on several overarching objectives. Foremost are the consolidation and perpetuation of executive power by capturing judicial institutions, predetermining outcomes, and bypassing constitutional limits, the executive has secured an environment in which its authority is effectively unchallengeable. A second aim is the suppression of political pluralism. Through judicial interference in elections, party governance, and the targeting of opposition officials, rival actors have been structurally disadvantaged, reducing the competitiveness of the political arena. A third objective is the institutionalization of compliance, achieved through reforms, career incentives, and coercive practices that normalize obedience among judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and bureaucrats. At the societal level, judicial and para-judicial mechanisms have shaped public discourse by controlling media narratives, intimidating civil society, and disregarding international oversight, thereby reinforcing a single dominant political narrative. Finally, these interventions have delegitimized independent legal norms, eroding the judiciary’s role as a neutral arbiter and enabling selective enforcement under the guise of legality.

Together, these aims have facilitated a coordinated transformation of Turkey’s political system. Executive authority has been decisively consolidated, while opposition actors have been structurally excluded from meaningful competition. In politically sensitive cases, judicial and prosecutorial actions have exhibited patterns consistent with executive priorities, contributing to concerns about weakened judicial autonomy and the stability of rule-based governance. Media and civil society, constrained by legal and para-legal controls, operate within a framework that enforces executive dominance and curtails pluralism. At the institutional level, reforms to the HSK, the politicization of higher courts have entrenched loyalty-based appointments and weakened the separation of powers. At the functional level, the use of detention as punishment, disregard for constitutional and European Court of Human Rights rulings, and trials based on fabricated evidence have eliminated the judiciary’s balancing role. At the local level, the dismissal of mayors, manipulation of municipal councils, and criminalization of senior officials have restricted local democracy, eroded citizens’ trust, and limited access to services.

These developments suggest a substantial transformation in the functional role of the judiciary, shifting it from a check within the constitutional order toward a more politically aligned institutional actor. International indexes such as Freedom House, V-Dem, and Amnesty International confirm this trajectory, documenting steep declines in judicial independence, protection of rights, and rule-of-law compliance. Turkey provides an illustrative case of a judicial coup in which the instrumentalization of legal institutions contributes to institutional transformation while preserving formal legality.

Addressing this erosion requires comprehensive, multi-dimensional reform. Judicial independence must be restored through institutional safeguards that prevent executive capture of appointments and preserve the principle of the natural judge. Political pluralism must be protected to ensure that opposition parties can function without judicial interference. Accountability mechanisms should be established for prosecutors and lawyers to prevent coercion, fabrication, and pre-ordered rulings. Media freedom and civil society capacity must be reinforced by limiting politically motivated sanctions and fostering independent oversight. Compliance with constitutional and international human rights norms must be ensured to prevent selective enforcement of law. Finally, a broader rule-of-law culture should be cultivated through education and civic awareness, fostering resilience against authoritarian encroachment.

The Turkish case demonstrates how legal institutions can be strategically employed to facilitate autocratization. Unless comprehensive reforms are enacted, the current trajectory risks entrenching executive dominance and consolidating authoritarian rule in the long term. By exposing the judiciary’s role in regime transformation, this article underscores the need to recognize judicial capture not merely as an institutional pathology but as a central mechanism of democratic backsliding.

Although judicial politics is often examined within comparative political science, courts are also complex bureaucratic organizations embedded within administrative systems. Their transformation therefore raises core concerns of public administration: institutional autonomy, merit-based staffing, procedural compliance, and accountability mechanisms. Judicial bureaucracies underwent institutional conversion that degraded administrative autonomy, professional norms, and rule-bound governance in Turkey.

Turkey provides an illustrative case of judicial coup dynamics, demonstrating how judicial institutions may be repurposed through sustained institutional work while preserving formal constitutional continuity. Rather than suspending legality, judicial coups operate through reinterpretation, selective compliance, and administrative reorientation within existing rule frameworks. This transformation shifts the judiciary’s role from neutral arbiter to politically consequential bureaucratic actor. While rooted in the Turkish case, the framework developed here offers broader analytical leverage for understanding how rule-bound institutions can be incrementally converted without overt institutional breakdown.

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[1] In process tracing methodology, a “hoop test” refers to a necessary condition that a hypothesis must satisfy in order to remain viable, failure eliminates the hypothesis, but passing the test does not by itself confirm it. A “smoking gun test,” by contrast, provides strong and discriminating evidence in favor of a particular causal explanation, significantly weakening alternative accounts (Collier, 2011; Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

[2] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (2017). Opinion on the duties, competences and functioning of criminal peace judgeships in Turkey (CDL-AD (2017)004). Council of Europe.

 

[3] Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1954. Pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, duly ratified international agreements concerning fundamental rights and freedoms prevail over conflicting domestic legislation.